Individual Case (CAS) - Discussion: 2019, Publication: 108th ILC session (2019)



Discussion by the Committee

Government representative – The Government of Uruguay stands before this Organization, with confidence and conviction, to examine Case No. 2699. Above all, we affirm that we have been, are and will be open to dialogue and negotiation with a view to making any changes to the system of collective bargaining and conflict prevention that are necessary, appropriate and reasonable, in accordance with our current realities and history, with our Constitution and laws, and with international standards, as long as there is a useful consensus that will allow us to progress towards extending and improving the system of collective bargaining and conflict prevention.

We will summarize our presentation in seven points. First, some general comments about our country; second, some background information regarding Article 4 of the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98); third, the importance of historical negotiation in private sector activities; fourth, and most notably, the reality associated with the Uruguayan law in question, namely Law No. 18566 of 2009 on the system of collective bargaining; fifth, the decentralization of tripartite negotiations; sixth, the importance of tripartism in Uruguay, as is the case at the International Labour Organization (ILO); and seventh, conflict prevention and labour peace clauses.

In relation to the first point regarding our country, we understand that all topics should be considered within the context of the country where the activities are taking place and to which the topics relate. According to many different qualified institutions, Uruguay is first in Latin America on democracy, rule of law, prosperity, social inclusion, social progress, quality of life, low-level corruption, technological development, fixed broadband subscriptions per inhabitant, average internet speed and e-government; it is second on freedom of press; and third in Latin America on economic freedom. Fundamentally, these were statistics for 2017 and 2018. It is in this context that labour relations are conducted in the country.

It is a country which, for the first time in history, has had 17 consecutive years of economic growth, even during the international crisis of 2008 and 2009. This shows, and it is important to relate this to collective bargaining, that this is a country where a great deal remains to be done, but where global indicators show that collective bargaining and labour relations are improving. Uruguay is fourth in the world in terms of the number of ILO Conventions that it has ratified and enforced.

In the 14 years that our Government has been in power, the first of its kind in history, it has extended collective bargaining to all private sector workers and companies, including, for the first time, to paid rural, domestic and home-based workers. The measure also applies to public servants working, for instance, in the police, local governments, judiciary, electoral council and high courts. Those 14 years have led to a real and significant increase in wages which are now on average 55 per cent higher than the cost of labour. This has also led to a rise in the number of retirements as well as to pension increases in our country.

This period also coincided with a notable increase in formalization. In those 14 years, approximately 50 per cent more companies registered to pay social security and 60 per cent more workers registered for and were paying social security.

This has led to higher revenues, which has in turn increased consumption, brought poverty down significantly, and almost entirely eliminated extreme poverty and destitution. We can say with satisfaction that Uruguay has already achieved some of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals and is fighting to achieve others.

A recent study carried out by consultants of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) entitled More Work to Do? Taking Stock of Latin American Labor Markets emphasizes that, under our Government, collective bargaining went from covering 28 per cent of workers in 2000 to covering 97 per cent of workers in 2005 and onwards. Similarly, the study concludes that collective bargaining seems to have had positive effects on employment and unemployment by helping to bring stability to labour relations, channelling demands in an orderly fashion and encouraging an environment conducive to moderation. We emphasize that this is not a government report, but one produced by a body to which we do not have commitments, as we did previously.

Furthermore, a recent 2018 report of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) emphasizes that collective bargaining systems that coordinate salaries in different sectors tend to produce less inequality and see better results in the workplace, including for vulnerable groups.

Another recent study based on data provided by the Catholic University, not the State University, shows that conflict was more prominent in Uruguay when collective bargaining bodies were rarely operational or not operational at all, than in the period since 2005 when they were indeed operational and collective bargaining was more widespread.

It is therefore necessary to stop and analyse the second point of our presentation, namely Article 4 of the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98), one of the central elements of the complaint. We have read the proceedings from 1949 where Article 4 was discussed. Article 4 reads as follows: “Measures appropriate to national conditions shall be taken, where necessary, to encourage and promote the full development and utilisation of machinery for voluntary negotiation between employers or employers’ organisations and workers’ organisations, with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of employment by means of collective agreements.”

The 1949 proceedings emphasized the need to take into account national circumstances and the phrase “where necessary” was added to the Convention. At the time, the Netherlands had pointed out – in relation to the original draft of Convention No. 98, which was later amended following the efforts of the Netherlands – that the standard was too strict, as indicated by the country’s representative. It was then that the phrase “where necessary” was inserted in order to give governments sufficient leeway to decide whether to take appropriate measures.

Therefore, in our understanding, the system of labour relations and collective bargaining in Uruguay is in line with the Convention.

In Uruguay, two essential modalities are in place:

(a) bipartite or bilateral negotiation between representatives of the workers and employers, the product of which is a collective agreement; and

(b) tripartite negotiation in the wage councils, which dates back 76 years to 1943, and where participants have the power to fix a minimum wage for each occupational category and branch of activity as well as to make adjustments to salaries. The negotiation is attended by up of three government representatives, two worker representatives and two employer representatives.

Tripartite negotiation in the wage councils is a traditional modality, a national specificity and a way of promoting – not imposing – collective bargaining as a whole.

As the Netherlands argued in 1949, it is necessary to give governments freedom of action in this regard.

Overall, it is our understanding that the law in question is perfectly aligned with the provisions of the Convention, with its 1943 predecessor, as well as with the practices accepted peacefully by the employers and by governments of different political parties, over a 66-year period. It strikes us that these questions are being raised now, when it is our turn to govern for the first time in history. Nevertheless, we are and will be open to consider, through dialogue and negotiation, all the changes required to extend and improve collective bargaining and conflict prevention. Proof of that are the proposals presented successively over the years, but particularly in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security in different consultation processes. Tripartite agreements have been made with the Chamber of Industry and the Chamber of Commerce and the trade union centre PIT-CNT in March 2015 and May 2016, where, for example, the Government proposed solutions to all the points raised by the Committee on Freedom of Association in paragraph 1389 of Report No. 356 of March 2010.

As we mentioned, tripartite negotiation in the private sector has been in place in Uruguay since 1943. In addition to minimum wage fixing by category, other working conditions have always been under negotiation, including the number of public officials, the responsibilities assigned to certain positions, breaks, income schemes, job boards, unemployment insurance schemes, hours, workplace conditions, sanctions regimes and recourse, etc. Such negotiations took place at times when the wage councils were operational: from 1944 to 1968 and also from 1985 to the beginning of the 1990s and to the present day. These practices have never been questioned until now. What is more, business associations have participated in and subscribed to them.

The employers are questioning an issue that Law No. 18566 of 2009 did not introduce. It simply put into statutory law a national practice that has been in force since 1943. The law explicitly states that: “The wage council can establish working conditions if so decided by the representatives of the employers and the workers.” Therefore, it seems contradictory that the matter has arisen.

Working conditions are also being negotiated in a meeting of the wage councils currently under way, in which 231 bargaining units are taking part. Topics under negotiation include clauses on peace and conflict prevention in 80 per cent of cases; clauses on gender in 74 per cent of cases; clauses on miscellaneous items in 57 per cent of cases; care systems in 44 per cent of cases, and we could go on. The same happens in negotiations on salaries that are above minimum wage, which is another traditional practice in place since 1943, and to which there are many solutions. If a wage council of a particular sector does not establish or reach a resolution, only then can the Executive issue a decree. This happens absolutely exceptionally. During the above meeting in which 231 bargaining units have taken part, the Executive has issued a decree in only eight cases, which amounts to 3 per cent of the total.

What happened when negotiation was not promoted? When negotiation was not promoted, workers and employers were not covered or protected. Coverage extended to only 10 or 20 per cent of all workers and employers. Collective bargaining should therefore be promoted to ensure more solid conditions for businesses, increase legal certainty, manage company specificities, organize negotiations and ensure classification of activities, which is also done in a tripartite manner, not decided by the Government.

The law in question, operating in Uruguay since 2009, prioritizes bilateral negotiation over tripartite negotiation, as is clearly indicated in article 12 (“it will not be necessary to convene the wage council for activities and sectors with a collective agreement duly agreed by the representative organizations”) and in article 15 (“The parties can negotiate by branch or sector of activity, company or establishment, or at any other level deemed appropriate.”). This is how the system works in our country.

They can negotiate externally then simply present their agreement to be finalized and put to a vote, or they can register and publish it without any intervention from the Executive. Many agreements are adopted by majority and the majority can be made up only of employer and worker representatives. This occurs, for example, when agreements are made outside the scope of the guidelines of the Executive. The guidelines of the Executive are not obligatory and in the last few meetings the number of resolutions passed by a majority have increased even when the Executive has voted against or abstained. Once again, this shows that the parties have autonomy.

What has happened in the meeting that is currently under way? Of the 231 groups participating, all but one has concluded with certainty that they will sign the agreements next Monday. What has this meeting achieved? A total of 85 per cent of bipartite and tripartite agreements, that is to say that workers and employers have signed agreements in 85 per cent of cases. And only eight decrees were issued, as indicated above. The wage councils operate in a highly intensive, long-term and democratic way. They are usually operational for four months on average.

Tripartism is part of the history and essence of Uruguay, as it is of the ILO, not only in terms of collective bargaining, but also in terms of the labour framework agreement that we approved two years ago with the hope of securing the biggest investment in the history of Uruguay. The labour framework agreement was produced together with business associations of the metal and construction industries, their respective trade unions, the trade union centre, the investing company and the Government. This is how we work in Uruguay. This is how we work towards reform, ensure the day-to-day executive management of social security and health, promote professional development, and develop projects and laws. Participants include employers, workers, and, where appropriate, pensioners and beneficiaries of these important social protection systems.

Lastly, conflict prevention, peace clauses and workplace occupations are recognized by the Committee on Freedom of Association, for example, in Report No. 356 of March 2010, and in Uruguay by the chair in labour rights at the University of the Republic. We emphasize that, in the current meeting that is taking place, agreements have been signed in 80 per cent of cases, including agreements on conflict prevention and peace clauses, in addition to those that are already in force and have previously been signed.

Uruguay guarantees the right to strike in article 57 of its Constitution. We also guarantee and defend the rights of businesses and business people. The Government has been expressly pushing proposals in that regard. We emphasize, in particular, the proposals of September 2016 and March 2017, ratified in May 2018. Business associations responded negatively to these proposals. An agreement was announced publicly by the then Presidents of the Chamber of Industry, the Chamber of Commerce and the PIT-CNT on the occasion of the official presidential missions of the Republic of Germany and the Russian Federation but this was also rejected by trade union directors. Another preliminary agreement had been previously negotiated in Geneva in 2011 which was not ratified by the workers. Our legislation neither prohibits nor promotes occupations. Occupations should occur exceptionally, while, undoubtedly, at the same time protecting the freedom to work and company management. In Uruguay, occupations are given effect through summary proceedings in the judiciary which last three days.

In the last few days, some cases have attracted attention and rightly so. However, we have complete peace of mind because the Government has expressed itself publicly, in contrast to others. For example, in the case of a company that had received a court ruling prohibiting an occupation under workers’ control, the Ministry of Labour spoke out against such action one month before the judiciary.

We conclude by thanking those who have listened so attentively. We reaffirm the position of the Government of Uruguay: we have been, are and will be open to dialogue and negotiation with a view to making any changes to the system of collective bargaining and conflict prevention that are necessary, appropriate or reasonable, in accordance with our current realities and history, with our Constitution and laws, and with international standards, as long as there is a useful consensus that will allow us to progress towards extending and improving the system of collective bargaining and conflict prevention.

Employer members – We would like to thank the Government representative for being here with us and the rest of the delegation. We have listened attentively to their intervention and thank them for their remarks. This matter is not unimportant; it is a legislative matter on which this Committee already carried out an analysis in 2010. The Committee of Experts also presented observations in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2015 and 2018 precisely in reference to the Convention in question, which is a fundamental Convention. It is concerning that national legislation is not aligned according to the bodies overseeing this case. Furthermore, as indicated by the Minister, an opportunity had already arisen to evaluate the situation within the framework of the Committee on Freedom of Association, as part of Case No. 2699, which is still ongoing. The involvement of the two supervisory bodies in addition to the Committee on Freedom of Association means that the Government of Uruguay is obliged to listen to our different observations and recommendations.

In 2010, a number of issues were addressed, but the conclusions stated, and I quote, that tripartite negotiations regarding the matters in question should continue at the present Conference. It was also announced that a mission would be sent to Uruguay in August 2011 to determine concrete areas where progress could be made. Lastly, the Committee expressed hope that the necessary measures would be taken without delay to prepare a draft law that reflects the comments of the supervisory bodies, and thus aligning all legislation with the Convention.

In 2010, they said to do this without delay. We are in 2019 and the information contained in the report of the Committee of Experts is once again being brought to the fore. This is not a capricious matter but one which has been left unresolved for ten years. Therefore, we would like to amicably address some of the points in question.

The Committee on Freedom of Association, in paragraph 1389 of Report No. 356 of March 2010, analysed a number of topics in detail, some of which have improved while others are in exactly the same condition.

First, one topic is that pertaining to article 4 of Law No. 18566 on duty of information in the framework of the collective bargaining process. The Committee had the opportunity to refer to some points that I will not repeat. In the view of the Employers, information on many of those points can only be requested from trade unions with legal personality. The Committee says that it can be both those with and without legal personality in accordance with the new law. It should be possible to establish and determine the type of information that can be requested by trade unions wherever necessary or relevant.

Why are we referring to this? Because there are three levels within the framework of a negotiation by branch of activity, which is the type that is prioritized in Uruguay, as indicated by the Government on previous occasions. Given the branch of activity is almost exclusively prioritized, as the Minister has just demonstrated, the information provided should be limited to basic information and should not include detailed information company by company. The Employer members of Uruguay have a reasonable and justifiable concern in that regard. Why? Because negotiations in Uruguay are run by the so-called wage councils. It is precisely in this framework that companies can be put at risk if specific and detailed information is known about them, particularly because competition is what reigns in free enterprise. So, we dispute the matter in that regard.

