Individual Case (CAS) - Discussion: 2018, Publication: 107th ILC session (2018)



A Government representative, Minister of Labour, Social Security and Social Solidarity, stated that the late submission of the country’s report had been due to human resources constraints and administrative changes at the Ministry of Labour pursuant to ILO recommendations, under the ongoing technical assistance project on labour administration. Nevertheless, the Government had managed to submit all reports requested under article 22 of the ILO Constitution for 2017, along with the report requested under article 19 and all questionnaires on the preparation of the items of the present session of the Conference, as well as the country’s response to the Committee of Experts’ comments regarding the application of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), due in 2018. She emphasized that the current Government had promoted collective bargaining and fostered social dialogue. The restoration of two key principles of collective bargaining (the extension principle and the principle of favourability) had been set as a top priority by the Ministry of Labour, since those had been suspended by the previous government in 2011. Indeed, the Government had set collective labour rights at the epicentre of its growth strategy, in order for workers to pursue, through negotiations, a fair share of the wealth produced. The Government had been involved in long and tough negotiations with its creditors, namely the European Institutions and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), who strongly believed that a coordinated system of collective bargaining would hinder the country’s return to growth and prevent unemployment from dropping. Finally, the Government’s persistence to restore the system of collective bargaining had been successful, after many months of negotiations. Legislation, entering into force in August 2018, had already been adopted, restoring the two abovementioned fundamental principles. The speaker considered that, even more important than the legislation itself, was the political mobilization that had taken place on the issue in 2017, and during the negotiations with the country’s creditors for the need to restore the collective bargaining system. Under the second round of negotiations, labour market issues had been strongly debated, due to efforts to address the points raised by the Committee of Experts. The Government had been supported by the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), several members of the European Parliament, the President of the European Commission and the ILO. The issue of collective bargaining had become emblematic, identified as part of the core of the European social model and it was therefore surprising that, after such efforts, the Government had been called upon to provide explanations for the violation of the Convention. For the past eight years, Greece had been under successive Economic Adjustment Programmes, a funding package from the Troika, consisting of the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the IMF. As part of the conditions for receiving funding, the country had signed a Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with the above creditors, under the terms of undertaking specific legislative, economic and political reforms. The reform package had been applied from 2010 to 2014 and aimed at reducing labour costs, not only by wage cuts, but also by imposing general restrictions on labour rights. In order to achieve the required internal devaluation, a number of severe measures had been adopted during that period, dismantling core elements of the Greek employment protection system. The result was severe deregulation of the labour market and of the legal framework, leading to violations of the Convention. More specifically, the reforms adopted in 2011 had led to the abolition of the extension and favourability principles, as well as to limitations on the time extension and after-effect of collective agreements. As a result, collective bargaining had stopped being a reality in the country. Bargaining coordination had dropped, earning inequality and low-pay incidence had increased significantly. At the same time, bargaining coverage had declined from approximately 85 per cent to less than 30 per cent of the workforce. Individual contracts without the protection of collective bargaining had been the largest share of the working population’s employment reality. Accordingly, real annual salaries had decreased by 18 per cent and part-time work rose by 28 per cent. However, those policies had not been able to effectively contain rising unemployment, which had reached 27.9 per cent in general and around 60 per cent among the youth. The Greek system of collective bargaining had experienced a “disorganized decentralization”. Trust among the social partners, and between the social partners and the State had been considerably and negatively affected. That had been the reality that the Government had tried to reverse, in 2015, when a change of paradigm had taken place in Greece with a new Government focused on social rights. The new Government’s objective had been to alleviate the major humanitarian crisis that had led to the collapse of the Greek society between 2010 and 2014, and to pursue the recovery of the economy by reducing the high unemployment rate and empowering the workforce. The above negotiations had indeed resulted in the restoration of the extension of collective agreements and the favourability principle. As already noted, the restoration of those principles had been legislated since May 2017 and would enter into force in August 2018. The last technical details had been agreed upon with the social partners recently, leaving no doubt that collective bargaining would be reinstated in the country in August 2018.

Moving on to the issue regarding the arbitration system in Greece, she recalled that arbitration had always been a part of the Greek legal framework for resolving collective disputes. Article 22, paragraph 2, of the Greek Constitution provided that the general working conditions shall be determined by law, supplemented by collective agreements, and when free collective bargaining failed, by rules determined by arbitration. Since 1990, that system had been entrusted to an autonomous organization called Organization for Mediation and Arbitration (OMED), governed fully by the social partners. The Government was aware that the Committee of Experts had stated many times that the right of unilateral recourse to arbitration had not been considered compatible with the Convention. Nonetheless, the specific requirements of the Greek Constitution, as well as the repeated rulings of the Greek Supreme Courts, had to be respected by the Government. The Supreme Courts had ruled that the Convention’s provisions and guidelines had already been implemented through the provisions of the Greek Constitution for free bargaining and arbitration and that there was no issue with respect to compatibility. In 2012, when the former Government had tried to abolish the unilateral recourse to compulsory arbitration, the full plenary of the Council of State had cancelled, in 2014, the abolition, ruling that it contradicted the provisions of the Greek Constitution. Furthermore, according to ruling No. 2307/2014 in Greece: (a) the establishment of an arbitration system was a constitutional obligation; (b) unilateral recourse to arbitration was also a constitutional right; and (c) the scope of arbitral decisions should cover all issues that could be negotiated during collective bargaining and could not be limited only to the determination of wages. Pursuant to those constitutional obligations, the existing legal framework provided that the right of unilateral recourse to arbitration was only given to either party when: (i) the other party refused to participate in the mediation process; or (ii) after the submission of the mediator’s proposal. That meant that the right could only be exercised when all possibilities for free negotiations had been exhausted. In addition, a number of other provisions also restricted the role of arbitration in order to foster free collective bargaining, such as the establishment of a second degree arbitration (on appeal). That appeal would be examined by a five-member Commission, consisting of two arbitrators, two Supreme Court judges (from the Council of State and Areios Pagos) and one Counsellor of the Legal Council of the State. Moreover, mediators’ proposals as well as arbitral decisions had to be fully justified and documented. Further, the judicial control of arbitral decisions had been increased and strengthened. Finally, in light of the provisions of the Convention, as well as the requirements of the Greek Constitution, the Government had recently initiated a tripartite dialogue on the basis of an independent expert’s study on mediation and arbitration in collective bargaining. Following the tripartite dialogue, the Ministry of Labour was planning to introduce further amendments to arbitration, with a view to further enhancing free bargaining and good-faith negotiations between the parties and strengthening the mediation procedure. Through such amendments to the mediation procedure, free collective bargaining was expected to be further enhanced and arbitration would be limited to playing a supplementary role, in line with the Committee of Expert’s recommendations, while preserving the constitutional particularities of Greece. She concluded by emphasizing the importance that the current Government gave to collective bargaining and to social dialogue. Under extremely hard conditions, the Government was reinstating a coordinated system of collective bargaining and guaranteeing the necessary legal requirements to foster social dialogue.

The Worker members regretted that the Government had failed to discharge its reporting obligations, which was a sine qua non condition for the effective monitoring of the application of ILO standards. Referring to the observation of the Committee of Experts, they recalled that, bearing in mind that small enterprises were in the majority in the Greek labour market, abandoning the favourability principle (Act No. 3845/2010), taken together with the possibility for “associations of persons” to conclude a collective agreement at enterprise level, even if the association was not a trade union (Act No. 4024/2011), had seriously detrimental effects for the whole basis of collective bargaining in the country. The figures cited in the report of the Committee of Experts were enlightening in that respect: of the 409 collective agreements concluded in 2013, 218 had been concluded by associations of persons and only 191 by trade unions. The right to collective bargaining guaranteed in Article 4 of the Convention was a right intended for workers’ organizations, and it was clear that associations of persons were not workers’ organizations in the proper sense. When the Committee of Experts had made observations previously, the Government had explained that an association of persons was created independently of the total number of workers and for a specific period of time; that three-fifths of workers at the enterprise level at least were required to create such an association; and that those workers were protected against anti-union dismissal and could take strike action. The Worker members did not consider those explanations very convincing. Admittedly, Collective Agreements Recommendation, 1951 (No. 91), provided that, in the absence of workers’ organizations, the representatives of the workers duly elected and authorized by them in accordance with national laws and regulations could conclude collective agreements. However, the preparatory work for that Recommendation showed that the possibility had been included so as to take into account the situation in countries where trade unions were not sufficiently well developed and to ensure that the principles set out in the Recommendation could be applied in those countries. Greece was certainly not a country where trade unions were insufficiently well developed, and its national legislation provided that the representation of workers in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) was through sectoral unions. They also referred to the Collective Bargaining Convention, 1981 (No. 154), ratified by Greece, Article 3(2) of which provided that appropriate measures shall be taken, wherever necessary, to ensure that the existence of non-union representatives was not used to undermine the position of the workers’ organizations concerned. There were three consequences of that: (i) ILO principles and standards implied that States were required to promote and develop collective bargaining; (ii) such bargaining must be carried out at a level that allowed the participation of workers’ organizations; and (iii) the fact of providing in law that enterprise-level agreements could derogate from sectoral and national agreements, in a context where trade unions were not present at the enterprise level, constituted a violation of ILO Conventions and Recommendations.

They underlined that the Committee on Freedom of Association had observed, in cases concerning Spain and Greece, that “the elaboration of procedures systematically favouring decentralized bargaining of exclusionary provisions that are less favourable than the provisions at a higher level can lead to a global destabilization of collective bargaining machinery and of workers’ and employers’ organizations and constitutes in this regard a weakening of freedom of association and collective bargaining contrary to the principles of Conventions Nos 87 and 98”. It was therefore the responsibility of the Government to take the appropriate measures for the effective promotion of the right to collective bargaining with workers’ organizations. Regarding recourse to the compulsory arbitration procedure, they considered that the nature of the current system had the effect of strengthening the position of employers by allowing them not to participate in the dispute settlement procedures. The Government was therefore requested, in the response it would provide to the decision of the Council of State deeming the suppression of the unilateral recourse to arbitration unconstitutional, to adopt an approach consistent with the restoration of effective collective bargaining machinery. With respect to the issue of protection against anti-union dismissal raised in the Committee of Expert’s observation, they considered that it fell within the scope of the implementation of flexible forms of work (flexibility in the power of enterprise management to terminate full-time employment contracts, the unilateral imposition of reduced working hours, the longer period for the authorized use of temporary agency work, the extension of the probationary period and of the maximum period for fixed-term contracts). All those measures made workers more vulnerable to unfair practices and unjustified dismissal. It was therefore necessary for measures to be taken to ensure that workers benefited from adequate protection against discriminatory practices that undermined their trade union rights. In conclusion, they noted that the question of the decentralization of collective bargaining and the role played by associations was not only the responsibility of the Government. They were conditional measures, or diktats, imposed on Greece since 2010 in the negotiations with the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF. It should be noted that the completion of the adjustment programme in no way implied the end of the conditional measures imposed by the creditors, who had reaffirmed that Greece would remain under strict surveillance. The examination of the case offered an opportunity for the Worker members to recall that the logic of austerity, with all its dramatic consequences on workers and societies, was incompatible with the fundamental standards and principles of the ILO.

The Employer members stated that they shared the concern of the Worker members and of the Committee of Experts that the Government had not submitted a report to the Committee of Experts in time for that Committee to fully consider the issue. That limited the Conference Committee’s ability to consider recent information. The Convention required that measures appropriate to national conditions be taken to encourage and promote the full development and utilization of machinery for voluntary negotiation between employers or employers’ organizations and workers’ organizations, with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of employment by means of collective agreements. Referring to the decision of the Council of State on the unconstitutionality of the provision in Act No. 4046 of 14 February 2012 providing for the suppression of unilateral recourse to compulsory arbitration, the Employer members indicated that the Government appeared to be encouraging the use of compulsory arbitration as a replacement for voluntary negotiation. The Committee of Experts had noted the issues raised by the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises and Industries (SEV) and its concern regarding the Government’s insistence in keeping regulations allowing unilateral recourse to compulsory arbitration to circumvent collective bargaining. The Employer members expressed their concern that no response had been provided to the concerns raised by the SEV. The Employer members expressed surprise that the Government had indicated that one of its top priorities was the restoration of a collective bargaining system, as the Government had also indicated that arbitration had always been a part of the Greek legal system, even if the Committee of Experts had made numerous observations that a system of compulsory arbitration did not meet the obligation under the Convention. The Government had stated that it considered the decision of the Council of State in light of the Greek Constitution. The Government’s statement appeared to imply that it had discharged its obligations under the Convention, as a result of recent amendments, and that the onus then fell on workers’ and employers’ organizations. Compulsory arbitration had a distortionary impact on the labour market and could materially affect the outcome of negotiations. In 1978, the mission report of the International Programme for the Improvement of Working Conditions and the Environment (PIACT) concerning Greece had stated that systematic recourse to compulsory arbitration resulted not only in excluding the establishment of a tradition of dialogue between the social partners, but also in deterring the labour organizations from designing policy. The prediction that systematic recourse to compulsory arbitration would stifle collective bargaining had been accurate.

The Employer members disagreed with the Worker members’ assertion that the status quo favoured employers in the country. However, they agreed that the Government should reinstate effective collective bargaining mechanisms. Legislative provisions that allowed either party to unilaterally request compulsory arbitration for the settlement of a dispute or collective agreement did not promote voluntary collective bargaining, stifled collective bargaining and were contrary to the Convention. The Employer members urged the Government to ensure that neither a decision of a national court nor any legislative amendments imposed compulsory arbitration for the settlement of disputes or collective agreements as the normal course. They further called on the Government to discuss the existing arbitration system with the social partners with a view to achieving compliance with international labour standards. Full and robust social dialogue with workers’ and employers’ organizations at the national level was necessary to resolve the concerns identified on the use of compulsory arbitration, including its scope. Lastly, the Employer members called on the Government to take immediate measures in that respect and to provide a full report on the measures taken to the Committee of Experts in advance of its session in 2018.