A second topic has to do with the powers of the Higher Tripartite Council, which is the highest body governing labour relations in the private sector, precisely in the area of collective bargaining. The topic relates to article 10(d). The supervisory bodies have demonstrated points such as those described there. The Government is requested to take the necessary measures, including measures to amend existing laws, to ensure that collective bargaining is established by the parties and is not subject to voting under the auspices of a tripartite entity. We have clearly requested that the Higher Tripartite Council does not intervene in negotiations.

Competition is the third issue we would like to raise, as contained in article 12 of the Law. The Committee on Freedom of Association made some statements in that regard, followed by the ILO secretariat which also made some observations after providing assistance in 2017. It is incomprehensible that the Ministry of Labour maintains an in situ position arguing that:

“The current draft of the law does not affect the freedom to negotiate nor does it undermine ILO principles in that regard. For that reason, there is no reason to abolish it. In addition, abolishing it would greatly restrict the ability of the actors involved to reach agreements since the topics they could discuss would be limited to minimum wages, and there would be fewer bargaining tools.”

Yes, they would be limited to the minimum wage, but I would like to respectfully draw the attention of the Government of Uruguay to one point. The Government of Uruguay ratified the Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 (No. 131). Convention No. 131 relates to minimum wage fixing with special reference to developing countries. It is precisely within that framework that a tripartite intervention can take place, not in any other. In other cases, the will of two parties, the employers and workers, is required in an agreement. Going beyond the two parties, probably because it is customary to do so in Uruguay, is not compatible with the spirit of the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98), and in particular, Article 4, as cited by the distinguished Minister. We find this point concerning because the Article allows for inappropriate interventions in the area of wage fixing. The wage councils have become an exercise in a kind of compulsory arbitration where representatives of the Executive set out and define the guidelines for negotiation. The reality is that the meetings are structured and guided by the wage councils.

In reality, the meetings, which are structured and guided by the wage councils, have shown that tripartite negotiation has eliminated space for free, voluntary, bipartite negotiation.

The law clearly favours tripartite negotiation, and this has, in practice, almost completely eliminated bilateral negotiation. Some argue that it is in the interests of small enterprises to ensure negotiation by branch.

We are gravely concerned by three factors. First, the Ministry is the body that sets the guidelines of negotiation for every meeting. Second, the role played by the Ministry gives the trade union movement a space to receive support for all of its stances. Third, working conditions have been proposed which, as I mentioned previously, do not fall under the above-mentioned tripartite framework. Therefore, we are gravely concerned by this issue, and it is absolutely vital to amend legislation in that regard.

The supervisory bodies highlighted some important points on article 14 of the Law on parties who can bargain collectively. The secretariat also gave a statement in its technical assistance report with which the employers disagree. We believe it is incorrect to suggest that the position of the employers would significantly change the system of collective labour relations in Uruguay, when it is simply about returning to the situation that existed before the law was approved.

Since 1966, labour law laid down rules on licences, and by extending them unanimously to all collective agreements, workers can now be represented by specially appointed delegates in the event that a trade union does not exist.

Lastly, I would like to refer to the automatic extension of collective agreements, as referred to in article 17.2 of the Law. The Committee, that is the Committee on Freedom of Association, has recalled that the duration of the collective agreements is, first and foremost, the decision of the parties concerned. But if the Government is considering taking action on this matter, legislation should be amended to reflect a tripartite agreement.

In this context, given that the complainants do not agree with the automatic extension of collective agreements, the Committee is inviting the Government to discuss with the social partners an amendment to the law with the aim of finding an acceptable solution for both parties.

Therefore, the employers are in favour of a rule ensuring that collective agreements are temporary. Collective agreements should not last for an indefinite period of time, they should have a time limit, and, as with all contracts, they should expire on a certain date. The social partners, not any third parties, should negotiate the terms and any extension to those terms. The time frame is one of the most important elements of a collective agreement. It is improper and inappropriate that the above-mentioned law regulates this topic. The rule should stipulate that once the time frame for the collective agreement expires, its provisions also expire, and the parties are free to negotiate a new collective agreement.

We believe that this last point, the last paragraph that I have just delivered, should be a guiding principle for all actions.

Lastly, some points highlighted in the above-mentioned law are relevant to the issue of strikes and picket lines. We will not refer to this topic because we, as the Employers’ group, do not believe it is covered in the Freedom of Association and the Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) or the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98). But we would like to draw your avid attention to the fact that a law relevant to workplace occupations was repealed, which has generated strong feelings in the business world, particularly among business people in Uruguay.

As a result, we would like to cordially invite the Government to consider this issue in the draft law that it will present for the consideration of Parliament.

These are, broadly speaking, the general topics that we wished to highlight. We cordially invite the Government of Uruguay to seriously consider presenting a legislative reform on the above-mentioned topics to the Congress or the Parliament as soon as possible.

Worker members – Firstly, we would like to thank the Government representative who has reported extensively on this situation, on implementation efforts, and on the situation in Uruguay. We have been analysing the implementation of the Convention in Uruguay. Since the Convention was ratified in 1954, the Committee of Experts has made ten observations on its implementation in law and in practice, but this is the first time it is subject to analysis by the Committee.

Protecting the right to organize and to bargain collectively in law and in practice is a fundamental pillar underpinning ILO Conventions and the legal system as a whole. In a country with a history such as that of Uruguay, balanced and fair governmental oversight of key issues, such as salaries and working conditions, is fundamental for debate and productive policymaking.

As representatives of the workers, we recognize the importance of tripartite and bipartite dialogue done in good faith, as the basis for maintaining a balance of power between employers and workers. We reaffirm that maintaining this balance is key to protecting the interests and rights of workers and the economy as a whole. Collective bargaining is a fundamental tool for constructing a fairer and more equitable society. In this way, the data from Uruguay is promising compared to other countries in and beyond the region.

In Uruguay, trade union density is high with 30 per cent of workers having joined a trade union and, as we have already heard, collective bargaining coverage stands at 90 per cent of workers, which is comparable to some of the more advanced countries in Europe. When collective bargaining was re-established through the wage councils in 2004, social and economic change took place in Uruguay. Poverty fell from 39 per cent to 10 per cent, real wages grew by 55 per cent, the unemployment rate dropped by 7 per cent and, as we have heard, informal employment fell significantly. These economic indicators are clearly a big improvement on the period from 1992 to 2004, when the Government at the time stopped convening wage councils, thereby restricting negotiations even in companies.

For the workers, the concrete results of collective bargaining in Uruguay are promising. The statistics and the facts show that collective bargaining is effective in practice. It is also having a dramatic impact on working conditions. It is through collective bargaining that trade union membership and representation become meaningful for workers. We note that this has been possible because the Government of Uruguay has made it a priority to establish strong collective bargaining institutions. We must ensure that this successful system continues to exist as any measure of significant change could destabilize it. The loss of one of its components could topple the entire model which is currently very effective.

It is quite clear that the social partners have complete autonomy to bargain collectively in a free and voluntary manner with the aim of improving salaries and working conditions. Indeed, this is exactly the objective of collective bargaining: to establish more favourable conditions for workers and in autonomous processes.

Uruguay has well-developed tripartite institutions, such as the wage councils. The workers support tripartite dialogue, including on the fixing of wages, according to the provisions of the Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 (No. 131). This Convention has been ratified by the Government of Uruguay and requires tripartite consultations to take place so that the parties can establish minimum wages in accordance with Article 4.

We take note of the comments that the Government made to the Committee of Experts, indicating that collective bargaining takes priority over the wage councils. It is worth noting that the wage councils are not able to convene when a collective bipartite agreement is already in place. Granting priority to collective agreements that offer better protections and conditions to workers than those established in other instances, should be considered an important measure to promote collective bargaining. At the same time, we take note of the fact that employers have expressed concern over the wage councils and the autonomy of the social partners in Case No. 2699 of the Committee on Freedom of Association. We also take careful note of the fact that the Government had responded to these concerns in a satisfactory manner by proposing various legislative amendments which are currently being discussed at national level.

The Workers’ group notes that the Committee of Experts considers that many of the amendments to Law No. 18566 are in line with commitments outlined in Article 4 of the Convention on promoting collective bargaining in a free and voluntary way. We welcome the fact that the Government of Uruguay has been proactive in discussing the concerns of the employers at national level as a result of the case before the Committee on Freedom of Association. This shows the importance that is attached to ILO standards and the supervisory system. Therefore, we join the Committee of Experts in noting with satisfaction the use of tripartite consultations and social dialogue to discuss the amendments with the most representative organizations. We hope that the Government continues to ensure that comprehensive and frank consultations are held, above all on topics related to the promotion of collective bargaining. The Committee on Freedom of Association has made it clear that draft laws that affect collective bargaining or work conditions are preceded by comprehensive and detailed consultations with the workers and the employers. However, as I mentioned before, it is important that any changes to the system of collective bargaining are made on the basis of a tripartite consensus. Any changes must be made with the aim of further improving coverage for the workers through the practice of collective bargaining. Therefore, we trust the Government to listen to all parties interested in improving access to collective bargaining. Throughout this process, we believe it is very important that the Government continues to keep the Committee of Experts informed of the progress made in consultations.

Approximately 100,000 private companies and 1 million workers are represented by chambers and trade unions in collective bargaining processes in Uruguay. It must be emphasized that collective bargaining has, for ten years, included domestic workers, which has, during this time, helped to increase the salaries of people working in this sector as well as to register and formalize this type of work in Uruguay’s state-owned social security institute, el Banco de Previsión Social. Another sector that participates in negotiations at the wage councils are rural workers. We consider this very important, especially if we take into account the fact that rural workers have been disadvantaged due to a lack of bargaining power and a lack of social dialogue.

To conclude, the data and figures presented here show that the system of collective bargaining in Uruguay has facilitated social dialogue, cooperation, stability, social cohesion, and has promoted a fairer distribution of wealth. Collective bargaining in Uruguay is a rights-based model which has allowed unionized workers to ensure a better distribution of economic growth, as all the indicators show.

Worker member, Uruguay – We are going to be completely honest or it will seem like we are hiding something from the audience of this gathering for the world of work. Some trade union movements are repressed, which not only undermines freedom of association but also puts the lives of some of our colleagues at risk. These are colleagues who have dedicated their whole lives to the workers’ cause, and we see how they are killed day in and day out in situations where their most basic rights are violated. Bearing that in mind, it strikes me as immoral to question the democratically adopted system of labour relations and collective bargaining in Uruguay.

Universal values are not just about class. If it were the employers who had endured the conditions that we have known, what the Colombian trade union movement has gone through for example, we would also be raising our voices in defence of human rights.

I am going to raise four issues from the point of view of the Uruguayan workers. Firstly, collective bargaining in Uruguay has a long history. Collective bargaining surged during periods of greater democracy in the country but became obsolete in the face of authoritarian style cuts. Secondly, I would like to point out that, during this long history, some of the elements inherent to “business sector complaints”, as we say in Creole, in the language of the workers, were much more consistent in other periods of collective bargaining in our country than they are today. Thirdly, there is a relationship between human development indicators in general and the productivity of workers at different levels of employment. This shows that there is a relationship between collective bargaining and the lives of the overwhelming majority in our country. Fourthly, if the situation is subject to criticism, which is to some extent penalizing, it means that we are being penalized for having a higher level of collective bargaining than the average. These are the four points that we are going to lay out.

First, the correlation between collective bargaining, democracy and long tradition has already been mentioned. The law on the wage councils, which introduced tripartite forms of negotiation in our country, was put in place in 1943. Industrial negotiation developed over a long period of time, in view of which the social partners were formed, not only among workers but also in business associations, through the introduction of collective bargaining by branch of activity, as established in law of 1943. But it came to an end in 1968 with the rise of authoritarianism and later the fascist dictatorship when the wage councils were suspended.

I would like to point out, and the agreement among delegates must emphasize this, that once democracy was recovered between 1985 and 1992, particularly under the Government of Mr Julio María Sanguinetti, but also at the beginning of the Government of Mr Lacalle, the wage councils were also operational but in their own unique way. They were not exactly the same as those established in the law of 1943, where, for example, the worker representatives and the employer representatives voted in the workplace. In this case, trade union membership was more representative. Between 1985 and 1990, tripartite negotiation was in place, but the so-called guidelines existed at that time, and the Executive had imposed criteria and ways to develop a collective agreement. This is very important because these were components of centralization and authoritarianism. The Executive did not approve any agreement signed freely and voluntarily by the parties if that agreement did not conform with the guidelines. Therefore, if any agreement was made privately between the business associations and the workers and their trade unions, it did not have an erga omnes effect, that is, it was not valid for all branches of activity.

During this period, the business sector did not file complaints. I imagine that mechanisms began to be developed in that regard so that businesses could complain about unfair competition. In the 1990s, under the pretext of free and voluntary negotiation, collective bargaining disintegrated and broke down almost entirely as a result of neoliberal policies that deregulated the economy, fostered indiscriminate trade liberalization, allowed for permanent workers to be substituted by one-man businesses, proliferated supplier companies with a temporary workforce, and gave barely 20 per cent of workers the right to collective bargaining.

Since 2005, a system of collective bargaining has been in place which, as already mentioned, is made up of two complementary systems. It is possible to reach a collective, bipartite agreement by branch of activity, and it is possible to have tripartite negotiations in the wage councils. There is nothing to prevent a bipartite agreement from being signed and there is nothing even to prevent companies from signing agreements. The level at which negotiations are held is determined by the parties. It is true that real wages cannot really decrease because there are three ways in which workers can get an increase: through a collective, bipartite agreement, through a wage council resolution, or through an executive agreement, vote, or decree. However, this already existed between 1985 and 1990 when the employers did not file any kind of complaint.

In effect, no agreement on working conditions can exist unless there is an agreement between workers and employers. The State cannot in itself make changes to working conditions. Indeed, for every wage council negotiation made in the wage councils, by branch of activity, there are thousands of company negotiations. The level of social dialogue and collective bargaining in Uruguay is enormously high.

In effect, we have requested that the right to information be enshrined in the law on collective bargaining. What information? Information which allows for industrial espionage? No, absolutely not. We mean information related to the economic performance of a particular branch and allows for the parties to negotiate in good faith with all the information on the table. We mean information that is necessary at the branch level, which is not the same as that at the company level, so that an agreement on working arrangements or on productivity can be signed in confidence, as the other side would request, and with the desire to manage things responsibly.

Generally speaking, we do not have problems with the automatic extension of collective agreements made with business associations. For example, the association for the metal industry in Uruguay and our trade unions agreed with permanent effect that 14 March would be a paid holiday.

Now, if a benefit is established within a collective agreement, that benefit is only valid for the duration of the collective agreement, usually two or three years. This is absolutely possible.

Therefore, I believe that there is a link between collective bargaining and democracy, given that we went from a complete absence of collective bargaining to representing at least 40 to 60 per cent of workers. Today, the level of employment is solid, the rate at which, let’s say, salaries are improving is solid, the level of formalization, social security, and decent work is also solid. Any attack on collective bargaining is an attack on people’s lives.

Independently of these opinions, as always, I conclude with the following thought: our trade union is open to participate in all conversations necessary to improve the collective bargaining system of our country.

Employer member, Uruguay – We are going to refer to the complaint to be presented in due course by the National Chamber of Commerce and Services of Uruguay and the Chamber of Industry of Uruguay, as the most representative employer organizations, and the International Organisation of Employers, regarding the collective bargaining law in Uruguay and its alignment with the Convention.

As previously mentioned, this case was first presented in 2009. Various supervisory bodies have issued decisions in relation to the case. For example, the Committee on the Application of Standards, which has a tripartite structure, dealt with the case in 2010, thus putting forward a vision on the observations made. The case also passed through the Committee on Freedom of Association which has a similar composition and similar guarantees for social partners. If we add the decisions of the Committee of Experts, a technical and independent body, we can be certain that Uruguay’s law is not in line with this Convention, which is essential and fundamental for this case.

Employers have not made this complaint on a whim; they have made it to ensure compliance with the Convention that our country ratified voluntarily. Ratification comes with the responsibility to align national legislation and practice with the Convention. Therefore, today we are not going to refer to the system of labour relations in Uruguay as a whole but to the collective bargaining law which was adopted by our country in 2008 but which is not in line with the Convention. The idea, and we thank the Government of Uruguay for presenting information before this Committee today, is to improve our legislative system and improve the practice of collective bargaining in our country. We would like to highlight this point unambiguously.

The case has been under the consideration of the supervisory bodies for many years. Unfortunately, the Government of Uruguay has not put forward a draft law that improves on the collective bargaining law in question. It is true that different negotiation bodies have been developed, fulfilling the tradition that the Minister himself referred to, and which are now in place in our country. However, there are no concrete results.

Although the Government has a majority in Parliament, it has not introduced a draft law amending the collective bargaining law, which should be the basis for the system. This is where the difficulty lies. Social dialogue should be effective and productive, it should not be subject to vetoes. Without doubt, the Government has the responsibility to take the above decision and fulfil the responsibilities to which it has committed by ratifying the Convention.

It is very bad that this case is taking so long to resolve. It is bad because, as mentioned before, it relates to a fundamental Convention. In our opinion, collective bargaining in our country prioritizes tripartite negotiation over bipartite negotiation, which is not in line with the Convention. Proof of that, and the Minister already said this, are the high levels of tripartite negotiation in Uruguay. It is necessary to analyse the marked and significant fall in bipartite negotiation in our country.

In addition, we object, and the observations of the supervisory bodies also point this out, to any intervention from the Government, the State, in the different areas of negotiation. One such intervention is fixing the levels at which the negotiations take place in the Higher Tripartite Council. Another is the idea of not referring exclusively to the negotiation of minimum wages and categories but instead establishing procedures to update them and setting salary increases for categories that do not receive the minimum wage. In those cases, strong intervention from the Government, the State, is inevitable, which is not in compliance with the Convention.

However, even though it is not subject to review in this case, there is also the issue of the occupations, which completes the picture on collective bargaining. We reject the notion that occupations are an extension of the right to strike. Since 1966, and for more than 50 years, occupations were understood by a decree adopted by the democratic Government as a violation of the right to property and to public order. Today, in line with a decree that we have disputed, we are told that it is an extension of the right to strike. Occupations are always violent, there are no peaceful occupations, at the very least, there is moral violence. Situations in which workplaces are occupied are part and parcel of the practical framework for collective bargaining in our country; as a result the employers are often forced into signing agreements in the wage councils. Therefore, the results of the negotiation are often neither free nor voluntary, but imposed.

We understand that Uruguay has a problem in light of all this. The stages of development highlighted here in this room point to an additional obligation: that of improving the system. In that regard, the Employers are committed to finding a solution that improves on the collective bargaining law.

By contrast, we understand that the supervisory system itself is being, indirectly, put into question in this case. This is a case where different supervisory bodies have ratified certain observations concerning a fundamental Convention, where those observations have been communicated to the Government concerned, where a direct contacts missions has been established and technical assistance provided, but where there has still been no change ten years on. It would seem that the observations and the supervisory system hold contempt for the facts of this case. We appear today in the best of spirits to find a solution, but we understand that the time has come to invite the Government of Uruguay to consult with the social partners and very swiftly present a draft law to amend the collective bargaining law. The law must also widely take into account the observations of the different supervisory bodies in relation to the full and effective implementation of the Convention not only in law but also in practice.

Government member, Mexico – On behalf of a significant majority of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries (GRULAC), we thank the Government representative as well as the social partners for taking the floor. First, we reiterate once again that key criteria have not been respected in developing the list of countries. The list is based on a geographical imbalance which is consistently affecting our region. This system is far from aligned with the best practices of the multilateral system. It is neither transparent, impartial nor objective. It is not tripartite in the house of tripartism nor does it foster social dialogue in the house social dialogue.

We have listened carefully to the intervention of the Government of Uruguay in which it outlined the different actions implemented to resolve the complaint of the Employers. We especially welcome progress made in relation to existing social and labour protections in Uruguay as well as the mechanisms of social dialogue and collective bargaining. The Government of Uruguay has promoted these practices at all times with a view to reaching a tripartite agreement on the points raised in the complaint, in line with ILO standards and principles. Similarly, we recognize the culture of dialogue and collective bargaining that traditionally exists in the country with the aim of finding solutions that are mutually acceptable for the social partners, in line with the principles of any democratic country and respectful of the national legal system and international standards. We encourage the parties to continue on this road so that they can find a definitive solution to the problem.

Government member, Spain – First, we would like to say that Spain strongly believes in the system of international standards of the International Labour Organization as well as the supervisory system. We also think that international standards require a supervisory system that is strong and independent. The supervisory system is key to ensuring compliance with the international standards of the ILO. Having said this, we would like to make two points with regard to this case. The first is that Spain supports and very much welcomes the efforts and initiatives carried out by the Government of Uruguay to amend Law No. 18566 of 2009, some of which are already in place, such as the establishment of the Higher Tripartite Council and other initiatives still under discussion. These amendments were put forward to address the different observations made by the supervisory bodies of the ILO in conformity with the Convention with a view to promoting free and voluntary collective bargaining.

Furthermore, Spain also welcomes the initiatives of the Government of Uruguay aiming to encourage discussions among social partners on new legislative measures to promote social dialogue and regulate other aspects related to strikes in the workplace. We know that Uruguayan law does not block bilateral or collective bargaining. Spain encourages the Government of Uruguay and the social partners to redouble their efforts to consolidate the existing legislative framework, thereby making it more clearly in line with the Convention. Technical assistance from the ILO secretariat would without doubt be helpful in that regard.

Worker member, Portugal – This statement is supported by the Galician Unions Confederacy (CIG) and the Basque Workers’ Solidarity (ELA). Uruguay is known and recognized today for its system of collective bargaining and social dialogue which is effective and in compliance with the fundamental principles and standards of the ILO. This system of collective bargaining and social dialogue is so effective that sectoral salaries have grown consistently since 2005 by 55 per cent. The minimum wage has also increased by 276 per cent.

It is worth emphasizing that growth in earned income is sustained by national economic growth, which has grown annually at a rate of 4.67 per cent. This shows that this system is not incompatible, nor does it compromise national development.

There is 100 per cent coverage of collective bargaining under the voluntary system currently in place. This statistic shows clearly that the system is inclusive, as it leaves no one behind.

In order to discuss the system of social dialogue established in Uruguay, we need to raise questions around the social dialogues that are in place in Europe. We know that introducing a system of collective bargaining which is not based on sectoral negotiation in countries with micro or small enterprises, as is the case in Uruguay, can reduce collective bargaining coverage among workers.

This system led to a fall in annual coverage which went from more from 1,800,000 workers to 250,000 workers between 2011 and 2015. Earned income levels also dropped with numbers in 2018 falling below those in 2009 according to a study carried out by the ILO itself which analysed the effects of austerity measures in Portugal.

The measures imposed had a devastating effect on the lives of workers leading to an increase in the level of social exclusion and working poverty. From 2005 to 2018, the sectoral system in Uruguay improved working conditions for more and more workers and integrated a large part of informal workers into the formal economy.

The system of social dialogue and collective bargaining in Uruguay operates on a sectoral basis and is inclusive of all. It prevents unfair competition among companies, guarantees protection of workers and ensures sustainable economic growth. It also respects the fundamental standards of the ILO, the Convention, and Article 4 in particular.

Employer member, Brazil – I would like to say in this short intervention that we are not happy to be discussing this case as it should already have been resolved constructively by the Government of Uruguay.

The Convention sets basic principles to ensure that collective bargaining is sustainable, feasible and effective. This is only possible if the parties are independent and autonomous, if the principle of free and voluntary negotiation is respected and if intervention from the public authorities is minimal.

The Worker members said at the outset that government oversight is acceptable. And I say, yes, government oversight is acceptable, but intervention is not. Despite the recommendations of ILO supervisory bodies, the Government of Uruguay insists on retaining legislative provisions that allow state intervention in bipartite dialogue, including in defining the terms and conditions of work.

We know that was not the objective of the ILO when it drafted the principles contained in Article 4 of the Convention. It is a historic undertaking for the ILO and its supervisory bodies to recommend that Uruguay change its law with a view to encouraging and stimulating free and voluntary negotiation. But ten years have passed, and the employers are yet to be granted appropriate conditions for negotiations, in line with the principles outlined in the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98) and the Collective Bargaining Convention, 1981 (No. 154).

Last year, in a case similar to that of Uruguay, this Committee expressed concern over compulsory arbitration mechanisms, such as those in Greece. In the conclusions, the Committee recommended that the Greek authorities refrain from interference that restricts the right to free and voluntary negotiation. It cannot be the case in the world of work that the State is a participant in bipartite dialogue. Effective collective bargaining systems ensure that workers and employers participate equally in negotiations. Otherwise, the outcome will not be fair or equal.

Therefore, the employers of Brazil are concerned that negotiations in Uruguay are subject to disruption and interference and request the Committee to recommend that the Government align its practices with the principles governing Article 4 of the Convention.

Government member, Paraguay – We thank the Government of Uruguay and welcome the efforts it has made in recent years to find a solution acceptable to all parties within the framework of true tripartism and in line with the best traditions of this Organization. We welcome the 2019 report of the Committee of Experts which highlights the outcome of some of these efforts. Examples include the preparation of draft laws in 2016 and 2017, taking into account the employers and workers, as well as substantive consultations regarding legislative reforms on collective working relations, including an exchange of views on different draft texts. In this context, we support tripartite social dialogue and urge the Government, the employers and the workers to continue working towards a bill that reflects the interests of all those involved.

Worker member, Spain – The powers awarded to the wage councils in the Uruguayan collective bargaining law do not turn collective bargaining into a form of compulsory arbitration nor do they restrict the topics that can be negotiated. They do not infringe upon the right of workers’ organizations to negotiate working conditions freely with employers, let alone facilitate intervention from the authorities in negotiations. This is true for three fundamental reasons. First, the meetings of the wage councils, which are a space for tripartism and social dialogue, never prevent employers and workers from freely and voluntarily initiating a process of bipartite collective bargaining by branch of activity or production chain, as expressly established in article 11 of Law No. 18566. Second, it is only possible to regulate working conditions within the framework of the wage councils if it is so agreed voluntarily and freely by employers and workers at a prior date, as indicated in article 5 of Law No. 10449. Third, government actions in the wage councils is limited exclusively to fixing minimum wages and making general adjustments. This is true unless the parties conclude tripartite negotiations within the branch.

It seems that those who have pushed for this case to be debated by the Committee are trying to go back to a time in Uruguay where wage councils did not exist, where collective bargaining became so scarce that it was practically inexistent, where real wages fell by 50 per cent in some cases, where informal work reached unprecedented levels of 40 per cent, where employment increased and where working conditions for the working class deteriorated.

As a result, it is surprising that we are questioning in this case the actions of a Government that promotes tripartite social dialogue, minimum wage fixing, and sectoral collective bargaining, as the most appropriate way to ensure improved working conditions for Uruguayans.

We urge the Committee to consider all these questions in relation to a country that has ratified the highest number of ILO Conventions in the region and as a result has the highest level of prosperity and wealth per capita in Latin America.

The Government of Uruguay is clearly committed to the ILO which makes us sure that it will continue making efforts to align Law No. 18566 of 2009 with the Convention where it is objectively necessary.

Employer member, Mexico – Although my colleagues have expressed their points clearly, I must intervene to say that I am frankly surprised. I am surprised, first, by the defiance of the Government in light of the efforts, suggestions, demands and conclusions of the most important supervisory bodies of this Organization. Second, I am surprised by the complacency and compliance of this Committee of which we are all a part. I say this because it cannot be that the Government of Uruguay has maintained a position of resistance for almost 11 years, or rather, openly and clearly expressed its opposition to complying with the resolutions of this Committee. The Government has persistently failed to meet its obligations, which challenges and puts into doubt the effectiveness of all that we believe in.

If the point raised by the Government and supported by the Workers was valid, it is like saying that the practices of a country work well if any of the social partners consider it to, regardless of whether they are in line with regulations, or even of whether they violate ILO Conventions. Such a position is inadmissible.