The Worker member of Greece expressed appreciation for the support provided by the ILO in supervising compliance with labour standards and providing technical assistance and noted that the Government had not resolved human resources issues in the country leading to non-compliance with its ILO reporting obligations. Collective bargaining destabilized by repeated statutory limitations had still not been effectively restituted and the significant interventions in the voluntary nature of collective bargaining and in the principle of the inviolability of freely concluded collective agreements, raised by the Committee on Freedom of Association, had not been effectively addressed. A number of issues were at stake, including the statutory infringement to set the minimum wage at poverty levels and further reduce it for young workers; the evisceration of the National General Collective Agreement (NGCA) by removing the right of its signatory social partners to bargain collectively; erosion of sectoral collective bargaining; annulment of fundamental principles protecting terms of pay and work, such as the extension of collective agreements and the favourability principle; and conferral to non-elected associations of persons the ability to conclude binding enterprise-level agreements. Those measures had deprived the social partners of the fundamental right and means to advance and defend their economic and social interests, resulting in a decline in collective bargaining coverage from over 80 per cent of the workforce to just over 30 per cent. Furthermore, successive measures had wiped out remaining institutional safeguards that had been ensuring a level playing field in labour markets, bearing upon collective dismissals, pension cuts and the right to strike, and the authorities had ignored the strong appeal by the Committee on Freedom of Association to review, with the social partners, all the contested measures and their impact. To address the adverse cumulative impact of the measures on the exercise of the right to bargain collectively and conclude collective agreements, it was necessary to ensure the unequivocal compliance of domestic law and practice with the Convention and the national constitutional order. Although the adoption of section 5 of Act No. 4475/2017, reinstating the extension of collective agreements and the favourability principle, was welcomed, the Government had undertaken to streamline and codify existing labour law which implied the consolidation and perpetuation of all prejudicial legislation since 2010, including provisions that overtly violated the Convention. With regard to the arbitration procedure, the Government did not fully comply with the decision of the Plenary of the Council of State No. 2307/2014 and the nature of the existing system was mainly subsidiary. The labour market was fully deregulated, workers suffered significant institutional disadvantage and abusive employer practices hindered the conclusion of collective agreements, for instance, employers avoided participation or denied their designation as an employer organization. In 2013, the Committee had requested the Government to establish a functioning model of social dialogue to promote collective bargaining but tripartite social dialogue had degenerated into a superficial fragmented procedure and any existing dialogue should be credited only to the social partners and the ILO. Consequently, the Committee was called on to: reaffirm previous recommendations and conclusions by the ILO supervisory bodies and request the tripartite review of the mentioned measures based on their impact assessment, with a view to rendering legislation and practice compatible with the rights enshrined in the Convention; emphasize that collective bargaining institutions could not be effectively restored without repealing all statutory interventions that violated the Convention, including associations of persons, and section 2(7) of Act No. 3845/2010 derogating the scope of collective agreements; reiterate that public authorities should refrain from any interference restricting the right to free collective bargaining or impeding its lawful exercise; and renew its emphasis on the need to reinstate the standing and practice of tripartite social dialogue, urging the State to respect the autonomy and the representativeness of the social partners, as well as collective bargaining outcomes.

The Employer member of Greece recalled the two main issues discussed: firstly, enterprise-level collective agreements and associations of persons and secondly, the issue of compulsory arbitration. With regard to the competence of associations of persons to represent workers at the level of an enterprise where a trade union did not exist, such measures were in full accordance with ILO standards, actively promoted collective bargaining and social dialogue and should therefore not be changed. Special regulations allowing trade union sections in small companies would, in the country’s specific context, be seen as a Government intervention in the way workers organized of their own free will and there should thus be no legislative amendments, irrespective of whether a favourability principle existed in the laws or not. The existing system, to the extent that it included unilateral recourse to compulsory arbitration, had been found by ILO supervisory bodies to be against ILO standards. The arbitration system was dominant and central in Greek industrial relations but recourse to compulsory arbitration stifled the development of collective negotiations and in practice caused an absence of industrial action and the development of collective bargaining. Although from an employer’s viewpoint, practically eliminating industrial action might appear as positive, near-zero strikes on salary issues was a symptom that the system had consistently provided easy solutions accommodating the workers’ side and constituted a fundamental distortion of the collective bargaining environment. Such a distorted environment was one of the main reasons explaining why social dialogue between workers and employers had been almost non-existent in the past ten years. Act No. 4303/2014 adopted after the 2014 Council of State decision had reinstated compulsory arbitration but it was essentially the same as the previous laws that had been found by ILO bodies to infringe the Convention and the Government intended to keep it that way. However, even in the framework of that decision, the situation could be improved drastically by adjusting the scope of compulsory arbitration to be as close as possible to ILO standards. The proposal was for compulsory arbitration to be accepted as the ultimate measure for resolving collective disputes strictly in the following cases: (1) where the employer was an entity belonging to the administration of the State where it provided essential services; (2) in sectors of the economy where the resolution of a collective dispute was necessary for reasons of public interest that was at risk at the moment of the dispute – apart from general government and essential services, a collective dispute at the enterprise or occupational level could not be conceived as putting at risk the public interest and compulsory arbitration should thus not be allowed for disputes at those levels; for sectoral, regional or national-level disputes, the risk of public interest should be proven, if it was to merit recourse to compulsory arbitration; (3) if one of the parties refused in bad faith to enter into negotiations; and (4) if negotiations had definitively failed and such failure had been proven by several cumulative conditions (at least one year had passed since the expiry of the previous collective agreement; the minutes of negotiations showed that one side refused to accept the realistic proposals of the other; and all means of union pressure had been used). Unilateral recourse to compulsory arbitration was thus not acceptable if strike action had not been undertaken to exert pressure on the employer. Although the proposal would not achieve full compliance with ILO standards, it could present significant improvement as an interim measure, until an opportunity arose to settle the matter at the level of the Constitution or its interpretation. Furthermore, substantial improvements should be made in the existing framework of the OMED, including procedures to establish true representativeness for both sides of the dispute, strong safeguards for ensuring independence and professional qualification of arbitrators and mediators, standards for decisions to be adequately substantiated concerning their economic impact and full-scale self-government of the OMED by the social partners regarding its administrative or legal setup, funding and internal processes of arbitration and mediation. In December 2017, the SEV had extended to the General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE) a formal invitation to discuss a brand-new arbitration system but since the GSEE had expressed the wish to return to the initial system that had existed before the crisis and to abolish the reforms of Act No. 4303/2014, which had brought back compulsory arbitration but had some marginal improvements over the old system, the discussion had not continued. As for the Government, it lacked any willingness to make the slightest move in the indicated direction, as demonstrated by the absence of any reference to the proposed changes in a technical document drafted with the country’s creditors, which thus represented an explicit demonstration by the Government to continue flouting the Convention, as well as Convention No. 154 for the foreseeable future. To conclude, the speaker suggested that if the Government was sincere about reviving collective bargaining, it should start by taking steps to comply with the Convention and if the workers believed in free collective bargaining as the main pillar for effective social dialogue, they should find the courage to denounce compulsory arbitration.

The Worker member of the United Kingdom recalled that the ability for independent trade unions and employers to engage in free collective bargaining to defend and promote their members’ interest was a core value of the ILO. Effective collective bargaining systems ensured that workers and employers had an equal say in negotiations and that the outcomes were fair and equitable. It was deeply regrettable that labour law reforms introduced since 2010 at the request of Greece’s creditors and the Troika had led to the dismantling of collective bargaining machinery and significantly weakened the position of workers in the labour market, depriving them of the institutional means needed to address economic hardship. In 2012, the national minimum wage – which had previously been set by collective bargaining, and had provided a safety net for low-paid workers – was substantially reduced. The collective bargaining system had been seriously weakened with the removal of mechanisms for the extension of sectoral-level agreements and precedence being given to enterprise-level agreements. Reforms had also limited the duration and content of collective agreements, as well as their effect on individual contracts after their expiry and imposed severe restrictions on the right for parties unilaterally to request arbitration. Those measures had discouraged free collective bargaining as they permitted employers to impose lower wages and worse working conditions and compelled trade unions to either accept employers’ terms or risk even greater salary losses and fewer negotiating rights. Moreover, there was no guarantee that lower salaries agreed at a sectoral level would not be further reduced through the proliferation of less favourable enterprise-level agreements. The dismantling of collective bargaining institutions, the accompanying wage suppression and other austerity measures had had wide-ranging impacts, including a dramatic increase in the risk of poverty or social exclusion. Consequently, the speaker called upon the Government to refrain from interfering with the collective autonomy of the social partners and reinstate the collective bargaining machinery as a matter of urgency.

The Employer member of Spain indicated that non-compliance of a Member State of the European Union with ILO standards for so many decades was worrying, not only for the Greek employers. The crisis of recent years had shown the interconnection between the economies of European countries. In periods of crisis it was all the more important for social partners to have a shared understanding of the problems in each country, as it was not possible to achieve results without such collective understanding and sharing the responsibility for the solution. The lack of a culture of effective collective negotiations was probably one of the reasons for the delay in approving structural reforms. Social dialogue could not be built instantaneously but needed preconditions and was based on the gradual building of mutual trust and respect among social partners engaging in continuous exchanges through collective negotiations. True social dialogue would be beneficial both to the Greek economy and to other partners in the European Union. Moreover, compulsory arbitration was contrary to the acquis communautaire. The ETUC had reiterated that the requirement for compulsory arbitration to be abolished raised no misgivings and that its abolition would bring the situation in line with ILO Conventions and the European Social Charter. In conclusion, there was support for the proposals of the SEV to urge the Government to comply with ILO and European standards.

The Worker member of Germany indicated that the reforms adopted by Greece since 2010 had been in conflict with the Convention. Under pressure from the Troika, the Government had weakened the validity of the NGCA and replaced negotiations of the social partners on minimum wage setting by legislation. The Government had also eliminated the favourability principle and weakened enterprise collective agreements. The negotiating position of the independent trade unions had been undermined by allowing associations of persons to act and negotiate as workers’ representatives. The devastating effects of the decentralization of collective bargaining were undeniable. Enterprise collective agreements had become the predominant form of collective bargaining, accounting for over 90 per cent of all agreements in 2015. Almost half of them had been negotiated with associations of persons. The number of sectoral collective agreements had fallen from 65 in 2010 to only 12 in 2015. In view of the disproportionate number of small and micro-enterprises in Greece, coverage under collective bargaining agreements had decreased from 85 per cent before the crisis to an estimated 10 per cent in 2016. Wage cuts were highest where negotiations were carried out at the enterprise level and with associations of persons rather than with representative unions. Dialogue through collective bargaining had become difficult or in some instances had completely stopped. The continuation of that situation put at risk collective rights and the democratic participation of workers. Therefore, the speaker called upon the Government to restore the institutional framework as soon as possible, so that a functioning social partnership and free collective bargaining could be guaranteed at all levels, in particular at the enterprise and national levels. Furthermore, the representation of workers’ interests by associations of persons instead of by trade unions should be legally prohibited. The speaker called on the Member States of the European Union to support Greece in re-establishing a peaceful society and rebuilding a democratic and fair collective bargaining system.

The Worker member of France considered it regrettable that the economic adjustment programmes implemented in Greece for a number of years had overlooked effective social dialogue, an observation shared by the Workers and Employers. Despite the repeated recommendations of the supervisory bodies, the only effective social dialogue formats were those involving the presence of the ILO in the context of technical assistance. Bipartite agreements between workers and employers were quite simply ignored and measures relating to labour law and collective bargaining had been taken without any consultation with the social partners. The social partners had clearly called for the re-establishment of social dialogue in the framework of an agreement on general collective bargaining in March 2018, a request that had already been made in joint statements in 2015 and 2016. Although Greece had ratified the Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards) Convention, 1976 (No. 144), the social partners were not even invited to work on the reports due from Greece. She called for the restoration of tripartite social dialogue in a structured framework, with procedures that respected the experience and knowledge of the social partners.

The Employer member of France said that the question of compulsory arbitration in Greece should be examined in light of Conventions Nos 98 and 154, both of which had been ratified by Greece, as well as the Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration Recommendation, 1951 (No. 92), and the Collective Bargaining Recommendation, 1981 (No. 163). Unilateral recourse to arbitration was a persistent problem and was contrary to the fundamental principles of the ILO. In brief, Greek legislation established the right to initiate a mediation process without the consent of the other party, and then an arbitration process, if a collective agreement was not concluded. The arbitration award was then regarded as a collective agreement which had been concluded in the normal manner, even in the absence of agreement between the parties, and had the same binding effect as a collective agreement. He noted that there were evident legal inconsistencies between the above instruments and the national law, and emphasized that the Government had not responded to concerns expressed by the SEV that unilateral recourse to compulsory arbitration was stifling collective bargaining. It was time for the Government to take measures to ensure the conformity of the law with ILO Conventions, as history had shown that the compulsory arbitration system, by its very nature, undermined collective bargaining, which was a fundamental principle of social dialogue.

The Worker member of Portugal also speaking on behalf of the Trade Union Confederation of Workers’ Commissions (CCOO) and the General Workers’ Union of Spain (UGT-Y), stated that the labour market restructuring explicitly imposed by Greece’s creditors violated core ILO Conventions and deprived workers of institutional means to defend themselves and to bargain collectively. Combined with a sizeable informal economy, the dismantling of collective bargaining magnified the negative cumulative impact on employment, exacerbated already existing disparities and severely compromised the right to work. Statistics were provided on the unemployment rate in the country which, despite a recent decrease, amounted to the highest in the European Union. Unemployment was often long-term and touched over 1 million people, in particular young people, showing that it increasingly acquired structural characteristics. Furthermore, while full time jobs decreased, the number of part-time workers, rotation and shift jobs – the so called flexible forms of employment – increased and such precarious jobs could not contribute to sustainable job growth. The deregulation of labour relations had thus led to the worsening of the basic protection indicators of employment and a dramatic increase of enterprise-level collective bargaining agreements.

The Worker member of Sweden speaking on behalf of the ETUC, stated that the rule of law could only be upheld if member States complied with international legal standards, even in times of economic difficulties. The case concerned human rights. The collective bargaining system in Greece had been radically restricted and dismantled, leading to violations. Greek trade unions had taken various legal measures with a view to reinstating the industrial relations system and the right to collective bargaining as well as the guarantee and enforcement of agreements. As a result, since 2011, national courts, international supervisory bodies and special procedures had identified violations of international standards on human rights, including labour and social security rights. Such bodies had expressed deep concern regarding the impact of austerity measures and deep regret when their recommendations had not been followed. Nonetheless, there had been no progress regarding respect in practice for the rights guaranteed in the Convention. That included the decision to establish the minimum wage by law without bargaining with the social partners and allowing enterprise agreements to be concluded with associations of persons that did not have guarantees with regard to elections and representativeness. The ETUC had criticised austerity measures and had expressed its solidarity and support for the GSEE, asking the Government to proceed in full and frank dialogue with that Confederation. Human rights needed to be guaranteed and respected. The speaker concluded by urging the Government to take the necessary measures in order to comply with the Convention, including through amending its legislation.

An observer representing Public Services International (PSI) and Education International (EI) regretted that once again the Government had not submitted its report to the Committee of Experts, thus avoiding its obligations under the ILO Constitution and Conventions. That prevented an honest discussion regarding the public sector, where the enforcement of the Memoranda of 2010 was having devastating consequences. There were no collective bargaining agreements in the public sector in Greece, including in public education. It was to be recalled that in Greece over 95 per cent of schools were public and teachers’ salaries and working rights were determined by regulations of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Labour. Equal rules applied to all public servants across all public sectors. All collective bargaining agreements had been abolished since the enforcement of the Memoranda of 2010 and replaced by individual contracts of employment. However, even before the enforcement of the Memoranda, the salary increases for all public servants were unilaterally decided by the State without any consultation. With regard to teachers, some further increases had been given after large-scale strikes and mobilizations. But in the last one, the Ministry of Education had issued civil mobilization orders for teachers, abolishing de facto their right to strike, a decision that had later been supported by the courts. Social dialogue did not exist anymore. For instance, while the Federation of Secondary School Teachers (OLME) participated in the National Council of Education and had to be invited in the Committee for Education Affairs of the Parliament to be consulted on every new legislative act put forth, the State was not required to take into consideration the OLME’s views. In 44 years of union action some form of dialogue had been established between the union and the sole employer of public school teachers in Greece, the Ministry of Education. Yet, that dialogue could not be defined as “social dialogue” in the strict sense because it did not lead to an agreement between both parties. True social dialogue needed to be genuine, meaningful and effective.