Government intervention in collective bargaining affects and subverts social dialogue, and creates tension in relations between workers and employers, including within the groups themselves. This is unacceptable. The Convention ratified by Uruguay is clear. Unfortunately, the Government’s lack of will to fulfil the Convention is also unacceptable. With all due respect, the Government representative has incorrectly interpreted Article 4 of the Convention and is not in a position to justify a clear and deliberate lack of compliance with the Convention. This discussion has been and gone. This Organization has made it clear that working conditions must be set through an agreement between employers and workers. This is not in doubt. The Government should not raise this point again as it is not in question. The supervisory bodies have resolved and finalized it. That is, unless you wish to disregard what has already been decided.

Despite clear recommendations, the Government continues to ignore reality. As a result, I urge the Committee to strongly request that the Government of Uruguay adopt measures to ensure compliance with the Convention and the related observations as quickly as possible.

Worker member, Argentina – I have the honour of speaking on behalf of the three trade union centres in Argentina. The Committee is addressing the above-mentioned complaint of the Employers which suggests that tripartite negotiation within the framework of the wage councils is, in practice, a form of compulsory arbitration. The wage councils were established as a tripartite labour mechanism with the aim of fixing minimum wages by category and branch of activity. It is a body responsible for promoting social dialogue with a particular emphasis on collective bargaining and on the prevention and resolution of conflicts.

The Employers have wrongly said that tripartite negotiation carried out within the wage councils in practice amounts to compulsory arbitration, extending beyond the fixing of minimum wages. Article 12 of Law No. 18566 stipulates that the wage councils are tasked with fixing minimum wages by occupational category and upgrading the salaries of workers of a particular activity. The wage councils can also establish working conditions if so agreed by the employers and the workers of the respective wage group. These rules show above all that the most important principle and objective of the wage councils is to boost collective negotiation. In the event that the employers and workers do not reach an agreement, the fixing of minimum wages by occupational category and by wage increase is the only matter determined in a tripartite manner. For other issues subject to collective bargaining, the law states that wage councils are only able to establish working conditions if it is so agreed by the employers and the workers of the respective wage group. By no means is it possible to say that this is compulsory arbitration. The decision is put to a tripartite vote only after the State has encouraged negotiation between the workers and employers. The absence of wage councils weakened the trade union system and the individualization of labour relations which inevitably lead to a drop in real wages and to precarious working conditions.

I would like to remind the Employers that article 19, paragraph 8, of the ILO Constitution states that international standards are minimum standards and that nothing stops the parties from exceeding those standards. In Uruguay’s case, the situation does not go against the Convention but rather exceeds it since the most favourable standards are applied.

We should not lose sight of the fact that the wage councils have significantly improved the wages of workers with substantial increases in real wages and minimum wages. This has in turn led to fewer people working in the informal economy. These are achievements that are a direct consequence of labour relations in Uruguay, which should be an example for other countries in the region, and of the Trade Union Confederation of the Americas (CSA). We call on other countries to adopt a similar system with a view to improving productivity, decent work and social justice.

Government member, China – The Chinese delegation listened carefully to the intervention of the Government of Uruguay. We noted that in recent years the Uruguayan Government conducted reforms in regard to labour and social security legislation, promoting collective bargaining at national, industrial and enterprise level, signed collective agreements, and also achieved positive progress in health and employment, enhancing workers’ wages and reducing informal employment for the promotion and protection of workers’ rights.

We also noted the political willingness of the Government in promoting collective bargaining, and its efforts in bridging agreements between different parties with the assistance of the ILO.

We support the Uruguayan Government to continue to extensively communicate with the relevant parties to find solutions jointly. We also hope that the ILO can provide the necessary technical assistance to the Uruguayan Government to better fulfil its obligations on the Convention.

Observer, International Organisation of Employers (IOE) – I make this intervention in my capacity as Secretary-General of the International Organisation of Employers (IOE) which is a complainant in the case before the supervisory bodies. I would like to emphasize that, in contrast to what we have heard from some of the speakers, this is not a minor case requiring a small technical adjustment in the way that collective bargaining is currently regulated in Uruguay.

This case has arisen because the Government of Uruguay has deliberately and repeatedly failed to comply with the recommendations and guidelines of ILO supervisory bodies. It is a case which, I would say, shows a complete disregard for the supervisory bodies and a failure to comply over a ten-year period, despite calls from this Committee in 2010 to change and amend legislation in practice.

Collective bargaining legislation and practices in Uruguay are a clear example of the attitudes facing the business sector, namely attitudes that promote inference, meddling and even bullying. This interference obliges business organizations to support government dictates on salaries; salaries which should be freely negotiated by the parties, as is the case in all countries which fully respect the provisions, principles and basic rights promoted by the ILO, in the context of collective bargaining.

This interference determines and imposes realities that are above and beyond what has been decided by the parties, above and beyond the scope of the collective agreements. This interference denies legitimacy to the freely elected worker representatives and imposes external representatives indirectly onto businesses. Prolonged interference of this nature is having serious consequences: (1) the elimination of bilateral collective bargaining; (2) a climate of social dialogue that is deeply damaged; (3) a growing climate of conflict that is having adverse effects on social order; (4) a climate of conflict that is affecting investment, decent work, and above all, freedom of enterprise.

Prolonged interference of this nature is giving rise to radical protests and collective unionized actions that are completely unacceptable. They consist of systematic occupations in the workplace, which deny businesses the capacity to determine and organize their own operations.

It is therefore a very concerning and serious case, and this should be taken into account when preparing the conclusions. The IOE feels obliged to request further discussions on this case in the future, including within the framework of other supervisory mechanisms, if immediate progress is not made.

Worker member, Colombia – I am speaking on behalf of the workers of Colombia and Nicaragua. For the workers, it is completely incomprehensible that, on the occasion of the ILO Centenary, one of the countries most committed to the objectives and principles of this Organization, instead of being presented as an example of progress, as an example of a country which complies with international standards and promotes basic rights in the workplace, has been called before this Committee for fully respecting the right to unionize, for having one of the highest levels of collective bargaining in the world, the highest in the Americas, and for promoting and guaranteeing freedom of association itself. Reprimanding the country in this way is equivalent to reprimanding a country for abolishing forced or child labour. I would not know how to explain this to my children let alone to Colombian workers who are literally giving up their lives to defend workers’ rights and who are hit hard by the absence of freedom of association which has arisen as a result of state and business sector complacency. Summoning Uruguay in this way goes against the role of tripartism, as promoted by the ILO.

The Convention stipulates that States should promote and boost voluntary negotiation procedures, a mandate to which Uruguay has attached great importance, not only by respecting the guarantees outlined in the Convention but also by taking effective measures to raise collective bargaining levels. By doing so, Uruguay has effectively managed to improve coverage of collective bargaining, raise incomes for active and retired workers, achieve the lowest levels of inequality in Latin America, enhance relations between trade unions and employers, and attain a level of social dialogue that other countries in Latin America can only dream of as it seems impossible to achieve.

This situation has not only promoted the well-being of the Uruguay population but also advanced progress for businesses in the country. Collective bargaining in Uruguay is not only done by company, as is the case in most countries, but also by economic sector. This means that collective bargaining covers almost all workers and companies. This is in contrast to what happens in Colombia, for example, where barely 2 per cent of economically active people are protected. It is precisely this to which they are objecting.

It does not make sense to include Uruguay on the list of this Committee following a complaint from the employers when, along with trade unions and companies, employers themselves have been negotiating salaries and working conditions in the country for decades. It was the will of the employers and the outcome of social dialogue that enabled the country to achieve such advancements in negotiations. The employers should not be alleging violations to the Convention if they themselves have participated in those violations, while also enjoying protections and making progress that should be celebrated.

We welcome the fact that the employers are requesting, before this Committee, that the Government of Uruguay ensure immediate compliance with the recommendations issued by ILO supervisory bodies. We hope that they make the same request equally as passionately to other governments, such as those of Brazil, Argentina and Colombia, which have, repeatedly for years, been the subject of dozens of ILO observations, direct requests and conclusions on freedom of association but continue to flout them.

Government member, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela – The Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela thanks the Government representative for the information provided. The Uruguayan case is another example of the over-representation of Latin America and the Caribbean in the work of this Committee: six of the countries on the list are from our region, almost 60 per cent is from South America. As on previous occasions, the criteria for the selection of countries is not clear in this case. The list does not respect the principle of geographical distribution.

We emphasize in particular the efforts made by the Government of Uruguay to promote social dialogue and collective bargaining as a means of guaranteeing the rights of all parties. We also welcome the progress made by the country in the areas of social protection, labour relations and protection of rights.

As a result, we invite the Government of Uruguay to continue promoting tripartism, collective bargaining and social dialogue, as it has traditionally done, and I stress, as it has traditionally done.

Employer member, Guatemala – We are once again examining the case of Uruguay in relation to the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98). We are doing so because both the Committee of Experts and the Employers’ group have repeatedly expressed concern in that regard; because the ILO supervisory bodies have repeatedly asked this country to align its laws with this fundamental Convention. So far, this has not happened despite setting up tripartite dialogue, which did not produce the expected results. This obliges the Government of Uruguay to take the necessary steps to ensure that the observations of the supervisory bodies are finally put into statutory law.

The Committee of Experts has highlighted the need to ensure compliance with Article 4 of the Convention, that is, to promote free and voluntary collective negotiation. In that regard, we are particularly concerned that the legislation and practices in place in Uruguay allow for workplace occupations when there is a conflict. It is evident that this does not in any way promote free and voluntary negotiation. How can there be a free and voluntary negotiation if one of the parties is stripped of its property and the future of the company is put at risk? Clearly, this puts unfair pressure on one of the parties, in this case on the employer, to sign an agreement on the basis of expectations which would be unacceptable in the absence of such pressure. Therefore, I am wondering what freedom we are talking about. We are talking about a serious violation of one party’s right to property and freedom by forcing them into collective negotiations. It is crystal clear that the above-mentioned law on promoting free and voluntary negotiation is being violated. The violation not only affects the employer, but also, of course, seriously impacts workers who do not support the movement in question and who wish to continue working. This, therefore, has a harmful effect on the right to work, which should be guaranteed for all.

With these concerns in mind, we call on the Government of Uruguay to meet the obligations expected of them as Members of this Organization and as parties to the Convention, which is a fundamental Convention, and to align its laws and practices with that Convention, so that voluntary and free collective negotiation can take place effectively. The Government should do so without delay given that many years have passed since this case was examined for the first time by the supervisory bodies.

Worker member, Brazil – I am speaking on behalf of the worker members of Brazil, the United States, Cuba and the Latin American Association of Labour Lawyers. This case is a success case, despite what some might think. It is a success case because of the progress made by the Government of Uruguay in promoting collective bargaining in the country, because of the way in which the Government has acted in relation to the observations and requests made by the supervisory bodies.

We should recognize, just as the Committee of Experts did, the intense and productive nature of the social dialogue process and the tripartite agreements carried out in 2015. We urge all countries to use this case as a reference point.

Uruguay has widely and consistently redistributed its growing prosperity since 2005 and has reduced inequality and informal labour.

Key to those changes was the restoration of a robust system of collective bargaining which offers wide coverage for the productive sectors and includes groups previously excluded from the workforce, such as rural and domestic workers.

Meanwhile, the United States, a prosperous country in which only 7 per cent of the private workforce is covered by collective bargaining, and where there is no sectoral bargaining, has moved in the wrong direction when it comes to salaries, causing inequality and informal work over more than 30 years.

Additionally, while in many other countries, rural and domestic workers continue to be largely excluded from collective bargaining, they are included in Uruguay.

On the Centenary of the ILO, we should be recognizing countries which have adopted social dialogue and tripartite mechanisms to advance towards better social justice.

We wish to fervently reject the argument that the wage councils are a form of compulsory arbitration. No provision of Law No. 18566 makes it obligatory to hold bilateral negotiation in the tripartite council. The parties have a right to use the wage councils but are not obliged to.

Furthermore, article 19(8) of the ILO Constitution assures that the ratification of international standards does not prevent countries from developing other forms of law, whether from customary law or judicial decisions, which promote more favourable conditions than those outlined in international law. Therefore, it is not acceptable to argue that rights are being suppressed as this suggests that the conventional standards are being used as a tool to subvert more favourable local laws.

Government member, Costa Rica – The Government of Costa Rica thanks the Government of Uruguay for the timely information provided in relation to ensuring compliance with the Convention. We recognize the will of the Government of Uruguay to improve relations between workers and employers through tripartite dialogue. We value the efforts made towards reaching a social agreement that satisfies the interests of the workers and employers. Uruguay is one of the longest standing democracies on the continent with a proven record of respect for human rights, international law, dialogue and peaceful settlement of disputes.

Recently in 2009, Uruguay underwent its universal periodic review on human rights. We saw that its public policies and judicial and institutional system were protective of human rights, including the right to work. We were also informed about the most recent measures put in place to strengthen social policy and the labour market.

We trust in the Government of Uruguay to continue taking action to strengthen the implementation of internal standards, of principles outlined in the Convention and of ILO regulations.

Employer member, Chile – The Uruguayan case is interesting for all the constituents of the ILO because it refers, among other things, to a topic that is at the heart of this very important international organization: social dialogue.

This Convention is a fundamental ILO Convention that promotes and recognizes the value of social dialogue, but not just any social dialogue, one that is carried out collectively in a free and voluntary way.

Since 2010, the Committee of Experts and the Committee on Freedom of Information have been requesting the Government of Uruguay to revise Law No. 18566 of 2009 which establishes the principles and fundamental rights within the collective bargaining system, as well as to take concrete measures to fully align legislation and practice with the Convention, particularly with Article 4. Unfortunately, this has not happened yet.

With respect to the powers of the Higher Tripartite Council on collective bargaining, the Committee on Freedom of Association has asked the Government to take the necessary measures “to ensure that the bargaining level is established by the parties and is not subject to voting in a tripartite body”.

With respect to the powers of the wage councils on salaries and working conditions, the Committee on Freedom of Information has highlighted the following: “recalling that it is up to the legislative authority to determine the legal minimum standards for conditions of work and that Article 4 of Convention No. 98 seeks to promote bipartite bargaining to fix conditions of work, the Committee hopes that in application of those principles, any collective agreement on fixing of conditions of employment will be the result of an agreement between the parties”.

It is a fact that the wage councils in Uruguay have become a form of compulsory arbitration, where the representatives of the Executive define the rules for negotiations and make proposals on working conditions, which makes it practically impossible for the parties to negotiate in a free and voluntary way.

In sum, the two above-mentioned situations are not in line with the Convention, because, not only do they fail to promote negotiations that are voluntary, free and bipartite, they also leave the door open for undue interference from the government in power.

Lastly, we join calls for the Committee of Experts to issue another observation for 2018 and respectfully ask the Government of Uruguay to propose a draft law in Parliament to guarantee that its laws and practices comply fully with the provisions of the Convention.

Government member, Dominican Republic – The Dominican Republic aligns itself with the statement delivered by GRULAC and supports the report presented by the Ministry of Labour of Uruguay. The Government of the Dominican Republic recognizes the will and actions carried out by the Government of Uruguay through its Ministry of Labour, which expressly show that the Government is complying with the provisions of Freedom of Association and the Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).

The information provided shows Uruguay’s commitment to complying with international labour standards. As a result, we recognize the country’s efforts to reform national laws and administrative practices with a view to advancing labour principles and strengthening fundamental workers’ rights in different areas, thereby promoting tripartism in line with the provisions of the Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards) Convention, 1976 (No. 144).

Employer member, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela – We welcome the fact that dialogues and tripartite agreements are in place in Uruguay to address proposed legislative reforms, in this case regarding occupations in the workplace, the scope of the wage councils, and whether the Government should accept technical assistance from the secretariat. These are circumstances which do not exist in Venezuela.

However, we are concerned that the Government is using subterfuge to interfere in labour relations and to promote a form of compulsory arbitration, setting out the rules of the negotiation or ultimately determining working conditions through mechanisms that should have the healthy and legitimate objective of promoting constructive and effective tripartite dialogue. This goes above and beyond the powers of the Government and is a violation of the Convention.

The right to organize and the right to free and voluntary collective bargaining should be prioritized in any effort to pursue tripartite dialogue. It is not for the Executive to approve, standardize or interfere in that dialogue as this would weaken agreements arising from collective bargaining. The role of the Government should be, above all, to promote bipartite dialogue with a view to fixing working conditions and facilitating the harmonious development of labour relations, in accordance with Article 4 of the Convention. The Convention seeks to prevent employers’ organizations from interfering in the affairs of workers’ organizations during the adoption of agreements. Therefore, it would never allow for the Government to interfere in or impose labour conditions. Dialogue and tripartite agreements cannot put free and voluntary collective bargaining at risk.

It would be absolutely absurd for the Government to impose working conditions through tripartite dialogue or arbitrary mechanisms, especially if the employers have found them to be unreasonable. Doing so would eventually impact the workers by limiting the capacity of the employers to offer them higher-standard, equitable and permanent working conditions, or worse, by affecting the sustainability of the company.

Let us hope that this practice is not repeated. Let us hope that Uruguay stops distorting tripartite mechanisms and begins using its resources in a healthy way to ensure balanced labour decisions, instead of finding creative ways to facilitate government interference that weaken or render illusory the true exercise of freedom of association and the right to free and voluntary collective bargaining.

We remind the Government of Uruguay of the need for constructive and effective tripartite dialogue. This should be enshrined in legislation in a way which always ensures compliance and full respect for freedom of association and for voluntary collective bargaining, in conformity with the Convention.

Government member, Argentina – We thank all the representatives and especially the Government of Uruguay for the information provided to us as well as all the Governments and social partners that have taken the floor. We would like to make two points during our intervention. The first has to do with the importance of the ILO supervisory system which is already guiding countries in their efforts to ensure compliance with international standards. We emphasize and agree with the statement by the representative of GRULAC who suggested that the list was not balanced geographically, and that our region was particularly affected. In the future, we would also like to see the Organization review the methodology used for preparing the list through tripartite social dialogue. Doing so would ensure that all those involved have the opportunity to improve the methodology by making it more transparent and objective. In this way, we can undoubtedly ensure that the most urgent, complex and important cases are brought forward based on the criteria and methodology. This would most certainly make the process fairer.

The second point we would like to make is that we have listened carefully to the intervention of the Government of Uruguay in which it detailed the actions it has implemented. For instance, it has ensured worker representation and prepared a report on the positive impact that its particular model of collective bargaining has had thus far. The Government of Argentina understands and values the effort made by the Government of Uruguay to attend these discussions and address the recommendations and considerations of the ILO. As has been already pointed out, we believe that all changes to the current system should be processed and made within the framework of tripartite social dialogue so that the positive aspects can be maintained. There is also, without doubt, a need to work through the methodology used to make those changes. We encourage the Government of Uruguay to continue working in the way it always has.

Employer member, Argentina – Collective bargaining is a fundamental pillar of decent work, it makes it possible to create trust and mutual respect among employers, workers and their organizations and contributes to maintaining stable and productive labour relations.

Our intervention is about the duration and validity of collective agreements. These two elements are essential and should be agreed by the contracting parties. The decisions made in these processes have special legitimacy and should never be undermined by standards which allow for the automatic extension of collective agreements.

Today the various forms of work are rapidly evolving. This emphasizes the need for effective social dialogue mechanisms to update labour relations and ensure respect for the principles and fundamental rights safeguarded by this Organization, without jeopardizing the creation of jobs linked to new technologies.

The Committee on Freedom of Association has recalled the following on this matter: “the duration of collective agreements is primarily a matter for the parties involved, but if government action is being considered any legislation should reflect tripartite agreement”. The amendments proposed by the Uruguayan Government to article 17 of Law No. 18566 were not the result of a tripartite agreement nor do not resolve the observations of the supervisory bodies since they propose that automatic extension be negotiated for all collective agreements. This can be interpreted as a new form of undue interference in collective bargaining.

Our sector would like to highlight the general rule which deems collective agreements temporary in nature. These agreements should have a prescribed time frame, this is one of their key characteristics. As with all contracts, once the time frame agreed by the contracting parties expires, so do its provisions, and the parties are then free to negotiate a new collective agreement.

In conclusion, we hope that the Committee will urge the Government of Uruguay to revise the benchmark standards with the participation of the social partners and take on board the comments of the supervisory bodies, guaranteeing respect for the autonomy of the contracting parties and compliance with the remaining principles and rights outlined in the Convention.

Employer member, Honduras – We are concerned that Uruguay is yet again the subject of complaints as a result of the Government’s failure to comply with a Convention that forms part of the very essence of the ILO. The Convention in question establishes the rules and guidelines for collective bargaining, ensuring it is trustworthy, actionable and effective. It also establishes the independence and autonomy of the parties who should be able to participate freely and voluntarily in negotiations.

Ten years after the case against the Government of Uruguay was first presented, the case is yet again subject to review because of a lack of engagement from the Government of Uruguay. The complaint was filed because the negotiation of wages by branch of economic activity in Uruguay does not comply with the principles of the Convention. It does not comply because the freedom to negotiate does not exist. The Government is therefore violating a fundamental right by denying employers and workers the right to reach agreements through collective bargaining. The labour administration system has in fact taken over this right.

With respect to the effects of the wage councils on salaries and working conditions, the Government has not proposed any legislative amendments and persistently refuses to recognize that the tripartite negotiations carried out within the framework of the wage councils are a form of compulsory arbitration, where representatives of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security set out and define how negotiations are carried out.

The Government has not been able to reach a tripartite agreement on the reforms requested eight years ago by the Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts. The Government of Uruguay must now fulfil the obligation to present a draft law to Parliament which puts an end to its disregard for the principles outlined in international collective bargaining Conventions that it itself has ratified.

Despite the recommendations of the Committee of Experts, the Government of Uruguay continues to close its ears and keep the standards in question in force. We therefore request the following measures from the Committee. First, the Government of Uruguay must adopt, as soon as possible, the measures required to close the observation of the Committee of Experts. Second, the Government of Uruguay should hold tripartite meetings which lead to a draft law that aligns national laws and practices with the Convention. Third, the Government of Uruguay must report on the progress made on this case at the next session of the ILO Governing Body in November 2019.

Government member, Russian Federation – We are grateful to the representative of the Uruguayan Government for the information provided on the measures to comply with its obligations under the Convention. We have listened carefully to the explanations given about labour reforms carried out by Uruguay over many years. The figures speak for themselves. A considerable amount of work has been put into reinstating workers’ rights, to improving social security and to bringing down the number of jobs in the informal sector. We note with interest Uruguay’s experience in promoting collective bargaining at three levels in the High Tripartite Council, at branch and sectoral levels and in individual businesses and enterprises. As far as we can understand, the national legislation of Uruguay guarantees the right to collective bargaining. Furthermore, the holding of such negotiations in collective bargaining appears to be a traditional practice in the country. We agree with other delegations that consideration of questions of compliance with ILO Conventions is something that, while we are doing, we should take into account the law and practice of a country and the specific features of the legal system in that country.

It is important that the Government is demonstrating openness and a constructive approach to cooperation with the ILO and is conscientiously working to implement the recommendations made when this issue was considered last time. This is something which we should encourage. We urge that efforts be continued to strengthen social dialogue in Uruguay through cooperation with the ILO.

Employer member, Plurinational State of Bolivia – I will begin by pointing out that it is not about questioning or objecting to collective bargaining as an appropriate way of resolving conflicts. Indeed, allowing those who are involved in the conflict to exercise free will, should logically make it easier to reach agreements that are healthy, appropriate, and in line with the realities of all companies. Such a situation is not foreign or unknown to Uruguay.

However, in the case we are discussing today, it is sadly but strikingly clear that the concept of “conciliation” has become “imposition”. This is a serious matter on which everyone should reflect given that this has become the normal way of reaching agreements. It, of course, leaves the employers defenceless, making them susceptible and vulnerable to different levels of pressure, through strikes and other measures, which, far from facilitating agreements, only damage the integrity of companies and therefore of sources of employment.

The employers of Bolivia have complete empathy for the employers of Uruguay. Like them, we are also being forced into signing time-limited agreements every year with a view to expanding on the baseline set by the national government annually. It is precisely because of this unfortunate experience that we understand the effects of pressure and even extortion from the trade union representatives who are not acting in line with the legal implications of free and voluntary negotiation.

It is precisely because of this that governments cannot deny that the employers are essential actors in labour relations. Consequently, while it is known by all that labour standards are protectionist in nature, this should not prevent governments from offering the employers the same legal security and certainty required to reach agreements freely in accordance with all legislation. Governments should establish conditions and labour relations through free negotiation.

As soon as a party is coerced into signing an agreement, even if that coercion is simulated, as is the case when one party forces another into discretionary submission through labour arbitration, it undoubtedly perverts the objective and purpose of the Convention. As a result, it is essential that all laws are in line and in accordance with the Convention. In the case of Uruguay, an observation of the Committee of Experts has been reoccurring since 2010 because, unfortunately, the Government has thus far failed to review and align legislation accordingly.

Government member, Panama – The delegation of the Government of Panama thanks the Government representative for the comments. With all due respect, we believe that the present case reveals that the procedure for selecting cases to appear before the Committee is inadequate from the perspective of geographical equity. Indeed, five out of the 11 countries on the long list of cases before the Committee on the Application of Standards are from South America, which amounts to almost 50 per cent. Three of them were also then put on the shortlist, which amounts to 60 per cent of those named. Latin America and South America is over-represented compared to other regions and subregions. Furthermore, the procedure does not take into account other criteria for determining serious cases requiring immediate attention. Equally, we emphasize the efforts made by the Government to promote collective bargaining and social dialogue as well as to make progress on social protection.

We encourage the Government of Uruguay to continue using tripartism, consultation and other mechanisms of dialogue.

Government member, Plurinational State of Bolivia – The Plurinational State of Bolivia thanks the Government of Uruguay for the information presented regarding the Convention. In addition, we welcome the efforts made by Uruguay to extend different workers’ rights, including such rights as freedom of association, collective bargaining, outsourcing, and the labour process. We also highlight the uninterrupted growth in the real wages of workers, advances in job creation and improved social security. These important achievements are reflected in lower levels of poverty in Uruguay.

In light of the information provided by the Government of Uruguay, we consider it unfounded to be reviewing this case before the Committee. Therefore, we encourage the Government of Uruguay to continue taking measures that promote and protect the right to organize and the right to collective bargaining in the country.

Government representative – We thank the various representatives for their insights regarding the case of Uruguay. First, we would like to once again reaffirm our Government’s commitment to dialogue and collective bargaining in practice, in our convictions and in our political resolve, and are ready to make any appropriate and reasonable changes, if met with social consensus, as they say at the ILO, to extend and improve the system of collective bargaining and conflict prevention.

We support the reports of the ILO supervisory bodies, including the Committee of Experts, the Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee on the Application of Standards and will listen, respond and do as they say. We have already acted in that regard. However, as we have expressly shown, in order for there to be social consensus, the parties have to be in agreement. In our first presentation, we explained how the Government has received a negative response to the many proposals that it has made, preventing us from reaching the social consensus needed to make changes. But, as noted, we have proposed solutions to every single recommendation made by the Committee on Freedom of Association in its report of March 2010, specifically in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018.

We would like to thank the Governments of Latin American and the Caribbean in particular which were almost unanimous in providing us with such important support at this meeting, which we were honestly not expecting. We are honoured, satisfied and proud that the governments of our region have supported our position and actions.

We would also like to thank the countries of other regions, such as Spain, China and the Russian Federation for their support and for their presentations. We did not expect this either and are honoured and thrilled in that regard. We are particularly grateful that these very important countries have devoted part of their very valuable time to our small country, which has, in our opinion, been unfairly placed on the list of cases to review. We come here with confidence, absolute conviction and peace of mind, and use the opportunity to demonstrate what we have done and what we are doing in Uruguay.

We would also like to thank workers around the world who have unanimously supported Uruguay. Honestly, dear workers, thank you very much because you have supported a country that is constantly seeking to improve, even though we make mistakes and are still lacking in certain areas. We urge you to support the system of collective bargaining, labour protection, social protection which we are developing in our country and which has been unfairly attacked by some today.

We would also like to highlight, and I say this with absolute conviction and sincerity, the presentation made by the employers of Uruguay. We believe that the presentation by the employers clarifies the expectations to take forward. In the same way, we regret and reject equally as forcefully, all presentations made by other Employer representatives who are unfamiliar with Uruguayan realities, and who have said things that are not true. They have not read the documents that we have presented, instead basing their views on ideological questions to attack a system of social protection and labour relations which, as has been shown, is creating and will continue creating better working conditions for both the workers and employers of Uruguay.