The Government representative reiterated that the extension principle and the principle of favourability that had been suspended since 2010 and 2011 respectively, would be restored in August 2018, after the exit from the economic adjustment programme. Furthermore, it was not true that supervision would be strict after exiting the programme; on the contrary, it would be limited only to the achievement of fiscal targets. In the current Government’s view, both principles were extremely important for a stable, effective and coordinated system of collective bargaining, and that had been the reason for the Government’s insistence on their restoration. The principles reversed the power imbalance between the parties; fostered social dialogue and incentivized the parties to engage in it; they unified rules and created a level playing field; they reduced income inequality and achieved a fair distribution of national income. Supplementary to the restoration of collective bargaining principles, a rise in minimum wage was under way. Moreover, there were a number of economic/efficiency benefits in having coordinated collective bargaining structures, such as reduction in transaction costs, higher productivity, lower unemployment and social peace. Hence, the re-establishment of an organized and fully functioning system of free collective bargaining had always been and still remained at the core of the holistic growth strategy that the Government had drafted and presented to the Eurogroup the past month. The strategy was based on a model of socially fair and sustainable growth, in which social rights were prerequisites, not bottlenecks, to economic growth. To this end, she recalled the support the Government had received in its efforts there had been the following: (a) a joint statement by the European Commission President, Mr Jean-Claude Juncker, and the Greek Prime Minister in May 2015; (b) a press release statements and letters to the President of the European Commission by a number of members of the European Parliament in December 2016; (c) a statement by ETUC in 2016; and (d) a joint press release by ETUC and ITUC in 2017, whereas the National Workers’ Confederation (GSEE) remained silent.

Regarding the issue of unilateral recourse to compulsory arbitration, the Government planned to introduce some further amendments to arbitration with a view to enhancing free bargaining and good-faith negotiations between the parties. The amendments included the following: (1) the mediator would have the ability to refrain from any proposal, blocking temporally the path to arbitration, if it was reasonably believed that there was still room for negotiation in good faith between the parties. In such a case, the parties would return to direct negotiations; and (2) unilateral recourse to compulsory arbitration would be only permitted: (i) to whichever party had come to mediation, if the other party had refused to participate; or (ii) to whichever party had accepted the mediator’s proposal, which the other party had rejected. The first condition penalized the party that had shown bad faith by refusing to participate in the mediation process, while the second ensured that the right of unilateral recourse to compulsory arbitration was only given to the party that had shown good faith and a consensual behaviour by accepting the mediator’s final proposal. She questioned the Employer members’ argument that arbitration undermined collective bargaining and pointed out that statistical data proved that mediation and arbitration had a supplementary role to collective bargaining. Arbitral decisions in general represented only a small part of the total collective bargaining agreements. In particular, during the past 28 years the average rate of arbitral decisions had been 12 per cent. Since 2014, only 7.7 per cent of collective disputes had led to mediation and only 2.3 per cent of them had been resolved with an arbitral decision. Finally, over 55 per cent of the cases which had led to mediation and arbitration, had been resolved on the basis of consensus by the parties without the need of an arbitral decision. She also reiterated that the amendments to the arbitration processes had been decided following extensive tripartite dialogue which had included the SEV. A few of the proposals submitted by the SEV had been taken on board, while the majority had been considered contrary to both the Greek Constitution and the Council of State’s ruling previously mentioned. The Government was however proceeding to limit the scope of unilateral recourse to arbitration. She concluded that the above proved the Government’s goal, strategy and priorities to enhance workers’ bargaining power, increase their income and thus set the preconditions for a socially fair and inclusive growth. It was important that those preconditions had been set, as the Greek economy was entering a phase of strong recovery. Recession was behind and the country had returned to positive growth rates. The Government had taken all the measures for the new growth model to become a reality. It was now up to the social partners to use in good faith the tools given to them, and to proceed with collective agreements that would serve social peace and promote social justice.

The Employer members recalled that several speakers had highlighted the lack of social dialogue at the national level. They had noted with concern that the Government’s intervention suggested a resistance to adopting measures to come into full compliance with the Convention with respect to the issue of compulsory arbitration. The Employer members further reiterated their concern that the Government had not submitted a report on the application of the Convention to the Committee of Experts. While statistical information had been provided to the Conference Committee, it was necessary that the information be submitted to the Committee of Experts. Referring to the obligation under Article 4 of the Convention to encourage and promote the full development and utilization of machinery for voluntary negotiation, it was stated that the use of recourse to compulsory arbitration in the Greek system did not promote voluntary negotiation and that the Committee of Experts had repeatedly stated that regular and repeated recourse to compulsory arbitration was not consistent with the obligations in the Convention. It was the Employer members’ position that compulsory arbitration was not compatible with Article 4 of the Convention, and that existing law and practice in Greece did not seem to be justified by any acceptable exception. Therefore, the Government should introduce changes that banned unilateral recourse to compulsory arbitration, in line with the requirements of the Convention. The Government’s reference to the ruling of the Council of State on constitutional obligations was not a complete answer to that issue. The Employer members urged the Government to re-establish without delay the ban on unilateral recourse to compulsory arbitration, requested it to report to the Committee of Experts on measures taken in that respect and to avail itself of ILO technical assistance in order to come into compliance with the Convention.

The Worker members said that they wished to dispel any misunderstanding concerning recourse to compulsory arbitration. They had not suggested that it was favourable to employers, but rather that the context and general situation of the Greek labour market was favourable to them. It was clear from the discussion in the Committee that the aim of compulsory arbitration in Greece was to make up for the inadequacies of the collective bargaining machinery. They reiterated that a country such as Greece, in which the labour market was composed essentially of small enterprises and where it had been decided to entrust collective bargaining to associations of persons, was not ensuring this right effectively. While the Convention did not preclude collective bargaining from being carried out at different levels, the choice of the level of bargaining had to be left to the parties, and the authorities should not provide on a unilateral and general basis that agreements concluded at lower levels could derogate from higher-level agreements. It was for the parties to decide whether or not to allow sectoral or enterprise agreements to derogate from general agreements. Such a decision was therefore in itself subject to collective bargaining. When responding to the decision by the Council of State on compulsory arbitration, it was the responsibility of the Government to adopt a global overall approach involving the reintroduction of effective collective bargaining machinery. The Government was also responsible for taking the necessary measures to protect workers against any acts of anti-union discrimination. This was of particular importance in view of the employment situation in Greece and the increase in flexible forms of work. The Committee needed to reaffirm the previous recommendations and conclusions of the ILO supervisory bodies and call for these measures to be reviewed immediately through a tripartite examination based on their impact assessment, with a view to bringing the legislative system and practice into conformity with the rights set out in the Convention. Finally, it was important to reiterate that the public authorities should refrain from any interference that might restrict the right to free collective bargaining or impede the exercise thereof, and to re-establish as a matter of urgency the status and practice of tripartite social dialogue so as to demonstrate that the State respected the principle of collective autonomy, representativity and the outcome of collective bargaining.

Conclusions

The Committee took note of the oral statements made by the Government representative and the discussion that followed.

The Committee expressed concern regarding the Government’s submission related to the compulsory arbitration system and the decision of the Council of State concluding that the provision in Act No. 4046, which provided for the suppression of unilateral recourse to compulsory arbitration, was unconstitutional.

The Committee also expressed concern regarding the Government’s failure to provide a report to the Committee of Experts in time for its most recent session in November 2017.

Taking into account the Government’s submissions and the discussion that followed, the Government was urged to:

- ensure that unilateral recourse to compulsory arbitration as a way to avoid free and voluntary collective bargaining is employed only in very limited circumstances;

- ensure that public authorities refrain from acts of interference, which restrict the right to free and voluntary collective bargaining, or impede its lawful exercise;

- provide information on the number of collective agreements signed, the sectors concerned and the number of workers covered by these collective agreements;

- provide information and statistics related to complaints of anti-union discrimination and any remedial action taken;

- avail itself of ILO technical assistance to ensure the implementation of these measures; and

- report to the Committee of Experts on the implementation of these recommendations before its next session in November 2018.

Taking into account the Government’s failure to meet its reporting obligations in 2017, the Committee urged the Government to comply with its reporting obligations to the Committee of Experts in the future.

Individual Case (CAS) - Discussion: 2013, Publication: 102nd ILC session (2013)

A Government representative welcomed the acknowledgement by the Committee of Experts of the grave and exceptional circumstances experienced in Greece. Her Government also welcomed the recognition by the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) of the exceptional and particularly dire conditions brought about by the financial fiscal crisis in Greece, and of the continuous efforts made by all the parties, the Government and the social partners, to address them. In June 2011, this Committee had had the opportunity to discuss this case and had recommended in its conclusions, that an ILO high-level mission visit Greece in order to explore the complexity of the issues involved. The Government representative reiterated that the bailout plan for the Greek economy envisaged the implementation of measures that would enhance labour market flexibility and ensure, at the same time, both the protection of workers and the competitiveness of the Greek economy. Measures had been adopted to restructure the system of free collective bargaining, in compliance with the principles set in the Convention. These measures had reformed the collective bargaining system by establishing decentralization in the implementation of collective agreements, placing emphasis on the enterprise level in order to facilitate the adjustment of wages to the economic potential of enterprises. Furthermore, the statutory minimum wages complemented the wage-setting system, filling the gaps between the collective agreements, as the statutory extension of collective agreements had been suspended since November 2011 by Act No. 4024/2011, together with the application of the favourability principle in case of conflict between collective agreements concluded at different levels. These reforms had been outlined in the updated Memoranda attached to the revised economic adjustment plans of the international loan agreements, signed between the Government of Greece and the Troika (the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)). However, despite the provisions included in the Memoranda for social dialogue on all issues related to labour market reforms, political conditions and timetables had hindered such a process.

In light of the above, and in particular with regard to comments of the Committee of Experts on the development of a comprehensive vision for labour relations, she stated that the Minister of Labour, Social Security and Welfare had initiated, since July 2012, a new round of consultations with the representatives of the social partners, in the belief that social dialogue, on the one hand, would contribute to the restoration of balance in the labour market and, on the other, would enhance its efficiency and smooth operation. With regard to the importance of a space for social dialogue and the role of social partners in reviewing the measures already taken, the speaker indicated that in relation to setting minimum wages, a new system for fixing the statutory minimum wage had been introduced in December 2012 by Act No. 4093/2012. The Act stipulated that by virtue of a Ministerial Cabinet Decree, the statutory minimum wage-fixing process would be defined taking into account the state and prospects of the economy and of the labour market (especially in terms of employment and unemployment rates). Consultations between the Government and representatives of the social partners, as well as specialized scientific, research and other bodies would be held in this process. Meanwhile, Act No. 4093/2012 determined the statutory minimum daily and monthly wages as provided for by Ministerial Cabinet Decree No. 6/2012. The minimum wage served as a safety threshold for all workers in the country, which meant that all types of collective agreements, including the National General Collective Agreement (NGCA), might establish wages higher than the statutory minimum wages. The NGCA remained the cornerstone of the collective bargaining system due to the general implementation of its non-wage clauses, whereas wage clauses of the NGCA applied only to employees working for employers represented by the signatory employers’ organizations. On 14 May 2013, a new NGCA had been signed, demonstrating the consensus of the signatory parties to reinforce bipartite social dialogue. Moreover, since July 2012, successful collective bargaining had taken place at the sectoral level, resulting in the conclusion of collective agreements in major sectors of the Greek economy, such as tourism, commerce, private health services and the banking sector. With regard to collective bargaining at the enterprise level, 976 collective agreements had been signed in 2012 compared to 179 in 2011. These collective agreements had been signed either by trade unions or associations of persons. The association of persons gave a collective voice to employees at the enterprise level and was legally qualified as a trade union, according to Act No. 1264/1982. Furthermore, by virtue of Act No. 4024/2011, it was possible to establish an association of persons in small firms of less than 20 employees. These associations of persons ensured high union density due to a participation requirement of three-fifths of the employees in the enterprise, and they acquired the right to sign a collective agreement only if there were no enterprise trade unions. The speaker observed that the requirement for the establishment of a trade union, was at least 20 members, and the union was nullified when its members were less than ten. She emphasized that the above clarifications demonstrated the compliance of all reforms with the provisions of the Convention. While ensuring the rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining, the Conference did not imply a certain system to be applicable and did not prohibit the reform of a national system, provided that the core of these rights was respected. Regarding the funding of the Organization for Mediation and Arbitration (OMED), the “Special Fund for the Implementation of Social Policies” (ELEKP) had been established in 2013, by virtue of Act No. 4144. The operation of this fund lay within the competence of the Manpower Employment Organization (OAED), which had assumed the responsibilities of the Workers’ Social Fund (OEE), including the funding of OMED.

The report of the ILO high-level mission had already provided valuable insight into the positions shared by the Government, the social partners and the international bodies involved in the international loan agreement, namely the Troika. In light of the above, the Government welcomed the cooperation with the ILO. The Government representative indicated that she was looking forward to the national seminar in the framework of the initiative “Promoting a balanced and inclusive recovery from the crisis in Europe through sound industrial relations and social dialogue” organized jointly by the ILO and the European Commission in Greece at the end of June 2013. The Government expected that this seminar could initiate the re‑engagement in social dialogue to implement policies enhancing economic growth, combating unemployment and protecting workers’ living standards.

The Employer members observed that this case raised a variety of issues relating to the recent financial and economic crisis in the country, and it was important to focus only on the issues relating to the Government’s application of the Convention. The CFA had recently reviewed substantially similar allegations concerning the Government’s application of the Convention. Although it was not always appropriate to refer to the conclusions of the CFA, due to that Committee’s specific mandate, the context of the case it had examined was similar to that of the present discussion. In this regard, qualifying the context of the country as grave and exceptional, the CFA had in its conclusions, called for the promotion and strengthening of social dialogue, as had the Committee of Experts. Likewise, when the Conference Committee had reviewed this case during its 2011 session, it had also concluded that the Government needed to make a better effort to engage in social dialogue. In addition, the Convention allowed for emergency measures to be implemented subject to certain caveats. Articles 3 and 4 of the Convention expressly referred to taking measures appropriate to national conditions. This was incredibly relevant in this context, as the country was debt-laden and experiencing a financial and economic crisis.