If this system of labour relations had failed, the number of companies registered to pay social security in Uruguay would not have risen by 50 per cent, and we would not have had 17 years of continuous economic growth for the first time in the history of our country. Growth rates rose above those for Latin America for most years.

We want to continue in the same vain. We are ready because we know that we need to make changes. We have made changes and proposals, and sometimes they have been blocked by one side and sometimes by another. Some speakers have said things that are not true. For example, it is not true that the Government is imposing working conditions in Uruguay. Working conditions in Uruguay can only be set by the workers and the employers.

Some have said that the Government is imposing guidelines on salary increases but this is not true. The Government proposes guidelines to discuss but it consults the parties before doing so and the guidelines are not obligatory. Where is the proof that the guidelines are not obligatory? Proof is the outcome of the current round of collective bargaining as well as that of previous rounds. What has happened in the current round of collective bargaining? A total of 85 per cent of agreements are agreements between employers and workers, and this is very important. But let’s do a more thorough analysis of the data. Out of the above-mentioned 85 per cent, 47 per cent is made up of tripartite agreements and 38 per cent of bipartite agreements, where both the employers and workers wanted to negotiate in a tripartite manner knowing that the Government was going to vote against or abstain. This shows that collective bargaining is free in Uruguay.

With regard to impartiality, the Government has, coincidentally but not by coincidence, voted with the employers in 5 per cent of cases and with the workers in 5 per cent of cases whenever it has had to vote with one party or another in this round of collective bargaining. This is the truth of what happens in Uruguay.

Some have spoken of pressure, but there is no record of the employers complaining about pressure in the proceedings of the wage councils or of other meetings. The employers did, however, make a statement in March 2018, a statement which we greatly appreciate, in which they say the following: “we have received the government guidelines, but, if it is true what the employers are saying, we will discuss it in the wage councils as long as it is recorded in the proceedings of the session of the Higher Tripartite Council in March 2018”.

Lastly, we would like to highlight the significance of what we have proposed. We have made long-standing proposals to progress on this issue and will continue doing so. It is for that reason that we welcome the statement by the Employer representative of Uruguay who highlighted the group’s willingness to work towards new measures that would make changes to the system of collective bargaining and conflict prevention, in consultation with the social partners. I repeat, the aim would be to extend and improve the system of collective bargaining and conflict prevention.

We are also pleased that there is a desire to discuss the right to strike before this Committee in Uruguay. We know that the employers do not want to discuss the right to strike at the ILO, they do not want to acknowledge it. And when we speak about occupations, we speak about the right to strike, therefore we welcome this development.

Therefore, we repeat that, in Uruguay, we prioritize bipartite negotiations, as is clearly indicated in Law No. 18566 and its articles. And proof of that is when we all meet here, we see how it works.

Therefore, we are and will be open to dialogue and negotiation with a view to changing and progressing, and we will continue doing so, with the help of the ILO wherever necessary, which we greatly value and appreciate. For us, it is also fundamental to respect the realities and history of our country.

Worker members – Uruguay shares fourth place with Norway in the ranking of member States with the highest number of ratified ILO Conventions. It has also been singled out on endless occasions as an example for others to follow on social dialogue.

It is our understanding that in the current system, the State does not force the parties to negotiate in the wage councils, nor does it impose so-called compulsory arbitration. We are pleased that, in its statement, the Government has assigned priority and importance to bipartite collective bargaining as well as to the Convention. Furthermore, it recognizes the possibility for the parties to negotiate bilaterally outside the wage councils. Any pre-signed agreement can then be presented before this body without any amendments from the Government. In addition, the social partners have the right to reject any call to appear before the wage council. They simply need to express their desire for bilateral collective negotiation or show that they are covered by another collective agreement that is still in force. Furthermore, even if the issue is called before the wage councils, the government representative cannot cast their vote if one of the parties does not attend, making it impossible to make a decision regarding the bargaining unit that was summoned.

One of the effects of this system is that it has given a strong boost to collective bargaining in general. In more concrete terms, outside the wage councils, the number of bargaining units increased substantially, the contents of the collective agreements became broader and, as we have previously mentioned, the right to collective bargaining was extended to sectors that previously did not have access to it. We reiterate the importance of the latter move for rural and domestic work.

As we have heard in the Government’s intervention, the system in Uruguay has also strengthened the purchasing power of wages and salaries, which has had a favourable effect, generating an upward trend in the periodic adjustment of retirements and pensions, as well as a notable increase in employment levels and in employment formalization with very positive impacts on the country’s economy.

The above-mentioned points lead the Workers’ group to ask the Government of Uruguay to redouble its efforts to promote tripartite consultations with the aim of reaching a consensus. I repeat, with the aim of reaching a consensus. However, the Government has indeed taken action and expressed commitment in that regard. The Workers’ group has also observed that it would be beneficial for the Committee of Experts to receive a more detailed explanation of the way the collective bargaining system works in Uruguay in law and in practice. Therefore, we would like to encourage the Government to provide the Committee of Experts with the data that was presented here and keep it informed of any progress made in tripartite consultations regarding potential legislative amendments.

Lastly, we take careful note of the comments made by the spokesperson of the Employers who rose questions related to the right to strike and how it is regulated by national legislation. The Employers stated that these discussions, these issues, are related to the right to strike and are relevant for the Committee on the Application of Standards. This is all fine, but it is also worth expressing the position of the Workers. We argue that the right to strike peacefully is protected by the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) and also includes all other peaceful trade union measures, such as occupations.

Employer members – We are extremely grateful to all the participants of this rich discussion which has demonstrated the importance of this case. If it was a simple matter, as in other cases, it would have gone relatively quickly. The rich interventions clearly set forth the need to ensure compliance with the Conventions. They also highlight the interest of this Committee to ensure that governments address the recommendations of the supervisory bodies.

Hopefully the distinguished Minister will understand, because he does not often come to these sessions, that when we give messages of this nature, it is because we very much hope that substantial changes will be made.

Ten years have passed, and although goals have been set, there have been no results. I would also like to ask the Minister to take into account the views of those who did not make an intervention. Many Government representatives from other regions did not make an intervention, despite often doing so within this Committee, and this silence is worth a thousand words. It is necessary to implement change because much time has passed without any substantial improvement.

Furthermore, we would have liked the Government of Uruguay to have given us specific details on each of the issues that we have presented and not to have simply provided general statistics on progress made in the country. We do not deny this progress, but it does not mean that the country is in alignment or in compliance with the Convention. Uruguay is not complying with the Convention, and this Committee should emphasize the need to ensure compliance as soon as possible.

Language is not only expressed verbally but also in gestures. In this debate, we noticed many derogatory looks and messages directed at the spokesperson for the IOE during his statement. Similarly, we believe that the reply by the Minister was clearly false. I do not want to repeat that the representatives of the employers of Uruguay standing before his Committee are concerned that they will go back to our country and be treated in the same way as our spokesperson was treated here. It is clear that this legislative instrument that has been put in place inhibits social dialogue and understanding. Employers in Uruguay are somewhat fearful of the statistics related to the agreements in case they are forced to sign those agreements or face other reprisals.

Therefore, we reaffirm each and every word expressed by the spokesperson of the IOE. In the year of the Centenary, a violation persists, as it has done for a period of ten years. The regulation of collective bargaining in Uruguay is, in practice, a clear example of the attitude taken towards the employers: an attitude of interference, meddling and bullying.

As a result of interference, the employer organizations are being forced into supporting government dictates and are therefore losing the ability to determine salaries which should be freely negotiated by the parties, as is the case in all countries that fully respect ILO principles and fundamental rights, such as the right to collective bargaining, as outlined in the fundamental Conventions.

In this way, we would like to request, in an amicable but authoritative manner, that the Government of Uruguay adopt clear and precise attitudes. The conclusions of this Committee should urge the Government to develop and submit a draft law to Parliament which ensures that Law No. 18566 as well as all national practices are in full compliance with the Convention and with other fundamental standards, fully taking into account the decisions of the various supervisory bodies. It should do so before the next session of the Governing Body in November 2019 and following comprehensive and effective consultations held in good faith with the most representative social partners.

We also urge the Government to send a report to the Committee of Experts before 1 September 2019 outlining all the actions taken so that the Committee can evaluate the information this year.

We have the best intentions and always an attitude of goodwill, which is what this Organization considers as the basis of social dialogue. Social dialogue arises from harmonious and peaceful relations. But we feel obliged to defend our suggestions for the future which, crucially, are in line with the Constitution of this Organization so that the ILO supervisory bodies can make immediate progress, as we have requested.

As I already mentioned, strikes are not addressed under any of the ILO standards, but that does not mean that the right to strike does not exist. It is perfectly possible for Uruguay to address the issue, but not within this Committee. The Employers recognize the right to strike under national legislation, but not within the framework of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) or the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98). Our position has not changed, and it is shared by the majority of Governments that consider that the methods and practices used to exercise the right to strike should be regulated by each individual jurisdiction. In this way, Uruguay’s law on this matter should be subject to internal review within the country, but not to the ILO supervisory system, at least not to the Committee on the Application of Standards, and I would also add the Committee of Experts.

I would like to conclude by saying that, although we did not wish to do so, we are obliged by the attitude of the Government of Uruguay towards the Employers’ group today to request that the conclusions of this case are included in a special paragraph.

Conclusions of the Committee

The Committee took note of the information provided by the Government representative and the discussion that followed.

Taking into account the discussion that followed, the Committee urges the Government to:

- initiate legislative measures by 1 November 2019, after full consultation with the most representative employers’ and workers’ organizations, considering the recommendation of ILO supervisory bodies, to guarantee the full compliance of national law and practice with the Convention; and

- prepare, in consultation with the most representative employers’ and workers’ organizations a report to be submitted to the Committee of Experts before 1 September 2019, informing in detail on actions undertaken to progress in the full application of the Convention in law and practice.

Government representative – The Government of Uruguay would like to thank the social partners for the rich and interesting discussion held in this room in relation to our case. In this regard, we would like to highlight three main points. Firstly, at the moment, a pre-election process is under way in our country, which entails certain restrictions regarding the dates proposed by Parliament. During the proposed election period, Parliament is on recess. There may be, therefore, although it remains to be seen, some complications concerning the dates being mentioned and requested as, as I said, during the election process, national Parliament is on recess, which makes this a complex issue to resolve.

Secondly, we would like to inform the Committee that we have already convened a first meeting, to continue the social dialogue, for 26 June. We have invited partners from both sides. Lastly, we thank the Committee for the outcome.

Individual Case (CAS) - Discussion: 2011, Publication: 100th ILC session (2011)

A Government representative said that it was quite possible that most of the members present knew little about the real situation in his country, which for the 200 years of its existence had always been looked upon by the rest of the world as a country that respected and promoted democracy, save for two occasions when it had been interrupted by a military dictatorship – most recently between 1973 and 1984. Currently the Latin Barometer, an international indicator, rated the Uruguayan people as having most confidence in the democratic system in the region than almost any country in the world. Also, the United Nations human development index had identified it as one of the leading countries of the region. Uruguay had always been respectful of human rights, especially workers’ rights, and both its workers’ and its employers’ movements prided themselves on their total independence from the political authorities. Referring to the case under discussion and to Act No. 18566 on collective bargaining in particular, he observed that what was being questioned was not so much the Act itself as the model of social dialogue that Uruguay had followed since 1943, with the adoption of the Wages Councils (Act No. 10449). For as long as that Act had been on the statutes, real wages, national development and the employers’ sector had been sustainable and continued. It was only when the application of the Act was interrupted with the advent of the dictatorship in 1968 that economic growth had come to a halt. Between 1990 and 2004, the failure to apply the Act resulted in a 23 per cent drop in real wages, as well as in the systematic decline of collective bargaining, which was reduced to the bare minimum.

From 2005 onwards, successive governments promoted a policy of far-reaching social dialogue, described by the ILO Director-General as “exemplary”. It was this, among other things, which enabled Uruguay to avoid falling into recession during the recent world economic crisis and to maintain a moderate growth rate in 2009–10, which was currently on the rise again. As it was practiced in Uruguay, collective bargaining covered virtually 100 per cent of private sector workers. Its system of industrial relations traditionally involved collective bargaining at the branch level, rather than at the enterprise level, although the Act that was criticized did not prevent the conduct of bilateral collective negotiations as well. The comments did not suggest violations of the fundamental principles of the Convention or of basic human rights, such as in other cases discussed by the Committee. An examination of the agreements concluded in the course of the four rounds of negotiations held in the Wages Council revealed that 90 per cent of the decisions had been taken by majority vote and 80 per cent unanimously. Overall, during the past five years real wages had increased by around 24 per cent. The ILO’s Global wage report 2010 had described the system of collective bargaining as a model.

He observed that his Government had adopted measures to bring national legislation into line with all the comments of the Committee on Freedom of Association. It should be borne in mind that any legislative reform required not just the agreement of the social partners, but also needed to be discussed and approved by the National Parliament. First, in July 2010 the social partners had been invited to engage in a round of negotiations to examine the comments of the Committee on Freedom of Association. The employers, who had initiated the complaint, had stated that they were unable to attend because the process of collective bargaining was starting at the same time. Secondly, a tripartite commission had been set up towards the end of 2010 to study possible amendments to Act No. 18566. It had held its last meeting on 26 May 2011. Thirdly, an eight-point work agenda had then been agreed, and a sort of preliminary agreement had been reached on two of the points. Lastly, the tripartite commission had appeared before Parliament to give an account of its creation, agenda and works, with the request that once it had completed its work its findings should serve as an essential input for the possible reform of Act No. 18566. He added that the Committee on Freedom of Association, the Committee of Experts and the Director of the International Labour Standards Department had been duly informed of all those activities. Finally, he indicated that, during the week that the Conference Committee had been meeting, high-level tripartite discussions had been held in Geneva at the suggestion of the ILO, during which there had been intense negotiations during which a climate of dialogue had developed which was sufficient for the social partners to re-establish mutual trust, and a definitive agreement had almost been reached. The outcome would be useful to continue the negotiations at the national level. In the light of the foregoing, he requested the Committee to close its discussion of the case, or to reserve its position until such time as the measures that were being applied had time to bear fruit.