The Worker members recalled that the case raised the issue of the relevance of the austerity policies pursued within the European Union, particularly the Eurozone. According to the Government itself, the harsh measures adopted had been practically dictated by the Troika in exchange for the provision of loans which the country urgently needed. The report of the ILO high-level mission was largely supportive of the Government. Nevertheless, the Government remained ultimately responsible for the policies that it was implementing. The conclusions of the Ninth European Regional Meeting held in Oslo in 2013 reaffirmed the desire of the tripartite constituents to pursue an upward course out of the crisis. In the present case there was a visible need to increase the coherence of policies with international and regional organizations and institutions on macroeconomic, labour market, employment and social protection issues, as underlined by the Oslo Declaration in 2013. The Worker members endorsed the Committee of Experts’ request for the creation of a space in which the social partners would be able to participate fully in the determination of any subsequent amendments to the agreements with the Troika, relating to aspects that represented the very core of industrial relations, social dialogue and social peace. With a view to enabling a job-rich recovery, consultations needed to be held between the Government and the social partners regarding: the protection of wages and their purchasing power; the formulation and implementation of labour market policy measures; the means of tackling pay inequality issues, including collective bargaining; the future of social security; the reform of the labour administration system; and collective bargaining in the public service. The Worker members echoed the concerns of the Committee of Experts regarding the measures taken under the law of 12 February 2012, concerning the approval of the plan for credit facilitation agreements in the context of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). That law aggravated the situation by imposing the abolition or renegotiation of collective labour agreements, which had been converted into agreements of indefinite duration. In particular, it enabled collective agreements to be concluded, on the workers’ side, not by representative trade unions but by “associations of persons” which did not offer the guarantees of independence corresponding to workers’ representatives. Finally, the Government had unilaterally imposed various flexibility measures, which gave employers numerous possibilities for making unilateral changes to key conditions in employment contracts. Voicing their deep concern for the Greek workers, the Worker members endorsed the declaration in the report of the ILO high-level mission to the effect that the ILO should have the capacity to assist the social partners in discussions regarding a model for social dialogue and collective bargaining, enabling them to preserve their role especially in collective bargaining at sectoral level.

The Worker member of Greece expressed the view that social dialogue and collective bargaining had been used as leverage tools for the negotiations of the loan mechanism and that authoritarian unilateralism had replaced democratic tripartism, thus making the social partners redundant. In February 2012, the social partners in Greece had been engaged in talks on a broad agenda, including the freezing of the national minimum wage for the next two or three years. The social partners had been renegotiating an agreement that was to expire after a year. However, this round of collective bargaining had never been concluded: the Government, under pressure from the Troika, had, despite its pledges to respect social dialogue outcomes, unilaterally legislated a 22 per cent slash in the national minimum wage, thereby bringing wages to below subsistence levels. This interference by the Government had given the final blow to labour institutions. Moreover, the Government had virtually abolished collective bargaining outcomes, as set out in the NGCA; had wiped out jointly agreed-upon minimum standards of work; had pushed huge groups of workers below the poverty thresholds, as social security contributions and taxes had been included in the gross amount of the wages; and had automatically reduced minimum welfare benefits that were directly linked by law to the minimum wage. She declared that since 2010, there had been a steady disintegration of a once functioning industrial relations system. While the IMF and the European Commission had described government interventions to reduce the scope of collective bargaining rights and diminish the wage-setting powers of trade unions as “employment friendly” policies, this was a sorely tested fallacy: spiralling unemployment, poverty, relentless recession, bankrupt businesses and households, and a gravely disinvested economy confirmed their wholesale failure. The IMF itself had recently admitted this failure.

Referring to the Committee of Experts, she stressed that weakening collective bargaining had hurt recovery; that collective bargaining was key for constructive processes that linked crisis responses to the real economy; and that social dialogue was vital in crisis situations. Moreover, the speaker pointed out that workers had been doubly disempowered: serious economic disempowerment was compounded by a critical loss of institutional capability to survive in an increasingly hostile labour market. She emphasized the need for intensive, frank, constructive and meaningful social dialogue, which was key for a comprehensive vision of labour relations. One starting point for such a vision was the NGCA and the notion that the wage-setting mechanism should fully conform to international labour standards, which means that it should be governed by collective bargaining. Taking into account the recommendations made by the ILO on various occasions, the speaker argued that overt intervention in lawful wage-setting mechanisms violated the core of the Convention, expressed grave concern with regard to the impact of the situation on collective bargaining processes, and expressed the hope that the Committee would deliver a strong message on the imperative need to respect labour rights as fundamental human rights, while implementing fiscal and social strategy measures. Lastly, she emphasized that the argument that social dialogue was an unaffordable luxury in times of crisis and that it was better for the State to simply intervene, was unwise and politically hazardous, as it ignored the political and economic added value of social dialogue for the operation of the system and for social cohesion. Social dialogue was not an idle discussion between opposing parties but a fundamental political and social process which, when destroyed, led to the vices of undemocratic decision-making.

The Employer member of Greece stated that, in the report of the Committee of Experts, five points of alleged non-conformity of the national legislation with the Convention could be identified. With regard to the first two points, the Committee had said that there had been no violation of the Convention considering that the legal imposition of a maximum three-year period for collective agreements was not contrary to the Convention, provided that the parties were free to agree on a different duration. The same applied to the abolition of unilateral recourse to compulsory arbitration under Act No. 4046 of 2012 and Act No. 6 of 28 February 2012 of the Council of Ministers. Currently, recourse to arbitration was only possible with the consent of all the interested parties. Furthermore, the CFA had adopted the same position regarding the abolition of compulsory arbitration in Greece. The legislation was thus in conformity with the provisions of Article 6 of the Collective Bargaining Convention, 1981 (No. 154), Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration Recommendation, 1951 (No. 92), and Collective Bargaining Recommendation, 1981 (No. 163). The speaker considered that the most difficult issue concerned the third point relating to interventions by the legislature regarding the content of the NGCA, which in fact played the role of an inter-occupational collective agreement. For decades, this collective agreement had determined wages and other minimum conditions of work applicable to all employers and all workers in the country, regardless of their trade union affiliation. However, the legislative intervention had had the effect of significantly reducing the minimum wages fixed by the 2010 inter-occupational collective agreement. This intervention had also suspended wage increases and the payment of seniority bonuses provided for in collective agreements at all levels. Furthermore, she specified that the levels of wages and all other forms of remuneration provided for in an inter-occupational collective agreement would only be compulsory for employers affiliated to signatory organizations. As regards other questions (for example, additional paid holidays), the inter-occupational collective agreement would apply to all employers and workers in the country. Minimum wages would from now on be determined through administrative means, after consultation of, inter alia, the social partners. In that context, the legal reduction of minimum wages laid down in the inter-occupational collective agreement was certainly contrary to Article 4 of the Convention, as was the suspension of the clauses relating to wage increases on the basis of seniority. However, the same did not apply to the future fixing of wages by administrative means, to which the Convention was not opposed. It should be noted that all interference in the content of collective agreements, whether or not justified by the gravity and exceptional nature of the economic crisis in the country, concerned the collective agreements in force at the time of publication of the respective laws. Currently, the contracting parties were not subject to any restriction regarding the content of collective agreements. However, in the current absence of a NGCA, it was up to the former signatory parties to find the means to emerge from the impasse. Referring to the definition of “collective agreements” in the Collective Agreements Recommendation, 1951 (No. 91), the speaker indicated that, to facilitate the conclusion of a collective agreement in an enterprise which did not have any enterprise union, Act No. 4024/2011 allowed workers to be represented to that effect by a “association of persons”. The association of persons actually belonged to the category of primary-level trade unions which had been recognized since 1982 by the basic law on trade unions. It had always enjoyed the right to strike without any concerns being raised in this regard. The recognition of the association of persons as a social partner actually represented a logical and even necessary development, since it constituted no more than a supplementary form of trade union organization. However, these associations had to account for at least 60 per cent of the workers of the enterprise, whereas enterprise trade unions were authorized to conclude a collective agreement regardless of the size of its membership. The last point concerned the relationship between enterprise collective agreements and branch collective agreements. Initially, in the event of a conflict between these two types of collective agreements, the agreement most favourable to the employees prevailed. Nowadays, enterprise collective agreements, even the least advantageous to the employees, always prevailed over branch collective agreements. The favourability principle had therefore given way to the “speciality” principle, inasmuch as the agreement closest to the employment relationship to be regulated applied. Since there did not appear to be any international rule establishing a hierarchy among the various levels of collective agreements, the legislative reform would enable enterprises to adjust their wage bill to their own economic situation, in such a manner as to preserve jobs.

In conclusion, the speaker recognized that collective bargaining was currently going through a difficult phase; the change in the legal context having somewhat disrupted collective labour relations. Hence the issues in question were not legal ones but rather of a political and economic nature. Lastly, the speaker indicated that the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises and Industries (SEV), as the most representative employers’ organization, had several times expressed its commitment to social dialogue and collective bargaining, and had declared its willingness to participate, with the workers’ confederation and the Government, in any joint platform at the appropriate level with a view to finding adequate solutions to the current situation, with the assistance of the Office.

The Government member of France, speaking also on behalf of the Government members of Cyprus, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain, considered that social dialogue was a privileged instrument for government action, in particular through the consultation of the social partners in the process of economic reform. Greece was currently facing an unprecedented crisis the effects of which had been particularly severe for the country. In such a difficult context, due note should be taken of the Government’s undertaking vis-à-vis the Committee to respect the principles of the Convention and of its intention to protect workers’ living standards. The Government could only be encouraged to continue along those lines.

The Worker member of the United Kingdom stated that the application of the Convention was a fundamental building block in enhancing social protection and strengthening social dialogue. Greece had established well-developed machinery and institutions for collective bargaining, which were now experiencing wide interference, with profound effects on the lives of workers, their families and communities. The measures of the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies were dismantling almost every aspect of the collective bargaining system. The NGCA had been abolished. Ninty per cent of the workforce in small enterprises could not join a union. With pay cuts and slashed pensions, poverty in Greece was soaring. More than one third of the population had an income of less than the poverty line set at just over €7,000 per year per person in 2012, and almost 44 per cent of children lived below the poverty line. There was little social assistance and few received unemployment benefits. It was estimated that at least 40,000 people were homeless. There had been an explosive growth in soup kitchens and a sharp drop in access to medicine and health services. She considered that this Committee must demand that the Convention be respected, that social dialogue be reinstated, and that workers and their organizations be able to participate in decisions about labour market and living standards. The fact of an economic crisis made these demands even more critical, not less.

The Worker member of France observed that, for three years, Greek workers had suffered from unusually brutal and widespread austerity measures, which had plunged the country into deep recession and seriously restricted the economic and social rights of employees and pensioners. The most vulnerable sectors of society had been particularly affected by the measures that the Government had implemented in an effort to apply the policies imposed by the European Union and the IMF. In that regard, the Government had passed several laws since 2010; on 5 March 2010, an austerity law (No. 3833/2010) had imposed severe wage and paid leave cuts in the public and private sectors, which had already been cut, once again, under a subsequent law. The right to collective bargaining was controlled by the Government, which prohibited the conclusion of collective agreements that might lead to a wage increase. The favourability principle that had guaranteed that collective agreements at company or local levels could not derogate from the provisions of national or sectoral conventions, but could improve or supplement them, had been discontinued. The situation was made worse by the prohibition against forming trade unions in small and medium-sized enterprises. The Committee of Experts had rightly considered that the Government should allow the exercise of freedom of association in small and medium-sized enterprises with 20 workers or fewer in order to guarantee that trade union organizations could exercise the right to collective bargaining and maintain the favourability principle, as enshrined in Recommendation No. 91. The Government had also taken measures deregulating the labour market and making it more flexible, and had reduced the amount of welfare benefits. All those restrictive and socially regressive measured openly violated Greece’s international commitments. Nonetheless, on 5 May 2013, a national collective agreement had been signed by the majority of employers’ organizations and the Greek General Confederation of Labour (GSEE), in an effort to maintain for the future the existence of this general private sector agreement, which demonstrated the fact that the main social partners remained committed to the principle of independent collective bargaining. There was no doubt that there were serious, ongoing violations of the Convention. The 2012 report of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, the 2011 report of the ILO high-level mission and the more recent report of the CFA, all corroborated the opinion of the Committee of Experts that there had been serious violations of fundamental workers’ rights. If emergency measures had been necessary, they should have been the subject of prior consultations and negotiations should have been in force for a very limited time. However, the Government had chosen to deny all social rights as well as the established jurisprudence. The violations of the Convention observed by the supervisory bodies were the result of deliberate political decisions which affected trade unions’ right to organize and the right to collective bargaining, thus hugely and needlessly reducing workers’ and pensioners’ standards of living, instead of planning to restructure the debt over the longer term, or taking other measures that would not ruin the economy. The Committee should strongly denounce that situation and require the Government to fully respect freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, and to put an end to socially regressive policies.

The Worker member of Italy stated that the labour market restructuring and austerity measures had had a very high cost for Greek society, hitting harder the most vulnerable: children, the elderly and migrants, especially women in those groups. As a consequence, the right to work had been severely compromised, which set a dangerous precedent for the European social model and governance. Unemployment was today more than double the Eurozone average rate, registering a 95 per cent increase in three years (2009–11) and reaching 27 per cent in February 2013. Austerity measures widened inequality and the gender gap in employment: unemployment for women was much higher than that of men, and women were more affected by legislation promoting flexibility in the labour market. The Greek Ombudsperson had reported a steady increase of complaints concerning unfair dismissals due to pregnancy or maternity leave or sexual harassment. The blind attack led against collective bargaining systems had entailed the deliberate dismantling of the welfare state on one side and a growing black market for labour on another side. Decentralization of the labour market was indeed the central objective of the Troika. The UN Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt, had noted, on his recent mission to Greece, that the prospects of a significant part of the population to access the job market and secure an adequate standard of living in line with international human rights standards had been compromised. The most highly educated workers were leaving the country, posing a threat to the national potential. These facts proved that austerity policies were only worsening the situation.

An observer representing Public Services International (PSI) stated that successive “rescue” packages were presented as an extreme remedy to save Greece from bankruptcy. Their provisions were summarily incorporated into Greek legislation and implemented instead of using collective bargaining as a means of achieving greater efficiency and better management of enterprises and public institutions. Moreover, the Troika had been pressuring the Government since February 2012 to cut 150,000 public sector jobs by 2015, which would have a wide impact on living standards and the potential for employment of future and current generations. She pointed out that quality public services were the foundation of democratic societies and successful economies. The driving force of the privatization of these services was the maximization of corporate profits rather than public interest. One of the key demands of the Troika was that the Government undertake massive privatizations to raise funds (€50 billion) so as to reduce the public debt. Among the enterprises targeted for privatization were public utilities which provided essential public services such as water and sanitation and energy. Moreover, public health systems had become increasingly inaccessible, in particular for poor citizens and marginalized groups, due to increased fees and co-payments, closure of hospitals and health care centres, and more and more people losing public health insurance cover, mainly due to prolonged unemployment. She recalled that the Convention applied to public service workers, with the only possible exception of the police and armed forces, and public servants engaged in the administration of the State, and demanded that public sector workers’ rights to collective bargaining be respected and that the current crisis should not be used as an excuse for dismantling social dialogue mechanisms in Greece. The austerity programme was being implemented in the context of a social protection system, which was characterized by protection gaps and which, in its current form, was not able to absorb the shock of unemployment, reductions of salaries and tax increases. Instead of strengthening the social safety net and making it more comprehensive, priority appeared to have been accorded to fiscal consolidation at the expense of the welfare of the Greek people. She called on the Government to engage in meaningful collective bargaining as one of the main instruments of getting out of this crisis and re-building democratic structures.

The Government representative assured that her Government would take serious note of all comments, and expressed particular appreciation for the common statement made by the Government members of Cyprus, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain, sharing their belief in the importance of social dialogue in the process of economic reforms. With respect to the points raised by the Employer and Worker members, she observed that the joint declarations by the social partners on issues referring to the collective bargaining system had failed to address all the key issues of the reforms with consensus and did not constitute social dialogue per se. The reform of the collective bargaining system was a political issue which did not touch upon the legal aspects of the Convention. The rationale behind the reform was to increase flexibility of the wage-setting system and swiftly adjust wages to the conditions of the Greek economy. In particular, the NGCA wage cuts were temporary, since they could be modified through collective bargaining process. The restrictions of the scope of application of the NGCA had been introduced in relation to the establishment of the statutory minimum wage system. This reform was a political issue to be addressed only by consensus of the social partners, mainly by expanding the applicability of the NGCA through increasing the participation of the signatory employers’ organizations, and by setting minimum wages different from the statutory minimum wage. Unfortunately, the NGCA of 14 May 2013 had not set minimum wages, which demonstrated the difficulties of the bipartite social dialogue and the necessity of the statutory minimum wages. The duration of collective agreements, albeit, determined by law at a maximum of three years, did not hinder the signatory parties to agree otherwise and reaffirm by exercising their right to collective bargaining, the continuation of the collective agreements. This practice was widespread in the ethics of collective bargaining in Greece since 60 years, as the signatory parties used to update by amendments their long standing collective agreements. Despite the abolition of the unilateral recourse to arbitration, the restricted mandate of the arbitrators to issue awards only upon basic wages, did not prevent the signatory parties to agree upon a different system of collective dispute resolution that would provide a wide mandate to the arbitrators for all issues of common concern. This possibility was established in section 14 of Act 1876/1990 and, if included in the NGCA, could be binding for all employers and employees in the country. Lastly, she pointed out that the abovementioned issues demonstrated the need for a comprehensive social dialogue at all levels which had to be embraced by the social partners. To this end, the Government looked forward to the active engagement of the ILO to help build solid and effective social dialogue to overcome the economic crisis.

The Employer members expressed their appreciation for the robust discussion on this case. While hearing a lot of serious concern expressed by various speakers in their contributions, they pointed out that many statements related to the economic upheaval in Greece and not to its compliance with the Convention. They referred to the massive changes taking place in Greece and underlined that it took time to adapt to change. In this regard, the Convention did not require a specific system of collective bargaining. Therefore, and recalling that the CFA had referred to the situation in Greece as grave and exceptional, the Employer members expressed the hope that the conclusions, while focusing on the application of the Convention, would be realistic given the context. Lastly, they noted that there had been some consensus on increasing social dialogue, and also called for measures to this end.

The Worker members expressed their firm support for the Committee of Experts’ request for the creation of a space for the social partners that would enable them to be fully involved in the determination of any further alterations within the framework of the agreements with the Troika, that touched upon matters that went to the heart of labour relations, social dialogue and social peace. They echoed the Committee of Experts’ call on the Government to review within that forum, in conjunction with the social partners, all the measures that had been discussed before the Conference Committee, with a view to limiting their impact and duration and to ensuring proper guarantees to protect workers’ living standards. The Worker members strongly urged the Government to ensure that the social partners could play an active role in any wage-setting mechanism. The Worker members strongly urged the Government, within the framework of the follow-up to the 2011 high-level mission, to accept, as a matter of urgency, a programme of technical assistance and cooperation for itself and the social partners to help create a space for social dialogue, taking as a starting point the NGCA and aiming at the implementation of the comments of the Committee of Experts. The Government should submit a report to the Committee of Experts at its next meeting to enable it to assess the progress achieved.

Conclusions

The Committee took note of the statement made by the Government representative and the discussion that followed.

The Committee observed that the outstanding issues in this case concerned numerous interventions in collective agreements and allegations that, within the context of austerity measures imposed by loan agreements between the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund and the Greek Government in a context characterized as grave and exceptional, collective bargaining was seriously weakened and the autonomy of the bargaining partners violated.

The Committee noted the information provided by the Government representative concerning the reform of the collective bargaining legal framework through the establishment of decentralization in the implementation of collective agreements due to the economic crisis. She further provided information on the Special Fund for the Implementation of Social Policies (ELEKP) that had been established in 2013 and was being operated by the Manpower Employment Organization (OAED), which had assumed responsibility for the Workers’ Social Fund, including the funding of the Organization for Mediation and Arbitration (OMED). She stated, however, that the statutory minimum wage fixing process which would be established by ministerial decree would be defined in consultation with the social partners. She reiterated that the critical economic situation and the complicated negotiations at international level provided no room for consultation with the social partners prior to the legislative reforms. She observed that the national seminar on promoting a balanced and inclusive recovery through sound industrial relations and social dialogue, jointly organized by the ILO and the European Commission on 25 and 26 June, would provide an important opportunity to capitalize on ILO experience to reinforce trust on common goals and confidence between social partners and the Government. She expressed her expectation that this event would initiate the re-engagement in social dialogue to implement policies enhancing economic growth, combating unemployment and protecting workers’ living standards.

The Committee recalled that the interference in collective agreements as part of a stabilization policy should only be imposed as an exceptional measure, limited in time and degree, and accompanied by adequate safeguards to protect workers’ living standards. Mindful of the importance of full and frank dialogue with the social partners concerned to review the impact of austerity measures and the measures to be taken in times of crisis, the Committee requested the Government to intensify its efforts, with ILO technical assistance, to establish a functioning model of social dialogue on all issues of concern with a view to promoting collective bargaining, social cohesion and social peace in full conformity with the Convention. The Committee urged the Government to take steps to create a space for the social partners that would enable them to be fully involved in the determination of any further alterations that touched upon aspects going to the heart of labour relations and social dialogue. It invited the Government to provide additional detailed information to the Committee of Experts this year on the matters raised and on the impact of the abovementioned measures on the application of the Convention.

Individual Case (CAS) - Discussion: 2011, Publication: 100th ILC session (2011)

A Government representative stated that the examination of the Greek case was a difficult task because it required consideration of complex information related to the reform of the collective bargaining system undertaken in the context of the current economic crisis. Her Government was aware of the sacrifices required from its people to combat the financial crisis, which had first appeared at the end of 2008, emerged in 2009 and escalated into 2010. The Government’s priority had always been and remained the rescue of the national economy, fundamental for the sustainability of the welfare state and social cohesion. While appreciating the concerns raised by the Greek General Confederation of Labour (GSEE) regarding the right to organize and collective bargaining, the Government considered that this case, although raising important socio-political issues, was not a case of violation of the Convention.

The Government representative recalled that in 2009, Greece had entered a period of severe financial crisis, characterized by an extremely high deficit: the cost of public borrowing had become excessive, hindering the country’s ability to obtain loans. To rescue the economy, a financial support mechanism had been established at the European level between February and April 2010 and a loan of €110 billion had been provided under the terms agreed upon between Greece and the Troïka (the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)). The terms of the loan scheduled the policy measures and the loan instalments in a period of three years. As far as labour law was concerned, the policies introduced in the Memoranda were epitomized on the following: the restriction of the public expenditure resulting in wage cuts, as a necessary component to control public deficit; improvement of the competitiveness of the economy through the decentralization of collective labour agreements; the reform of the wage-setting system; the development of flexible terms of employment; and reform of the social security system. The implementation of these measures had required prompt and effective adoption of new legislation introducing the following reforms. Firstly, regarding the GSEE’s allegation about the reform of the system of collective agreements introducing the possibility of deviation among them, this reform, initiated by Act No. 3845/2010 on “Measures to implement a mechanism to support the Greek economy by the Member States of the Euro area and the IMF”, decentralized the system of collective agreements, by relaxing the principle according to which the collective agreements for the national, general and sector prevailed over collective agreements at the occupational and enterprise levels. Act No. 3819/2010 further provided for special enterprise level collective agreements, which could suspend, for a limited period of time, the implementation of more favourable clauses contained in the sectoral collective agreement applying to a particular enterprise. The national general collective agreement, however, remained in force and no deviation from its terms was possible. These reforms did not touch the principle of free collective bargaining enshrined in the Convention, as unions maintained the right to conclude collective agreements. The GSEE’s allegation that the new legislation dismantled the solid machinery of the collective bargaining system was a socio-political argument but not a legal one. Secondly, regarding the GSEE’s allegation about the exceptions from the minimum wages set by the national collective agreement for children (of 15–18 years) and young workers (of 18–24 years) these measures aimed at promoting young persons’ access to the labour market and helping them to acquire work experience. The subsidization of their social security contributions by the Public Employment Service secured that their real wages remained at the level set by the national general collective agreement. Thirdly, regarding the GSEE’s allegation about permanent pay cuts introduced by Acts Nos 3833/2010 and 3845/2010 for employees in the civil service and all public sector legal entities, the said legislation was accompanied by measures to control and minimize expenses of the general government. Due to the seriousness of the situation, pay cuts had to be prompt, whereas collective bargaining was not time efficient to provide the necessary results. This was a unique and absolutely unprecedented practice in Greece. At the same time, free collective bargaining in the public sector on non-pay issues had not been affected or restricted. In the private sector, no pay cuts had been legislatively implemented and free collective bargaining had not been affected in any way. Under the heavy socio-political climate, a national general collective agreement was signed in July 2010 by the GSEE and employer’s organizations. This collective agreement was of the utmost importance since it set minimum wage standards and other minimum work conditions for all employees in the country. For the first time in the history of collective agreements in Greece, the national general collective agreement had been concluded for a three-year period to provide for the stability of wages for the year 2010 and for increase of wages from 1 July 2011 and 1 July 2012, reflecting average Euro inflation of the previous year. Collective agreements signed in the country in 2010 and 2011 had similar clauses.

In 2010, the social partners showed outstanding responsibility in supporting the national effort to overcome the economic crisis, which was accompanied by the increase of unemployment and strong signs of economic recession, threatening social coherence of the country. The Government valued and respected social dialogue. However, the critical economic situation and complicated negotiations at the international level provided no room for consultations with the social partners prior to all legislative reforms. Constructive social dialogue in cases of national economic emergency was an extremely difficult task and required other time frames than those available at the time. The Government had to serve the public interest and put aside its long tradition for the observance of the free collective bargaining process, by introducing unprecedented wage cuts for employees in the public service and accelerating labour law reforms. While these measures had to some extent lowered the existing level of protection in certain labour law regulations, they had not touched upon the core of the fundamental rights set by ILO Conventions and Recommendations or the Greek Constitution. The measures affecting collective bargaining rights were limited in time and covered the years 2010 to 2012. While the Convention and the Constitution prohibited the Government from intervening in collective bargaining, these instruments did not restrict the legislator from taking measures to reform the system of collective agreements. The Government assumed full responsibility for the legislative measures taken to overcome the economic crisis. Its actions were inspired by the need to serve the public interest by saving the national economy. This case had high political sensitivity and concerned measures undertaken under the European policies and implemented under continuous monitoring and evaluation by the Troïka. Such policies may also be implemented in other countries of the European Union facing similar economic crises. While the Government appreciated the EU’s concerns and considered that the discussion of this case enhanced the awareness of the need for social cohesion, from the legal point of view, it considered itself to be in compliance with the core of ILO standards. It is in this spirit that the Government welcomed the Committee of Experts’ suggestion for a high-level mission visit and was already in touch with the Office for the necessary preparations, for the understanding of the economic and legal complexities of the Greek case and the evaluation of ILO standards observance in a developed country under economic crisis.

The Worker members stressed that the case under discussion had been selected because of the Greek trade union movement’s concerns about the legislation that had been or was going to be introduced as part of the country’s economic support measures. The information sent to the Committee of Experts concerned this Convention, but it also touched on related Conventions such as the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), and the Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952 (No. 102). Moreover, it raised some of the issues covered by collective bargaining, such as protection of wages, equal remuneration, discrimination in employment and within occupations, employment policy, minimum age, social security, labour administration and workers with family responsibilities. The Committee of Experts had called on the Government to monitor the impact of the policies adopted under the international support mechanism and to send it a detailed report on the application of the relevant Conventions in 2011, and it would therefore shortly be considering these issues in the light of the very recent adoption of a new three-year budget adjustment programme to follow that of May 2010, which would entail additional austerity measures. The disputed points with respect to the Convention concerned three laws that had been adopted under the first public finance rescue plan that had been negotiated with the countries of the Euro zone and with the IMF: Act No. 3833/2010 on the “Protection of the national economy – Emergency measures to tackle the fiscal crisis”; Act No. 3845/2010 concerning the measures to implement an economic support mechanism set up by the States Members of the Eurozone and by the IMF; and Act No. 3863/2010 on the “New social security system and relevant provisions”. Act No. 3845 completely changed the hierarchy of collective labour agreements that had been established under a 1990 Act by allowing collective agreements at the enterprise or branch level to derogate from national or sectoral agreements, thereby dismantling a robust collective bargaining system that had previously functioned without any problem. It removed children (of 15–18) and young workers of 18–24 years from the scope of collective labour agreements and allowed their wages and working conditions to be determined by decree. It also provided for drastic and permanent wage cuts in the public service, including areas where labour relations were determined by private contracts of employment as part of the collective agreement system. Those measures had been adopted either without the social partners being consulted at all or after a mere show of consulting them on predetermined conclusions. Although the reasons behind the measures were circumstantial, they were in fact structural in nature. The measures were quite disproportionate, and yet no more socially balanced options had been considered. Because of the combined effect of dismissals, wage freezes and the abandonment of minimum wage levels, those three laws would result in a permanent and unjustifiable dilution of workers’ rights, whereas the Committee of Experts had rightly pointed out that any exceptions to existing standards – even though they might be justified in particularly pressing circumstances – must be allowed only in exceptional and temporary circumstances. The experience of the trade union movement showed that governments often took advantage of crises to introduce measures that were designed to restrict workers’ rights rather than to apply carefully thought-out economic adjustment strategies. It was important to understand the real impact and implications of a case such as that of Greece and to realize that the measures that were taken were never temporary and that the ramifications of policies of austerity went far beyond the borders of a single country. As the Committee of Experts had observed in its general survey, “It appears that in some cases the imperative need to achieve fiscal consolidation has not been balanced with sufficient concern for the social and human costs of such rapid austerity measures. Not only social cohesion will be put at risk, but in such conditions the economic recovery may be accompanied by a prolonged ‘human recession’. One should also remember that governing only by financially oriented criteria may lead to an undermining of social justice and equity. Public opinion is much less ready to accept drastic austerity measures if it sees that the efforts requested are not equally distributed and shared by everyone.” There was every reason to worry that blaming too much on the crisis might in the long run invalidate the ILO’s supervisory machinery, since it undermined the very essence of the Organization’s founding principles. Greece must therefore not be allowed to become a laboratory for the radical and permanent revision of fundamental Conventions and a means of dismantling systems of collective labour relations.