The Worker members indicated that the present case of Uruguay examined by the Committee was not being discussed at their initiative. They recalled that, according to the information provided by the Government to the Committee of Experts, it had initiated contacts and consultations with employers’ and workers’ organizations with a view to examining the recommendations made by the Committee on Freedom of Association in relation to the legislation. They added that the International Organisation of Employers, the Uruguayan Chamber of Industries and the National Chamber of Commerce and Services of Uruguay had presented a complaint in February 2009 to the Committee on Freedom of Association against the Government for failure to comply with its obligations under the Conventions on freedom of association and collective bargaining. However, they noted that, in its 356th Report (March 2010), the Committee on Freedom of Association welcomed the Government’s aim of promoting collective bargaining, the increased coverage of collective agreements and their number, while making certain comments on the provisions which could raise difficulties in relation to their conformity with the principles of collective bargaining, or which should be interpreted in the light of those principles. The Government had followed the conclusions of the Committee on Freedom of Association by recently re-establishing a tripartite commission to examine the Committee’s conclusions. They considered that social dialogue and collective bargaining were working in Uruguay and recalled that the Committee of Experts had only requested the Government to reply to certain questions in its next report due in 2012.

The Employer members said that the employers’ organizations had submitted the present case to the various ILO supervisory bodies in view of the inaction of the Government. It was of a matter of great importance, as it was closely linked to the freedom to engage in free and voluntary collective bargaining, in full compliance with the autonomous will of the parties and with Article 4 of the Convention. The Act on collective bargaining in Uruguay, adopted in 2009, did not respect that autonomy and interfered to a very large and unacceptable extent in the will of the parties to determine the subjects of bargaining, the structure of bargaining, legitimacy to engage in bargaining, the duration of collective agreements and the free exercise of entrepreneurial activities. Such unjustified interference prejudiced all the parties, and not only employers. The complaint had at first been made by the employers’ organization with a view to prevention, in relation to the draft legislation, and had then been maintained due to the omissions of the Government. The complaint had been presented jointly by the International Organisation of Employers, the National Chamber of Commerce and Services of Uruguay and the Uruguayan Chamber of Industries. The conclusions of the Committee on Freedom of Association had been endorsed by the Committee of Experts and related to the following aspects: the process of reforming collective bargaining had been undertaken without full and frank consultations and was not the outcome of agreed solutions, or even a process of attempting to reach agreement. Although that might appear to be a matter covered by another Convention, it took on great importance in relation to the reform of collective bargaining in view of the requirement to promote voluntary negotiation, as set out in Article 4 of the Convention. Respect for collective autonomy needed to be demonstrated from the outset, in the reform of the system itself, but that had not occurred in the present case and consultation had been considered as a mere hurried procedure.

With regard to the content of the 2009 Act on collective bargaining, they indicated that, among other points, the new system broke with the principle of respect for what was agreed between the parties through negotiation, as it allowed a tripartite council (the Wages Council), in which decisions were adopted by simple majority, to focus collective bargaining on specific sectors, at the request of one party, and it could therefore, even though in a subsidiary manner, determine wages and other conditions of work at the branch level. The problem arose, on the one hand, through the emergence in the negotiations of a third party, the Government, which should not enter into matters that were essentially covered by bipartite bargaining and which could influence not only wages, but also other conditions of work that were normally included in the content of collective bargaining. Moreover, the majority could be obtained by the addition of the votes of the representatives of the Government and of any other of the parties and, one of the parties to a collective agreement could see its content changed or agreed to without its consent. The genuine nature of an agreement was undermined when it was modified or determined unilaterally by one of the parties with the support of a third that was not a party to the agreement. In these conditions, negotiations were no longer bipartite, free and voluntary. Moreover, the Higher Tripartite Council had been created, with the tripartite composition indicated above, which could consider the determination of matters relating to levels of tripartite and bipartite bargaining. That meant that the structure of collective bargaining was no longer a matter for the parties, as in practice it could be predetermined by the Government with the support of any other party. Accordingly, not only was the presence of an unrelated third party imposed, but the structure, and to a large extent the content of collective bargaining at the branch or sectoral level could be determined or modified without the agreement of one of the parties. The Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts had reminded the Government that the level of collective bargaining should be determined by the parties and should not be the subject of a vote in a tripartite body in which, moreover, the tripartite representation was not balanced. The Government would accordingly become an almost compulsory arbitrator. That had been the underlying element in the conclusions of the bodies which had examined the case and which recommended that the composition should include an equal number of members and that, in any case, a deadlock in the vote should be decided, not by the presence of the Government, but by an independent third person, preferably nominated by employers and unions.

Another matter of particular concern was the imposition of external legitimization for the negotiation of collective agreements at the enterprise level. That was a particularly serious matter in a country where there were a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises. At the enterprise level, workers should be free to choose their own representatives, and should have the possibility to have recourse to unorganized representatives in the absence of union representatives. What was not in accordance with the Convention was the fact that, in the absence of union representatives, the matter was legally required to be referred to the immediately higher trade union organization. They recalled that the Committee on Freedom of Association only admitted recourse to trade union representation at a higher level if such union representation already existed at the enterprise level. Another especially prejudicial aspect of Uruguayan legislation was the legal imposition of the automatic extension of the duration of collective agreements once they had expired, which was known as ultractividad. Such a crucial decision could affect the competitiveness of the economy and should be the subject of agreement between the parties or, if that could not be reached, of a tripartite agreement, although the achievement of such tripartite agreement had not even been attempted. There were other important and significant points, such as the lack of guarantees to ensure compliance with the duty of confidentiality, and supervision of the registration and publication of collective agreements, which in reality concealed an interest in a higher level of supervision of compliance with minimum legal provisions. Finally, one of the issues of most concern, if not the most worrying, was a Decree, which established the right of workers in the enterprise to occupy the workplace, and also envisaged a procedure or mechanism for legitimate occupation. That innovative right constituted unacceptable and excessive interference in the capacity to engage in voluntary bargaining, and undermined and distorted any negotiation, as in practice it compelled enterprises to close when a dispute occurred, as had occurred in Uruguay recently.

The fact that the Employers’ group had called for the inclusion of the present case in the list was not the product of a caprice, but of well-founded concern. The manner in which the system of collective bargaining had developed, its future negative impact on social and economic development and its proper functioning should be a matter of concern for all the social partners, and not just for employers. The Government had not yet put forward any proposal for the amendment of the Act. The only point on which it had expressed its intention to come to an accommodation was in relation to not using the system of voting to determine conditions of work in the Wages Council, although that had not yet taken the form of firm proposals. They trusted that the Government would demonstrate the will which would allow the employers to believe that the comments of the supervisory bodies would be taken seriously.

The Worker member of Uruguay said that, although all those who had spoken had expressed surprise at the inclusion of Uruguay in the list, he himself was not surprised. It was an almost constant pattern that any country that managed to make progress in the field of labour rights and the protection of workers and to strengthen democracy would provoke a reaction from national employers’ organizations and the International Organisation of Employers. He emphasized that the same organizations that kept silent in other cases where there was true denial of labour rights and violation of human rights, were alarmed when the workers of a small country and a great people achieved a balance that had always eluded them. Until 2005, no Uruguayan Government had worried about addressing the demands of the working classes. Now, only six years later, the country had almost 40 labour laws, putting workers on a more equal footing with other sectors in the world of work. They included acts on collective bargaining for workers in the public and private sectors, freedom of association, restricting the working day in the agricultural sector to eight hours, and constitutional protection for subcontracted workers, a landmark act on domestic workers, including rights to collective bargaining; and approval of the Occupational Safety and Health Convention, 1981 (No. 155). He added that everything could be improved, including acts, decrees and standards. Uruguay had not yet reached the peak, nor become world champion of workers’ rights, so much so that workers in the public and private sectors were clamouring for the Government to give effect to the Act on bargaining in the public sector. Perhaps for that reason, the ILO Director-General had declared in 2010 that Uruguay was an example to follow in tripartism, dialogue and industrial relations. The workers had not come to defend a Government that had its own means of doing so, but to show the fruits of such struggles, cooperation and determination and to demonstrate that, when combined with a Government that was sensitive to the demands of the great majority, it was possible to achieve the objectives of social justice and to move forward towards a better distribution of wealth. The comments of the supervisory bodies had already been taken into account in Uruguay and a tripartite commission had been established with equal numbers of members, which had agreed its agenda by consensus and was working in the suggested directions in the above areas. Furthermore, a high-level mission would visit Uruguay on 28 August and could verify on the spot how labour relations were working and the outcome of collective bargaining. In the last round of bargaining, 80 per cent of agreements had been approved unanimously. A few hours previously, efforts had been made in Geneva to conclude a tripartite agreement which, although it had not been completed for lack of time, remained valid in terms of its content. He wondered why such efforts had not been made before. Lastly, he strongly challenged the inclusion of the “Uruguay case” in the session.

The Government member of Argentina, speaking on behalf of the Government members of the Committee which were Member States of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean countries (GRULAC), said that, having listened carefully to the statement by the Government of Uruguay on the measures taken to continue building a culture of social dialogue and collective bargaining, GRULAC welcomed the efforts of Uruguay and encouraged it to pursue its activities towards a successful tripartite solution, keeping in mind that a National Tripartite Commission had been set up to examine the application of Act No. 18566 on collective bargaining, and that it had already invited an ILO mission to visit the country at the end of August to work with the Commission and hold talks with the Government and the social partners. GRULAC also took note of the efforts of the Government during the 100th Session of the International Labour Conference to forge an agreement between the parties.

The Employer member of Colombia said that he had examined the case of Uruguay in his capacity as a member of the Committee on Freedom of Association, when the issues raised had been of concern to the Employers’ group because of the way in which the legislation was being adopted. Since March 2010, when the Committee on Freedom of Association had presented its conclusions, the Employers had seen little progress. It was at the Employers’ insistence that the Government had begun to act. He referred to the Consultation (Industrial and National Levels) Recommendation, 1960 (No. 113), and in particular Paragraph 5(a), and cited paragraph 1071 of the Digest of decisions and principles of the Freedom of Association Committee, according to which: “It is important that consultations take place in good faith, confidence and mutual respect, and that the parties have sufficient time to express their views and discuss them in full with a view to reaching a suitable compromise. The Government must also ensure that it attaches the necessary importance to agreements reached between workers’ and employers’ organizations.” He said that the principles laid down in the Recommendation and the principle that he had cited from the Digest had been undermined by the composition of the Tripartite Commission, which had unbalanced bipartite representation. In conclusion, he emphasized the importance of the high-level mission due to visit the country in August 2011.

The Worker member of France recalled that the Convention had a number of key objectives with a view to attaining free collective bargaining that determined workers’ conditions of employment at different levels, between workers’ organizations, on the one hand, and employers’ organizations, on the other, without interference by one organization in the affairs of another, and without the employers being able to make employment of a worker dependent on relinquishing union membership. The Convention thus protected the freedom of workers to join unions, and the independence and autonomy of both parties to the negotiations. The right to organize and the right to negotiate conditions of employment were clearly not being seriously challenged in Uruguay, although bilateralism was not being fully respected. That appeared to be the key issue in the complaint from the IOE and the employers in the country. However, the problem was that this did not seem to be the only reason. The competent public authorities could, especially by legislative means, extend the application of collective agreements to an entire branch or region or to the whole country; the provisions of such agreements were then binding on all the employers concerned and all the workers. Such provisions existed in many democratic countries and were in conformity with the Collective Agreements Recommendation, 1951 (No. 91), which was not a binding instrument. It should be added that the Convention did not go into the details of bargaining procedures or systems, which left much freedom of adaptation for national law and practice, in which there was considerable variety.

The comments of employers’ organizations concerned the powers – too extensive, in their view – of the tripartite wage council, which could summon employers’ and workers’ organizations to negotiations, especially on minimum wages, which was not – in itself – contrary to the relevant Convention ratified by Uruguay, namely the Minimum Wage Fixing Convention, 1970 (No. 131). Similarly, the legal minimum standards in terms of wages and conditions of employment could be the subject of tripartite negotiations within wage councils if the partners agreed, which was not in violation of Convention No. 98 or of Convention No. 131. The report of the Committee of Experts essentially quoted the conclusions of the Committee on Freedom of Association relating to two complaints from employers. However, it was difficult to understand exactly the complainants’ grievances other than with regard to the limitations on full bipartism, even though they might be opposed to wage councils dealing with conditions of work, which was an established fact also found in the conclusions of the Committee on Freedom of Association. First, the Committee of Experts asked the Government to amend the legislation to enable non-organized workers, in the absence of trade unions, to choose representatives to participate in bargaining on conditions of work in the enterprise; that was not a requirement of the Convention, but of Recommendation No. 91, a non-binding standard and the last resort when a union was unable to organize, but it should be noted that, in a context of employer pressure against the organization of employees, their autonomous bargaining capacity was drastically reduced, or even totally absent. It would be preferable for higher-level unions, such as branch unions, to have competence for bargaining at the enterprise or group level, which would offer real guarantees of independence vis-à-vis the employer and could help the workers to organize. It appeared that the complainants wished extended collective agreements to have a limited content, reduced to monitoring the application of legal minimum standards and the resolution of formal issues. That would amount to undermining the principle of the extension of agreements, the aim of which was to improve conditions of employment in the branch or country, which, in his opinion, was in line with the interests of employed persons and was a practice that existed in his country and had never been criticized as such by the Committee of Experts. Moreover, the employers disagreed with the fact that agreements that had expired remained in force until they had been replaced by new agreements. The principle of extending the validity of collective agreements therefore appeared to be just, in order to avoid the deterioration of conditions of employment if an agreement expired and the employer refused to negotiate a new one. The Committee of Experts had concluded by calling for the recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association to be discussed by a tripartite body. However, the question arose as to the ulterior political motives of the complainant employers’ organizations which, instead of apparently defending the Convention, appeared to want to reduce the protective power of agreements which extended on a branch or national basis or, when such agreements expired, might refuse to negotiate agreements that were more favourable to the workers. It was to be hoped that the Committee of Experts, on the basis of the reply expected in the Government’s next report due in 2012, would undertake an autonomous analysis of current law and practice in order to draw its own conclusions.