The Employer members pointed out that the facts under examination concerned new legislation – austerity legislation enacted in 2010 by the Government and the Parliament to deal with a serious and structural financial and economic crisis. This was the first time that the crisis response had been brought before the Conference Committee but not the first time the Committee of Experts had made comments on the application of this Convention by Greece. Since the ratification of this Convention by Greece in 1962, the Conference Committee had discussed issues regarding its application in Greece only in 1989 and 1991. The Employer members observed that, since the Government had not communicated its reply to the Committee of Experts’ 2010 observation, the Committee of Experts views were based solely on the complainants’ allegations. For this reason, the facts on which the Committee of Experts relied upon were incomplete. Thus, the Conference Committee could not make firm recommendations. While expressing their deep concern at the grave circumstances faced by the Government, employers and workers in the country, the Employer members stressed the need to follow a careful approach in order not to make the matter more divisive or worse by pre-emptive conclusions based on an incomplete picture. The Committee’s task should be limited to discussing issues regarding the Convention. As regards the complainants’ argument concerning multiple levels of minimum wages, this was not exceptional and did not in itself constitute a violation of the Convention. On the first issue raised by the Committee of Experts concerning the need for full and frank consultations with employers’ and workers’ organizations before the enactment of emergency legislation altering the machinery for collective bargaining, they pointed out that without the Government’s reply, it was not clear whether that occurred and, if so, how, or if not, why not. As regards the second issue on the potential impact of changes to the collective bargaining machinery on compliance with other ILO Conventions ratified by Greece, they commented that the Committee of Experts was conveying an impression of potential widespread breaches, which may be premature. In the absence of a Government reply, the Employer members expressed caution with regard to the Committee of Experts recommendation that the Government avail itself of technical assistance and that a high-level mission visits the country to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the issues. In this regard, the proper application of the Convention did permit emergency measures to be implemented subject to certain caveats. The terms of Article 4 of the Convention, referring to “measures appropriate to national conditions” could hardly be more relevant than in a case where there was a national economic and financial crisis in a debt laden country. The call for a mission of the type proposed by the Committee of Experts must be approached with great sensitivity at least until the Government’s position was understood, and until the situation had stabilized. Moreover, while the Committee of Experts made this suggestion, paragraph 72 of the Committee of Experts’ Report, which highlighted cases in which technical assistance for member States would be useful, did not mention Greece amongst the listed cases. While noting that legal or political observations by an international body like the ILO could be misinterpreted by outside actors and affect confidence and coherence in the direction of policy from other international actors, the Employer members urged caution in the nature and timing of ILO responses which at the very least would need the cooperation with the Government to have real benefit. Finally, they observed that the Government had indicated that an ILO mission would be welcome and this was encouraging.

The Worker member of Greece stressed that the suggestion for technical assistance was particularly welcome since the measures implemented in Greece were both complex and pervasive. She hoped that a high-level mission would fully clarify these measures and their wide ranging implications on the application of the Convention and other Conventions ratified by Greece. She stressed that not only the legislation invoked in the last comments remained in force, but over the last 12 months, various laws containing more than 100 legal provisions had been adopted, which further deconstructed the basis for collective agreements. The situation was an emergency situation but the measures were permanent, disproportionate and with harmful irreversible effects. Social dialogue degenerated into summary, informative and superficial procedure. Three times over the last year, workers in the public sector, especially public utility companies, saw their wages reduced up to 25 per cent by unilateral and permanent measures in violation of standing collective agreements. Last week, by a new unilateral decision, the Government increased the compulsory unemployment contribution in wages from 0.5 per cent to 3 per cent. A new element of concern was the thrust against sectoral collective agreements in a new law of December 2010, which established the special enterprise-level collective agreement. Under this law, any employer, by threatening with lay-offs, could effectively force a union to consent to standards lower than those of the binding sectoral agreements. Also, she/he could unilaterally or by consent convert full-time work contracts into part-time or into reduced-term rotation work, the worst form of flexible employment. This legislation, that favours potentially unions controlled by the employers, had weakened the workers’ bargaining position in many sectors crucial to the economy, such as tourism. A number of collective agreements which had expired at the beginning of 2010, covering thousands of workers, had been renewed with great delay, but yielded mostly zero wage increase, or their renewal was still pending. Moreover, recent data from the Labour Inspectorate showed a dramatic surge up to 2.725 per cent in just two months in individual contracts, mainly concerning reduced-term rotation work after the adoption of the abovementioned legislation. Individual contracts negated the very concept of negotiation and de facto undermined collective bargaining and the essence of trade unionism potentially rendering trade unions useless. Recalling the European Commission criticism over the Government’s inadequacy in eliminating sectoral agreements and replacing them with enterprise-level contracts, she pointed out that the European Commission and the IMF approach to determine by law the level of bargaining in Greece went directly against the principle of free and voluntary collective bargaining embodied in Article 4 of the Convention, according to which, the determination of the bargaining level should essentially be left to the discretion of the parties. She remarked that this case posed a fundamental question regarding the value, the validity and dependability of principles under emergency conditions when they were more needed as a stable frame of reference. She concluded by stating that the qualitative and quantitative regression of the labour market, in spite of the crisis, should not settle into a long-term deep social regression and demolish social cohesion. The situation in Greece had a complex socio-political context, but the case presented by the GSEE was firmly founded on the standards framework and facts. Ratification of Conventions should be taken seriously, not only by Greece but by all parties involved in the loan mechanism. Further evidence and updated data would be presented to the ILO and hopefully to the high-level mission. The added value of this discussion lay in sending a strong message to respect standards, to uphold the autonomy of the social partners and to promote effective social dialogue in which trade unions and workers were part, and not the targets, of the solutions.

The Employer member of Greece wondered whether it was possible to declare discussion of this case inadmissible, given that the Committee of Experts had not had time to formulate observations and that the time allowed to the Government to submit its report had not yet expired for 2011. In addition, a high-level ILO mission was to visit the country just after the end of the current session of the Conference, as the Committee of Experts had also noted in its report. All those factors showed that this case had not yet reached the required maturity for discussion by the Conference Committee, unless the aim was to ensure that, from now on, the Conference Committee was seized with cases before the Committee of Experts had given its view. While taking note of the statement made by the Worker member of Greece, the speaker suggested that the Conference Committee should refrain from drawing any conclusion on the case and should await the results of the high-level mission and the comments of the Committee of Experts.

The Government member of France, speaking also on behalf of the Government members of Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain, stated that these countries were fully aware that since May 2010, Greece had adopted financial and legal measures with a view to reducing the public deficit and restructuring the labour market, aiming to advance the competitiveness of its economy. These countries believed in the importance of social dialogue, respect for workers’ rights and the autonomy of social partners in collective bargaining, and attached great importance to the upcoming ILO high-level mission to Greece.

The Worker member of Spain stated that the moment had come to examine this case, rather than waiting until the Greek economy had collapsed or workers’ rights no longer existed. Revising the Greek system of collective bargaining had an impact on compliance with other international labour standards and on the European social model. In reality, the crisis was being used as a pretext to dismantle a model founded on economic development and social cohesion so as to benefit financial capital and speculation. The austerity plan drawn up by the European Union using the European Governance Plan and the Pact for the Euro was founded on fiscal austerity and cutting social benefits and salaries and undermining collective bargaining, which would only serve to worsen the social situation in countries, particularly those subject to permanent control of financial markets. It was unacceptable that those who had benefited from financial rescue packages using public resources were requiring workers to make ever more sacrifices. As the Committee on Freedom of Association maintained, in the case of budget adjustments or stabilization policies that entailed restrictions on the free setting of wages, the following requirements should be met: such measures should be exceptional, restricted to those necessary, not exceed a reasonable period of time (the Committee considered three years to be too long), and accompanied by sufficient guarantees to protect workers’ standard of living. None of those requirements had been fulfilled in Greece. It was even more worrying that certain institutions, particularly the IMF, were putting pressure on some countries not to comply with international labour standards.

The Worker member of Germany emphasized that the proposals of the European Commission, Governments of Member States of the European Union, the European Central Bank and the IMF to resolve Greece’s financial difficulties had resulted in the adoption of legal and administrative measures that were undermining the fundamental rights of the social partners, and especially the trade unions. The Greek Government’s restrictions on the right of unions to bargain collectively were quite out of proportion; moreover, on the grounds that urgent measures were called for, it had imposed a wage freeze without setting any clear time frame. The Government’s attempt to occupy what had always been the social partners’ preserve should be categorically condemned, since it ran counter not only to the Convention but also to other standards of the ILO and of the European Union, whose Charter of Fundamental Rights recognized the workers’ right to form trade unions and to negotiate. In May 2011, the European Trade Union Confederation called on the ministries of economy and of finance of the European Union and on the Government of Greece to respect the autonomy of the social partners. Moreover, the fact that the European Court of Justice gave precedence to capital and services over labour rights needed to be corrected, for example by including a social progress clause in the texts governing the European Union. In conclusion, the speaker expressed his unqualified support for the recommendations of the Committee of Experts with respect to the promotion of employment and equal opportunities, decent remuneration, good working conditions and the need to respect the freedom and autonomy of the social partners in negotiating and determining conditions of employment at the enterprise and sectoral levels.

The Worker member of France stated that the Act of 5 May 2010 called into question the precedence of the national general collective agreement since agreements concluded at the sectoral and enterprise levels could deviate from the terms of the sectoral agreements and thus from the national general collective agreement. In shifting the level of bargaining towards the enterprise, the Act under discussion had some negative side effects and favoured discriminatory and exclusionary measures, especially towards young persons, and women. The dismantling of collective bargaining had its first impact in terms of unemployment, affecting four out of ten young persons. Together with Spain, Greece had the highest share of young persons among the unemployed in Europe (40 per cent against 21.4 per cent in Europe). The general unemployment rate was likely to reach 22 per cent by the end of 2011. Young workers found themselves in an unprecedented precarious situation, holding apprenticeship contracts remunerated at 70 or 80 per cent of the minimum basic wage, or holding the so-called “newly hired” contracts. Such a deviation from minimum protection was taking place at the same time as the issue of social protection had been given special importance during this session of the Conference. The fact that such contracts were not in conformity with ILO Conventions had already been recognized. The dismantling of that level of bargaining had also affected equality between men and women as demonstrated by the increased unemployment rate among women, at 18.7 per cent compared to 11.6 per cent for men, in addition to wage inequalities reaching 20 per cent. The categories most affected by such precarious conditions of employment were young women, mothers, older-aged women, and migrant female workers. She emphasized that a charity organization called SOS Village based in Athens and Thessaloniki, had registered an increase of 45 per cent in demands from single mothers only, in one year. The fact that the agreement was called into question engendered unacceptable social consequences and impacted negatively on the strategic objective of employment as reiterated in the ILO Global Jobs Pact as well as in numerous ILO Conventions. The standard-setting framework of the ILO was itself called into question by conditions imposed by the IMF which provoked a problem of coherence in the international decisions. In conclusion, the speaker stressed the need for the Conference to deliver a strong message in order to be able to come out of the economic crisis by guaranteeing protection and social cohesion through a process of democratic and inclusive debate and the respect for fundamental labour rights. She called for the strict application of the Convention.

The Worker member of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela expressed support for the workers of Greece in their fight against violations of their right to bargain collectively, as a result of the agreement between the IMF and the European Union. In effect, Greek workers’ rights to stability, social security, decent working hours and collective bargaining, won through struggle and sacrifice, were being undermined in tackling a crisis not of their making. The measures taken would simply lead to greater exploitation of workers to benefit monopolies. The public sector had already seen two rounds of drastic wage cuts in 2010, violating collective agreements in force, while the cost of the family shopping basket, transport and electricity had risen continuously.

The Government representative expressed her deep appreciation for the common statement made by the Governments of Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain, and shared their view about the importance of the upcoming ILO high-level mission to Greece. She indicated that her comments would address only issues related to Convention No. 98 but recalled that the Government’s reply, which had already been sent to the Office, contained all necessary information regarding the other Conventions affected, according to the GSEE allegations. She also indicated that additional information would be provided to the Committee of Experts in the context of regular reporting while any further legislative developments would be discussed during the visit of the ILO high-level mission. Her Government acknowledged that current reforms were affecting labour law, but considered that the decentralization of collective agreements that had been introduced did not restrict the freedom of collective bargaining. She further pointed out that the reforms were introducing more flexibility, but as the upcoming ILO high-level mission visit would have the opportunity to attest, did not touch upon the core of ILO standards. She expressed the view that austerity measures affected mainly job opportunities and the quality of wages but these were economic factors. She noted that social dialogue concerning some of the necessary legislative measures could not take place due to the limited time available, while collective bargaining proceeded smoothly except for the question of wage cuts in the public sector. Her Government remained committed to the promotion of social dialogue, collective bargaining, trade union and social rights as fundamental values securing social cohesion. Economic policies, even in times of crisis, required the understanding and involvement of the people themselves. All measures taken by the Government, no matter how painful for the citizens and the country, had been taken, recognizing the need to maintain social cohesion. In the Government’s view, the rescue package of the Greek economy was compatible with international labour standards. The Government representative concluded by stating that the ILO high-level mission would have the opportunity to further examine the situation and appreciate the complexity of the legal and socio-political issues involved. Her Government firmly believed that there had been no violation of ILO core labour standards, and that it would be premature to draw any conclusions at this stage.

The Employer members welcomed the Government’s acceptance of a high-level mission. They noted the statements of the employer and worker members of Greece that conveyed the right spirit with which the Committee ought to deal with matters of significant economic, industrial and social concern. The Employer members felt that steps had been taken and it was important to ensure that these did not offend the principles and provisions of the Convention. They stressed that the Committee’s conclusions needed to be realistic, to convey a thorough understanding of the situation, and to be respectful of the support that was being provided to Greece by European Union Member States and the International Monetary Fund. The Committee had to remain conscious of the broader picture. It needed to express its concern about the circumstances facing, not just the workers and the employers in the country, but also the Government, as it sought to navigate through the crisis. The Employer members expressed the view that based on the discussion and the willingness of the Government to accept further information-gathering, fact-finding and analysis, the foundations were laid for a proper assessment of the Convention.

The Worker members considered it was important for the Committee to send a strong message to international organizations and financial institutions, in view of the present global context in which anti-crisis measures were eroding workers’ rights. The economic policies adopted to overcome the crisis and to achieve economic recovery could not be effective if they did not take into account the need to guarantee social cohesion and the social protection of all citizens. The drastic deregulation of industrial relations which was taking place in Greece would not lead to economic development or maintain the competitiveness of enterprises. In that context, the Government should embark on effective and open tripartite dialogue on the measures which had been adopted in the framework of a rescue plan, without any consultation with the social partners. That dialogue would have the objective of verifying whether the financial rescue measures which had been taken, and which jeopardized the system of industrial relations, were really justified. It would also provide an opportunity for an assessment to be made of whether it was more appropriate to adapt temporarily the Industrial Relations Act, which had up to now guaranteed social peace, rather than undertaking a definitive reform of the Act. Finally, it would show the extent to which the information communicated by the Government representative gave effect to the principles contained in the Convention. The Worker members welcomed the proposal made by the Government to accept a high-level mission and expressed the hope that the mission would address the entirety of the points raised in the discussion and that it would also contact the EU and the IMF.

Conclusions

The Committee took note of the statement made by the Government representative and the discussion that followed.

The Committee noted the information provided by the Government representative concerning the reform of the collective bargaining legal framework due to the current economic crisis. She stressed that the Government’s top priority was, and remains, the rescue of the national economy as a fundamental requirement for the sustainability of the welfare state and maintaining social dialogue. She recalled that the terms of the necessary loan agreement between the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were stipulated in the Memoranda accompanying it. As regards the pay cuts in the civil service and the public sector legal entities, the Government representative stated that, due to the seriousness of the situation, the pay cuts had to be prompt and collective bargaining in these circumstances was not time efficient. While reaffirming the great importance which the Government attached to social dialogue, she emphasized that the critical economic situation and the complicated negotiations at international level provided no room for consultation with the social partners prior to the legislative reforms. The Committee noted that the Committee of Experts had before it numerous allegations from the Greek unions concerning the non-application of the Convention, particularly as regards the promotion of collective bargaining and the autonomy of the bargaining partners.

The Committee welcomed the constructive nature of this discussion on a subject whose consequence went far beyond the particular matter before it. It recalled the importance of the principle that restrictions on collective bargaining as part of a stabilization policy should be imposed only as an exceptional measure and only to the extent that is necessary, without exceeding a reasonable period, and they should be accompanied by adequate safeguards to protect workers’ living standards. It looked forward to having at its disposal full information to enable it to determine whether this principle is being applied. The Committee requested the Government to intensify its efforts and undertake full and frank dialogue with the social partners to review the impact of the austerity measures taken or envisaged with a view to ensuring that the provisions of the Convention are fully taken into account in future action. It welcomed the Government’s indication that it was working on arrangements with the ILO for the visit of the High-Level Mission proposed by the Committee of Experts. It considered that contact with the IMF and the European Union would also assist the Mission in its understanding of the situation. It invited the Government to provide additional detailed information to the Committee of Experts this year on the matters raised under the Convention and on the impact of the abovementioned measures on the application of the Convention.

Individual Case (CAS) - Discussion: 1991, Publication: 78th ILC session (1991)

A Government representative indicated that a new Act No. 1876 respecting free collective bargaining was adopted in 1990 and replaced an old Act No. 3239 of 1955 on collective bargaining, which was the subject of comments by the supervisory bodies. This new Act was an improvement on the previous situation, as had been noted by the Committee of Experts. The speaker explained that the delay in sending by the Government of its comments concerning the communications of certain trade union organisations was due to administrative difficulties, but that such comments had been already supplied to the ILO. According to the allegations made by the trade union organisations, the Government had acted arbitrarily to reduce wage increases provided for in the national labour agreement, with the result that the workers had lost 13 per cent of their purchasing power. The speaker stated that in its reply to these allegations the Government confirmed its firm hope for the establishment of free collective bargaining and indicated that the adoption of Act No. 1876 of 1990 was to reinforce this institution. He indicated that the most representative organisations of the country, namely the League of Greek Industries and the Greek General Confederation of Labour, had signed, as a result of free collective bargaining, a new national collective agreement for two years. The Greek workers, being aware of the difficult economic situation in the country, accepted the reduced wage increases as compared to the consumer price index increase during the period of 1991-92.

Concerning the allegations made by the trade union organisations with regard to the abolition of the automatic wage indexation in the private sector, the speaker indicated that the system introduced by Act No. 1884 of 1990 affected only workers and employees of the public sector during the four months period (May-August 1990) and was absolutely necessary, taking into account the negative evolution of almost all variable components of the national economy, such as the enormous deficit in the public sector. The introduction of such a system was necessary within the framework of the modernisation process undertaken by the Government for the sake of the national economy which experienced a difficult period of its evolution.

Those measures did not affect the private sector by virtue of section 21 of Act No. 1884 of 1990, which provided that wages for workers in this sector for the period May to August 1990 had to be determined by a supplementary national general collective agreement. That agreement had not been yet concluded. The speaker added that since the entry into force of Act No. 1884 of 1990, numerous collective agreements concerning wages had been negotiated and signed, without any intervention on the part of the Government. He pointed out that neither Act No. 1884 nor any other subsequent Act could affect the validity of the provisions of the collective agreements.

The Workers' members indicated that Act No. 1876 of 1990 might be considered as progress, since it provided for the possibility to bargain collectively at the branch and at the sector levels, and for the obligation to bargain collectively. However, in spite of the existence of this Act, the Government continued to intervene into free collective bargaining. They recalled the Committee of Experts' comments concerning the principles of free collective bargaining, and that the autonomy of the social partners constituted a fundamental aspect of the freedom of association. Any limitations should be applied only on an exceptional basis and should not exceed a reasonable period and should be accompanied by the appropriate guarantees with a view to protect the workers' level of life. The Government should reply to the comments by the Committee of Experts and communicate more detailed information on the application of the Act and the circumstances in which the Government intervenes in free collective bargaining.

The Employers' members noted that Act No. 1876 of 1990 was an improvement in the field of free collective bargaining. With reference to two interventions of the Government in 1990, they pointed out that the Convention was aiming at the "promotion" of the free collective bargaining, which did not exclude certain intervention in the case of the force majeure under the conditions determined by the Committee of Experts. They noted that these restrictive measures should not exceed a reasonable period; one could, of course, ask what constituted a reasonable period. A period of four months may be considered a limited period, according to the employers.

As regards the indexation of wages, the Employers' members considered that such indexation imposed by the law could not be in conformity with the notion of the free collective bargaining.

They stated that the explanations given by the Government representative allowed to make a conclusion that there was the intention to eliminate certain restrictions imposed on the collective bargaining and that it would certainly be possible to pursue a dialogue in the future.

The Workers' member of Greece stated that the solutions to the economic problems of his country might be found only through a real tripartite dialogue, but, in practice, the Government's policy was more and more authoritarian and arrogant. In May 1990 a law was adopted to abolish a fundamental part of the national collective agreement; in September 1990 the Government arbitrarily reduced wage increases by 50% and submitted a draft law on social security which did not provide for the tripartite participation and cancelled the increase in pensions and minimum wages from collective agreements. Thus, the road to the privatisation of the social security scheme was clear. Facing the Government's refusal to sign a national agreement on the social security, a series of strikes took place in all the important branches of the economy.

The speaker referred to provisions of Act No. 1915 of 1990, on the protection of the trade union rights, which allowed to terminate the employment of workers participating in strikes recognised as "illegal and abusive" by the court. The terminative is effective 24 hours after the judgement is pronounced and if one take into account the regularity with which tribunals judge almost all strikes to be "illegal and abusive", it can be concluded that the exercice of the right to strike has been drastically limited by judicial means. Besides, according to the new law, only the employer could fix the number and the list of workers who constituted a minimum personnel, as well as the works and services which must be guaranteed during the strikes.

The speaker pointed out that the Government abolished the financial assistance to the trade union organisations and strangled financially the trade union movement. He explained that currently the State did not participate in payments to the body called "the Workers' House" responsible for financing the administrative costs of union organisations which came exclusively from the automatic check-off of 0.25 per cent of the workers' salary together with the same sum from the employer. This body was administered by the State which intervened in an unacceptable way in the orientation and use of these receipts. It was thus financially strangling the trade union movement and, at the same time, interfered in the collection and distribution of trade union dues.

In April 1991 a national collective agreement had been signed by the GSEE and three representative employers' organisations, and in May 1991 a law had been adopted which excluded from the scope of the national collective agreement workers of the public sector having private law contracts. This was a new authoritative intervention which partly repealed the national collective agreement concluded as a result of free collective bargaining. The same law suppressed the application of a fundamental provision of No. 1876/1990 and reintroduced compulsory arbitration of social conflicts by the administrative committees provided for in Act No. 3239 of 1955, which was characterised by unacceptable interventionism of the State into the collective bargaining. He referred to the case of Mr. Stelios Koletsis, Chairman of the Workers' Federation in the Hotel and Tourism Sector and member of the executive committee of the GSEE, who had been dismissed for having attempted to defend the workers' interests in his sector, as well as to the case of Mr. Grigores Felonis, member of the regional unit excutive committee.

The speaker concluded requesting the Government representative to take up an obligation to repeal all the legislation which was not in conformity with the Convention.

The Employers' member of Greece stated that the automatic indexation of wages had existed in the country since 1982 with the consent of workers, but contrary to the employers' wish. That system was legalised in 1990, but the Government decided to abolish it for four months for purely economic reasons. At the same time it invited the social partners to find solutions through free collective bargaining. Thus, the Federation of Greek Industries, together with other employers' organisations, asked the Greek General Confederation of Labour to conclude an agreement on salaries at the national level for that period. As it was not concluded, agreements were finally concluded at the branch level and 60 per cent of workers of the private sector used them during 1990. The same results were achieved in the collective agreements for 1991 and 1992.

The Government representative, in reply to the question put by the Workers' member of Greece, pointed out that his Government could not repeal provisions referred to by the Workers' member and expressed the opinion that the social partners and the Government would have the opportunity to examine the question. He took note of the concern expressed in the Committee.

The Committee noted the observations of the Committee of Experts and of the information communicated by the Government concerning the new Act of March 1990 on collective bargaining. The Committee noted that this new legislation constituted progress as compared to the previous situation, since it provided for the right and the obligation to negotiate and made it possible to negotiate at all levels. The Committee noted that on at least two occasions the Government had intervened in wage negotiations. The Committee recalled, with reference to the comments of the Committee of Experts, the importance of the principle of the voluntary negotiation of collective agreements. The Committee expressed the hope that the dialogue between the Government and the representatives of workers and employers would lead to a better application of the Convention, as it was true that any policy of economic stabilisation must be a result of consultation and not constraint. The Committee wished to see real progress in this area in the near future.

Individual Case (CAS) - Discussion: 1989, Publication: 76th ILC session (1989)

The Government has communicated the following information:

In reply to the observations of the Committee of Experts in regard to the application of Article 4 of the Convention, the Government notes that, in the context of the effort being made to modernise the legal provisions governing collective bargaining in Greece, the Minister of Labour, in 1988, set up a committee of university professors and professors who are experts in labour law. This committee recently submitted a draft Bill it had drawn up; comments on it are being sought from interested parties and representatives of political parties before being put into final form. This draft Bill has already been signed by the competent Ministers and will be placed before Parliament. The draft Bill provides that there shall be no state intervention at any stage of labour dispute resolution (face-to-face negotiations, arbitration), since there are no plans to set up a special corps of arbitrator mediators outside the public service. In addition, no limitation will be placed on the right to strike from the beginning to the end of a conflict or even while dispute resolution is being pursued.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2021, published 110th ILC session (2022)

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2018, published 108th ILC session (2019)

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2017, published 107th ILC session (2018)

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2014, published 104th ILC session (2015)

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2013, published 103rd ILC session (2014)

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2012, published 102nd ILC session (2013)

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2011, published 101st ILC session (2012)

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2010, published 100th ILC session (2011)

The Committee notes that in a communication dated 29 July 2010 the Greek General Confederation of Labour (GSEE) submitted urgent comments with regard to the legislative measures implemented or to be implemented by the end of 2010 by the Greek Government in the framework of the mechanism to support the Greek economy (the GSEE refers to this mechanism as the “loan mechanism”). The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) and the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) expressed their support for these comments in communications dated 9 August and 22 September 2010, respectively. In a communication dated 25 November 2010, the Government indicates that its reply is being finalized and will be communicated to the Committee as soon as possible, the delay being due to the complexity of the issues and the consequent need for involvement and coordination of many co-competent agencies.

The Committee notes that on 5 May 2010, the Greek Parliament adopted Act No. 3845/2010 (FEK A’65/6-5-2010) on “Measures to implement a mechanism to support the Greek economy by the Member States of the Euro area and the International Monetary Fund”. The Act contains as Appendices III and IV, a “Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies” and a “Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality” which contain time-bound commitments set up by the Ministry of Finance, with the participation of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund and communicated in letters by the Ministry of Finance and the Governor of the Bank of Greece to the President of the Eurogroup, the European Commission and the European Central Bank and to the International Monetary Fund.

The Committee also notes the adoption on 8 July 2010, of Act No. 3863/2010 on the “New Social Security System and relevant provisions” (FEK A’115) in order to implement certain of the time-bound commitments made in the two Memoranda attached to Act No. 3845/2010 in the area of structural policies on strengthening labour markets. In addition, on 5 March 2010, prior to the creation of the mechanism to support the Greek economy, the Parliament had adopted Act No. 3833/2010 (FEK A’40/15-3-2010) on the “Protection of the national economy – Emergency measures to tackle the fiscal crisis”.

The GSEE criticizes section 2(7) of Act No. 3845/2010, as a result of which the national general collective agreement will no longer function as a minimum wage setting mechanism since branch and enterprise level agreements will be able to deviate from the terms of the sectoral agreements and the national general collective agreement. The GSEE notes that this provision dismantled a solid machinery of collective bargaining which had been functioning smoothly and effectively for 20 years as a result of a “Social Pact” endorsed unanimously in 1990 by all political parties and empowered by the consensus of the most representative employers’ and workers’ organizations following intense social dialogue. According to the previous system introduced by Act No. 1876/1990, the national general collective agreement took precedence over all other collective agreements, applied to all private sector workers in the Greek territory regardless of affiliation to a trade union, and bound all employers throughout the country.

The GSEE also objects to the exceptions introduced in the application of the national general collective agreement to young workers (of 18–24 years) and children (of 15–18 years) and the authorization granted to the Minister of Labour (in section 2(9)(e) and (f) of Act No. 3845/2010) to regulate through Presidential Decrees their working conditions, thus excluding this vulnerable group of workers from the scope of the minimum standards of wages and working conditions, which had so far been set through the national general collective agreement. It notes in particular, that newly hired young workers up to 24 years of age and children of 15–18 years will be remunerated at, respectively, 80 and 70 per cent of the minimum basic wage, as this is established in the national general collective agreement, for a period of 12 months (sections 2(6) of Act No. 3845/2010 and 74(9) of Act No. 3863/2010).

Furthermore, the GSEE objects to the permanent (and not temporarily restricted) drastic reductions in wages introduced twice in 2010 in the wider public sector including for employees under private law contracts (employed in local self-government and public enterprises) despite the provisions of the relevant collective agreements in force (sections 1(2) and 1(5) of Act No. 3833 and sections 3(1), (4), (6) and (8) of Act No. 3845/2010). The GSEE claims that collective agreements have been prohibited in the wider public sector by sections 1(2), (5) and 3(5) of Act No. 3833 and 3(8) of Act No. 3845/2010, which provide that all provisions in collective agreements which are contrary to the Acts in question are cancelled and superseded.

The GSEE also draws attention to various time-bound commitments introduced in the two Memoranda without any consultations with the social partners which in its view, constitute in and of themselves a violation of the autonomy of the bargaining parties and designate a pretextual process of dialogue on foregone conclusions and binding commitments that are already part of national legislation.

Finally, the GSEE criticizes the absence of consultations on the adoption of the abovementioned legislative measures which, according to the GSEE, does not signal a political will and commitment to engage in social dialogue in good faith nor does it manifest a sincere intention to take into account the views of the GSEE on these significant matters.

The GSEE concludes that Acts Nos 3833/2010, 3845/2010 and 3863/2010 lead to workers’ disempowerment in the face of the combined spill-over effect of lay-offs, wage freezes and the abolition of the minimum standards of wages, negate the State’s fundamental obligation to provide and protect decent work, violate the very essence of individual and social rights and endanger social peace and cohesion. The GSEE emphasizes that the measures in question are permanent and irreversible, notwithstanding the specific time frame and limited duration of the loan mechanism; are disproportionate, socially unjust and discriminatory vis-à-vis workers, especially the most vulnerable; have been adopted without examining sufficiently other well-weighed and more appropriate alternatives; are not quantifiable and their scope has no perceivable causal relationship with the pursued aim of implementing the stability programme; are not accompanied by adequate and concrete safeguards to protect the living standard of workers and support vulnerable groups in addressing the combined effect of economic austerity measures and the economic crisis; have had a serious and direct impact in weakening the position of GSEE during the collective negotiations that began in January 2010 for the conclusion of the new national general collective agreement.

The Committee must emphasize the importance of holding full and frank consultations with the employers’ and workers’ organizations on the revision of collective bargaining machinery, in accordance with the principle of the autonomy of the parties to the collective bargaining process and in light of the long-ranging implications of such revision for the standard of living of workers. Furthermore, it must recall that as a general matter, if, as part of its stabilization policy, a government considers that wage rates cannot be settled freely through collective bargaining, such a restriction should be imposed as an exceptional measure and only to the extent that it is necessary, without exceeding a reasonable period, and it should be accompanied by adequate safeguards to protect workers’ living standards. The Committee will examine the comments by the GSEE, along with the Government’s reply and the Government’s regular report which is due in 2011 it at its next session; the latter should also address the comments previously made by the Committee (see observation 2009/80th Session).

The Committee finally notes that as indicated by the GSEE, the revision of the collective bargaining machinery may have a wider impact on the observance of a range of ILO Conventions ratified by Greece, including the Labour Inspection Convention, 1947 (No. 81), the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), the Protection of Wages Convention, 1949 (No. 95), the Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100), the Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952 (No. 102), the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111), the Employment Policy Convention, 1964 (No. 122), the Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138), the Labour Administration Convention, 1978 (No. 150), the Collective Bargaining Convention, 1981 (No. 154), and the Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention, 1981 (No. 156).

In light of the complexity and pervasiveness of the measures adopted in the framework of the support mechanism, which touch upon a number of ILO Conventions ratified by Greece, the Committee invites the Government to avail itself of the technical assistance of the Office and to accept a high-level mission to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the issues, before the examination by the Committee of the impact of the measures in question on the application of this Convention, as well as other Conventions ratified by Greece.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2009, published 99th ILC session (2010)

Article 4 of the Convention. The Committee notes the observations dated 20 February 2009 from the Greek Federation of Bank Employee Unions (OTOE) on the application of the Convention. The Committee also notes the conclusions and recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association relating to Case No. 2502. The Committee notes that its attention has been drawn by the Committee on Freedom of Association and the OTOE to two legislative aspects:

Intervention by the authorities concerning the provisions of collective agreements relating to supplementary pension funds. The Committee notes that the OTOE’s observations relate to Act No. 3371/2005, which permits the unilateral denunciation of collective agreements concerning the supplementary pension funds of bank employees and provides that the private funds in question established under collective agreements will be automatically transferred to a single public fund. The Committee notes the 2007 conclusions of the Committee on Freedom of Association, according to which “state bodies should refrain from intervening to alter the content of freely-concluded collective agreements. Giving by law a special incentive encouraging one of the parties to these agreements to denounce or cancel collective agreements by which pension funds were set up constitutes interference with the free and voluntary nature of collective bargaining. … Nothing in Convention No. 98 enables the Government to step in and unilaterally determine these issues, much less to unilaterally determine that the assets of a private pension fund, established by collective agreement, can be automatically transferred to a public pension scheme. The establishment of the funds through collective bargaining as well as trade union participation in the administration of these funds constituted a trade union activity with which the Government unduly interfered”. The Committee further notes that a number of court decisions have been issued concerning the application of Act No. 3371/2005, and these have reiterated that the unilateral denunciation of collective agreements was null and void. The Committee observes that, in the light of the above, it has been asking the Government for a number of years to hold full consultations on the future of the supplementary pension funds of bank employees and of their assets so that the related issues are resolved by mutual agreement of the parties to the collective agreements by which the supplementary pension funds were set up (the banks and the representatives of the bank employees), and to amend Act No. 3371/2005 in the light of any agreement reached.

Exclusion of retirement-related matters from the scope of collective bargaining. The Committee notes that Act No. 1876/1990 on free collective bargaining and other provisions states, in section 2(3), that retirement-related matters are excluded from the scope of collective agreements. The Committee notes the conclusions of the Committee on Freedom of Association in Case No. 2502, which emphasize that supplementary pension schemes can legitimately be considered as benefits that may be the subject of collective bargaining, and asks the Government to take all the necessary measures as soon as possible to amend section 2(3) of Act No. 1876/1990 so as to ensure that supplementary pension schemes are not excluded from collective bargaining. The Committee fully endorses this recommendation.

The Committee notes with interest the recent communication from the Government dated 6 November 2009 indicating that, owing to a change of majority following the legislative elections of October 2009, its position now coincides with that of the OTOE and new consultations are planned with the OTOE and the Hellenic Bank Association with a view to finding an acceptable solution for all parties regarding the problems posed by Act No. 3371/2005 and Act No. 1876/1990. The Committee encourages the Government to make every possible effort to settle this dispute, which goes back to 2005, and hopes that it will soon be able to report on progress made with regard to the requested legislative amendments. The Committee requests the Government to indicate any new developments in this respect.

Observations from the ITUC. The Committee notes the communication from the ITUC dated 26 August 2009 denouncing the violent assault on trade union leader Constantina Kuneva, general secretary of the Cleaning Industry Union of the Athens Region (PEKOP). Noting the ITUC’s allegation that this assault was directly linked to her trade union activities, the Committee requests the Government to provide information on any investigation made into the assault on the PEKOP general secretary and the results thereof.

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 1999, published 88th ILC session (2000)

The Committee notes the Government's report.

Article 4 of the Convention. The Committee notes Act No. 2602 to improve and develop Olympic Airways. It notes that this Act establishes the conditions of employment of employees of this enterprise, appears to limit their right to collective bargaining and probably has consequences on the application of the collective agreements which are in force in the air transport sector. The Committee requests the Government to ensure that the employees of Olympic Airways enjoy the full right to collective bargaining of their terms and conditions of employment and to keep it informed in this respect.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 1999, published 88th ILC session (2000)

The Committee notes the Government's report.

Article 4 of the Convention. The Committee notes with satisfaction the adoption of Act No. 2738/99 under which workers in the public service may enjoy the right to collective bargaining. The Committee requests the Government to keep it informed in future reports of the application of the above Act.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 1998, published 87th ILC session (1999)

The Committee takes note of the communication of the Greek General Confederation of Labour dated 3 February 1998 in which it states that 18 months after the entry into force in 1996 of Law No. 2414 on the "Modernization of Public Enterprises and Corporations" which provides for collective bargaining in public service enterprises, the Government introduced a provision in a draft law on tax regulations (article 31(8) of Act No. 2579/98) according to which the modification of the Personnel General Rules of public enterprises and corporations "which present negative economic results or have entered the phase of rationalization" should be made within six months from the date the said Act was published in the Official Gazette; however, if no agreement was reached after the expiration of the negotiation period, the modification would be made by law. The General Greek Confederation of Labour denounces this legislative intervention in the collective bargaining. In its communication dated 9 October 1998, the Government specifies that the legislative regulation was made within the framework of rationalization of certain public enterprises which met serious economic and financial difficulties, including urban transport of Athens railways and postal services but did not cover the large majority of the public utility undertakings and other enterprises of the wider public service. The Government insists that these measures were transitional and since they were completed the modifications to the Personnel General Rules of public enterprises and corporations were now by means of labour collective agreements concluded between the administration and the most representative organizations of the workers concerned. The Committee takes due note of this information.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 1995, published 83rd ILC session (1996)

Article 4 of the Convention (intervention of the authorities in freedom of collective bargaining in the public sector). With reference to its previous comments, the Committee notes with satisfaction the information provided by the Government in its report to the effect that Act No. 2123 of 14 April 1993 suspending the implementation of the national general collective agreement for workers in the public sector in the broad sense of the term, and workers in public utility enterprises and local administrative organizations, applied only to 1993. Since then, on 21 March 1994, a national general collective agreement has been concluded, in agreement with the social partners, for the period covering 1994 and 1995. Workers employed by the State, by public enterprises and under private employment contracts by local organizations are specifically covered by the provisions of the general collective convention.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 1994, published 81st ILC session (1994)

The Committee notes the Government's report and its observations relating to the comments made by the General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE).

1. With reference to its previous observation, the Committee notes the information supplied in the Government's report to the effect that Act No. 2025 of 1992, which imposed restrictions on collective bargaining by workers in the public sector in the broad sense of the term, in public utility enterprises, local administrative organizations and state banks, ceased to be in force on 31 December 1992.

2. The Committee notes, however, that the GSEE states that in 1993 the Government again took steps by legislative means to: (i) suspend the implementation of the national general collective agreement in the public sector for workers employed under private employment contracts, workers in associations in the private sector and the staff of local administrations; (ii) impose a wage rise of 4 per cent for employees in branches of activity which are similar to the above; and (iii) confirm and extend the powers of the Minister of the National Economy to set maximum levels for wage increases for employees in the public sector in the broad sense of the term, and to extend these powers to 1994 just as it had done in the 1992 Act.

The Government admits that under section 3 of Act No. 2129, of 14 April 1993, the wages of workers employed by the State, by public utility enterprises and by local administrations under a private employment contract were increased by 4 per cent as of 1 January 1993 and states that this increase can be granted through collective bargaining. It also states that collective labour agreements which have already been concluded provide for an increase of 9 per cent, that bank employees have concluded a collective agreement providing for an initial increase of 3 per cent and a further increase of 12 per cent and that the national general collective agreement for the private sector was concluded on 6 June 1993 and provides for a wage increase of 5.4 per cent, followed by an increase of 8 per cent.

The Committee regrets that the Government has once again intervened in the free collective bargaining of terms and conditions of employment by employees in the public sector in the broad sense of the term, by setting maximum wage levels by legislative means for 1993 and 1994. The Committee recalls that it has already pointed out that the intervention of the Government in the field of collective bargaining, which has occurred over several years, prejudices the rights of workers and employers to negotiate their terms and conditions of employment freely. The Committee emphasizes that in the event of economic difficulties, the Government should give preference to persuasion to constraint and that in any case the final decision should rest with the parties to the agreement.

The Committee therefore requests the Government to re-examine its position in the light of the above comments and to keep the Committee informed of any development in the situation.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 1993, published 80th ILC session (1993)

The Committee notes the discussions at the Conference Committee in June 1992 on collective bargaining and the conclusions of the Committee on Freedom of Association in Case No. 1632 (286th Report, adopted by the Governing Body at its 255th Session, March 1993) concerning the restrictions on collective bargaining for workers in the public sector in the broad sense of the term, enterprises of public interest, local administration organizations and state banks, following the adoption of Act No. 2025 of 1992.

The Committee, in the same way as the Committee on Freedom of Association, expresses the firm hope that, as provided for by Act No. 2025, the Act did lapse on 31 December 1992 and requests the Government to confirm that this is so in its next report. It trusts that in future the Government, in accordance with its undertakings, will emphasize the principle of the voluntary bargaining of collective agreements in order to settle terms and conditions of employment, including those in the public sector.

The Committee requests the Government to keep it informed of developments in the situation in this respect.

[The Government is asked to report in detail for the period ending 30 June 1993.]

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 1992, published 79th ILC session (1992)

With reference to its previous observation, in which it requested the Government to indicate the measures that have been taken to re-establish the autonomy of the social partners in the negotiation procedures for wage increases, the Committee notes the information supplied by the Government in its report to the effect that the League of Greek Industries and the Greek General Confederation of Workers, following free collective bargaining, have signed a new national general collective labour agreement for a two-year period covering 1991 and 1992.

The Committee trusts that the principle of the voluntary negotiation of collective agreements, and therefore the autonomy of the social partners, which is a fundamental aspect of freedom of association, will be respected in future and requests the Government to continue supplying full information in this respect in its future reports.

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 1991, published 78th ILC session (1991)

The Committee notes Act No. 1876 of 7 March 1990, respecting free collective bargaining and other provisions, and it requests the Government to state:

(a) by virtue of which provisions public officials (with the exception of public servants engaged in the administration of the State, who are not covered by the Convention), that is those persons who are not covered by a private employment relationship and who are excluded from the scope of Act No. 1876 (section 1), are authorised to negotiate their terms and conditions of employment;

(b) the reasons for which scientists are not authorised to negotiate their conditions of employment and wages (section 20(2) of the Act);

(c) whether, during the period covered by the report, section 16(d) (which authorises one of the parties to request a dispute to be referred to arbitration in establishments and bodies of public interest if the other rejects the proposals of the mediator) has been applied; in particular, whether an employer has requested that a dispute be referred to arbitration and, if so, in which sector.

[The Government is asked to report in detail for the period ending 30 June 1991.]

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 1991, published 78th ILC session (1991)

The Committee notes the Government's report and the provisions of Act No. 1876 of 7 March 1990 respecting free collective bargaining, which replaces Act No. 3239 of 1955 respecting collective bargaining and industrial disputes. It also notes the comments of the Panhellenic Federation of Caterers and Tourist Trade Workers, of 23 May 1990, of the International Union of Food and Allied Workers' Associations, of 27 June 1990, and of the General Confederation of Greek Workers, of 11 May and 26 September 1990.

The Committee notes that Act No. 1876 of 7 March 1990 is an improvement on the previous situation, since it permits bargaining at the level of enterprises, branches and professions and sets out the right and obligation to negotiate. Nevertheless, the Committee notes with regret that trade union organisations have indicated on two occasions, in May 1990 and September 1990, that the Government has acted arbitrarily to reduce wage increases provided for in the national labour convention, with the result that the workers have lost 13 per cent of their purchasing power. It also regrets that the Government has not supplied comments in this respect.

In these circumstances, the Committee recalls that the principle of the voluntary negotiation of agreements, and therefore of the autonomy of the social partners, is a fundamental aspect of freedom of association. With regard to wage negotiations, the Committee has always indicated that where, for compelling reasons of national, economic and social interest, a government considers that it would not be possible for wage rates to be fixed freely by means of collective negotiations, such a restriction should be imposed as an exceptional measure and only to the extent necessary, without exceeding a reasonable period, and it should be accompanied by adequate safeguards to protect workers' living standards.

The Committee regrets the successive interventions of the public authorities in wage negotiations and recalls that persuasion should be preferred to constraint. It requests the Government to indicate in its next report the measures that have been taken to re-establish the autonomy of the social partners in the negotiation procedures respecting wage increases.

The Committee is also addressing a request directly to the Government concerning the scope of Act No. 1876 of 7 March 1990.

[The Government is asked to report in detail for the period ending 30 June 1991.]

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 1990, published 77th ILC session (1990)

The Committee notes that, in 1988, a Bill was prepared to amend Act No. 3239 of 1955 as amended in 1957 and 1974.

The Committee requests the Government to provide information in its future reports on any further developments in the status of the above legislation.