The Employer member of Mexico said that the comments of the Committee of Experts on the case had caused him serious concern. Interference by the Government, leading to the restriction of one of the most important rights of the parties involved in industrial relations, was unacceptable. In an atmosphere of interference, he recalled that the matter at hand was one of principle. He was not satisfied with the information provided by the Government that it had “already begun a round of negotiations”. That was not enough. The Act violated the Convention and should be amended. Collective bargaining was a search for balance between both parties. It was intolerable to ignore this principle, and particularly to ignore the opinions of the supervisory body. He found it extraordinary that the workers had not expressed themselves in a different way, perhaps because they had not realized that, by means of this unique and invasive intervention, their acquired rights could be undermined by the decision of a third party outside of theirs involved in industrial relations.

The Worker member of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, speaking also on behalf of the Trade Union Confederation of the Americas – International Trade Union Confederation and the World Federation of Trade Unions, recalled that Uruguay was a country that had lived through one of the most cruel dictatorships during which it was unthinkable to speak of freedom of association, and particularly of collective bargaining. The trade union organization at that time had been clandestine, but gave rise to the Inter-Trade Union Assembly – Workers’ National Convention (PIT-CNT), the current name of which was adopted during the dictatorship, and which had defended workers in a context of far-reaching anti-union repression. The composition of the Tripartite Advisory Council was currently in accordance with the Convention and was made up of two representatives of the three sectors represented, precisely to comply with the requirements of the Committee on Freedom of Association. She recalled that, at the recent ILO American Regional Meeting held in Chile in December 2010, Uruguay had been cited as an example of social dialogue and of major progress in the field of social justice. She therefore wondered how it was possible that the present case was now being examined by the present Committee. She reaffirmed that what was actually happening in Uruguay was that, since the arrival in power of progressist governments in 2005, workers’ rights had been improved substantially, even above the requirements of ILO Conventions. More specifically, it was the only country in the world in which domestic workers benefited from collective agreements, and a large number of labour laws had been approved, including on freedom of association, the eight-hour day and collective bargaining in the public and private sectors. Workers were regaining rights which had been trampled underfoot by the dictatorship and by right-wing governments, supported by certain employers, who were now demanding respect for the right to organize and collective bargaining. Democracy was one of the treasures of the people of Uruguay. Those who were now denouncing the situation in the Conference Committee were those who had been in violation of democracy and social dialogue, and who had left the tripartite body on two occasions. Their absence had been due to the will of the employers. The report of the Committee of Experts indicated that most of the points covered by the complaint had been remedied and it also noted with satisfaction the adoption of the Act on collective bargaining in the public sector. In certain countries in Latin America, social progress was being achieved despite the intentions of certain employer sectors, which availed themselves of international mechanisms with a view to holding back such progress. That perhaps explained why the present case was being discussed, instead of others that had been cited.

The Employer member of Uruguay said that collective bargaining was the cornerstone of collective labour relations, and expressed regret that the process of dialogue had not been effective when it came to adopting the Act in question. The recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts, along with the analysis of the Governing Body, should be respected. In consequence, no other option remained but to consider amending Act No. 18566, particularly within the tripartite forum created in response to the observations made by the Committee of Experts. The case should not be set aside until the Government had incorporated the recommendations of both the Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts.

An observer representing the International Organisation of Employers (IOE) said that the legal framework for the voluntary negotiation of collective agreements, and particularly the autonomy of the social partners, were fundamental to the principles of freedom of association embodied in Conventions Nos 87, 98 and 154, particularly when a country had ratified them, as was the case with Uruguay. When legislating on the system of collective bargaining, the concerns of all the social partners, including the employers, needed to be taken into account. The Act on collective bargaining, above all, needed to be the product of tripartite consensus, as it was the fundamental instrument that gave collective agreements their social legitimacy. She voiced the profound disquiet of the international employers’ community at the recent adoption of Act No. 18566, which consolidated the intervention of the State and undermined the principle of collective autonomy in labour relations. It was worrying that the Government should thus disregard the recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts regarding the lack of compliance of the Act with the Convention. The IOE trusted that the consultations that had now been entered into with the social partners to consider the recommendations of the ILO’s supervisory bodies would be conducted in good faith and with a determination to reach solutions that were acceptable to all the parties concerned and welcomed the information that a direct contacts mission was to visit Uruguay at the end of August. She concluded by calling on the Government to: apply the principles of freedom of association and collective bargaining without delay; to examine the provisions of Act No. 18566 in detail and in the light of the recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts so as to find solutions that were acceptable to all parties; draft a bill with the assistance of the Office that reflected those recommendations, and submit it to Parliament through a priority procedure; and analyze the issues raised by the Committee of Experts in its direct request on the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) with a view to achieving acceptable solutions for all the parties.

The Government representative expressed regret at the employers’ misunderstanding of the situation. He underlined that the social partners were always consulted and that the Act had not been imposed on any of the parties. The Employers had withdrawn from the negotiations, which had obliged the Government to play a role in the matter. Since then, a number of meetings had been held. In fact, Uruguay had ample tripartite space to generate dialogue. With regard to the requirement for Government endorsement in relation to wage councils, he said that the new section 5 of the Act on wage councils stipulated they could establish working conditions if they were agreed between employers and workers. This had been fully explained to the Committee on Freedom of Association, which regrettably had focused on the bill, rather than the Act that had been adopted. With regard to the Higher Tripartite Council, it was composed of nine Government representatives and six representatives from each social sector, in accordance with the system followed in the ILO. Concerning the automatic prolongation of collective agreements, he underlined that collective agreements remained in force for the period agreed by the parties. If no duration had been agreed, a decision could be taken to prolong the application of an agreement, as established in the legislation of many other member States. He denied that the Government had approved a decree allowing occupation of the workplace. The original draft had contained a provision to that effect, but it had been withdrawn after the previous President had made a commitment to the employers of Uruguay. In reality, the Decree provided for a procedure for bringing an end to the occupation of a workplace. In fact, as the Committee on Freedom of Association had acknowledged, occupation of a workplace was a form of workers’ action. The Decree provided a means of ending workplace occupation if it restricted the exercise of fundamental rights. He concluded by affirming that the issues examined did not affect life or fundamental rights in the country, and that they should be resolved at the national level.

The Worker members noted the information supplied by the Government, and in particular its wish to establish a system of industrial relations at the national and sectoral levels ensuring solidarity between enterprises and workers. Apart from the Government’s willingness to comply with the recommendations of the supervisory bodies, reference should be made to the forthcoming ILO mission and the organization of a tripartite meeting during the work of the Conference aimed at restoring trust between the social partners. The forthcoming ILO mission should closely analyse the Employer members’ remarks and the Government should re-examine them and keep the Committee of Experts informed.

The Employer members hoped that the reference made by the Government representative to the deficiencies in the Employers’ knowledge was not symptomatic of its approach to dialogue. They indicated that the matters under examination were those addressed by the Committee of Experts and the Committee on Freedom of Association. Although the Government referred to an agreement concerning the modification of the tripartite Council, up to now there had only been indications of the intention to modify it, but no concrete proposals, which meant that it was still governed by the Decree in that respect. With regard to the automatic prolongation of collective agreements, they recalled that the Committee on Freedom of Association had indicated that their automatic extension should be the subject of tripartite agreement. They acknowledged that the provisions envisaging the right to occupy the workplace had been withdrawn from the draft text. At the same time, while recognizing the good economic performance of the country, they maintained that the present issue was a legal matter and that it was a serious question for employers, as any additional imposition, without the agreement of the parties, constituted unacceptable interference. In practice, through subsidiarity, external bodies were being legitimized, the structure of collective bargaining was being modified, the duration of collective agreements was being changed and the right to occupy the workplace was being established, which made it necessary to close down enterprises. They regretted the lack of will to amend the law. They nevertheless urged the Government to engage in sincere and full consultations with a view to carrying through that modification, for which purpose a draft text would need to be drawn up with the assistance of the Office. In that respect, they welcomed the mission and hoped that all the points raised would be addressed.

The Government representative specified that there had never been any question of a direct contacts mission, but that what had been agreed to was a mission.

Conclusions

The Committee noted the statements of the Government representative and the discussion that followed. It also noted the conclusions and recommendations of Case No. 2699 examined by the Committee on Freedom of Association.

The Committee observed that the Committee of Experts, in the same way as the Committee on Freedom of Association, had commented on certain provisions of Act No. 18566 of 2009 on collective bargaining relating to, among others: (i) the exchange of information necessary to allow the normal conduct of collective bargaining; (ii) the composition and powers of the Higher Tripartite Council; (iii) the possibility for wages councils to establish conditions of work; (iv) the parties engaged in bipartite collective bargaining; and (v) the effects and duration of collective agreements.

The Committee noted the statements of the Government representative according to which, as from 2005, successive governments had promoted a policy of in-depth social dialogue. He had recalled that the model of industrial relations in Uruguay traditionally consisted of collective bargaining at the branch level, and not the enterprise level, but that nevertheless the Act which had been the subject of the complaint did not prevent bilateral collective bargaining. He emphasized that any reform of the legislation would have to have, not only the agreement of the social partners, but also the approval of the National Parliament, which was sovereign and independent of the executive authority. The Government representative had indicated that, at the end of 2010, a tripartite commission had been established to examine possible reforms of Act No. 18566 and that an agenda had been agreed for its work. An ILO mission, headed by the Director of the International Labour Standards Department, had been organized and would visit the country in August. Finally, he had indicated that in accordance with the recommendations of the ILO, a high-level tripartite body had been established during the present International Labour Conference and that intense negotiations were being undertaken which had resulted, in his opinion, in a climate of confidence that was sufficient to re-establish confidence between the social partners, to such an extent that a definitive agreement had almost been reached.

The Committee noted the widespread exercise of trade union rights in the country and the respect for human rights, as well as the Government’s indication of its will to comply with the provisions of the Convention. The Committee welcomed the fact that tripartite negotiation on the matters under examination had continued during the present Conference and that an ILO mission would visit Uruguay in relation to those issues at the end of the month of August 2011. The Committee trusted that the mission would be able to note tangible progress. The Committee trusted that, with the objective of bringing the legislation fully into conformity with the Convention, the necessary measures would be taken without delay to prepare a bill that reflected the comments of the supervisory bodies.

The Committee requested the Government to send a report to the Committee of Experts this year containing information on any progress in relation to the matters raised and hoped that it would be able to note progress in the very near future.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2022, published 111st ILC session (2023)

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Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2019, published 109th ILC session (2021)

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Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2010, published 100th ILC session (2011)

The Committee takes note of the Government’s detailed reply to the comments of 2008 by the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). It also notes the comments of 30 August 2010 by the International Organization of Employers (IOE), the Uruguayan Chamber of Industries (CIU) and the National Chamber of Commerce and Services of Uruguay (CNCS), objecting in particular to certain provisions of Act No. 18566 on collective bargaining.

The Committee notes the conclusions and recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association in Case No. 2699, in which the complainants alleged that the abovementioned Act was inconsistent with the Convention.

Article 4 of the Convention. In its previous comments the Committee noted that, according to the Government, the national legislation lacks a single comprehensive text regulating collective bargaining and, consequently, part of the doctrine holds that there are two models of collective bargaining in the country: the typical model and the model that has grown out of the convening of wages councils. The Committee pointed out in this connection that decisions fixing minimum wages may be taken by tripartite bodies, but emphasized that according to the principles of free and voluntary collective bargaining between parties, laid down in Article 4 of the Convention, other conditions of work should be set by workers’ and employers’ organizations without interference from public authorities.

The Committee notes that in its report the Government states that with the adoption of Act No. 18566 of September 2009, the limitation mentioned in its last report has been resolved and the promotion requirement set in the Convention has now been met.

The Committee notes in this connection that the Committee on Freedom of Association drew up the following conclusions regarding Act No. 18566 [see 356th Report, Case No. 2699, para. 1389]:

I.      with respect to the exchange of information necessary to allow the normal conduct of the process of collective bargaining and that in the case of confidential information, its communication carries the implicit obligation of secrecy, and breach thereof would give rise to civil liability of those who are in breach (article 4), the Committee considers that all the parties to the negotiation, whether or not they have legal personality, must be liable for any breaches of the right to secrecy of the information which they receive in the framework of collective bargaining. The Committee requests the Government to ensure that this principle is respected;

II.    as regards the composition of the Higher Tripartite Council (article 8), the Committee considers that an equal number of members could be taken into account for each of the three sectors, and also the appointment of an independent chairperson, preferably nominated by the workers’ and employers’ organizations jointly, who could break the deadlock in the event of a vote. The Committee requests the Government to hold discussions with the social partners on the modification of the law so as to arrive at a negotiated solution to the number of members of the Council;

III.   with respect to the powers of the Higher Tripartite Council and in particular considering and pronouncing on questions related to the tripartite and bipartite bargaining levels (article 10, paragraph (d)), the Committee has emphasized on many occasions that “the determination of the bargaining level is essentially a matter to be left to the discretion of the parties”. [See Digest of the decisions and principles of the Freedom of Association Committee, fifth edition, 2006, para. 989.] The Committee requests the Government to take the necessary measures including the amendment of existing legislation to ensure that the bargaining level is established by the parties and is not subject to voting in a tripartite body;

IV.   as regards the possibility of wages councils establishing conditions of work for each case to be agreed by the employers’ and workers’ delegates in the respective wage group (article 12), the Committee recalls, firstly, that under ILO standards, the fixing of minimum wages may be subject to decisions by tripartite bodies. On the other hand, recalling that it is up to the legislative authority to determine the legal minimum standards for conditions of work and that Article 4 of Convention No. 98 seeks to promote bipartite bargaining to fix conditions of work, the Committee hopes that in application of those principles, any collective agreement on fixing of conditions of employment will be the result of an agreement between the parties, as the article in question appears to envisage;

The Committee notes in this connection the Government’s statement in its report that the competence of the wages councils is aligned with the provisions of section 83 of Act No. 16002 of 25 November 1988, covering conditions of work, but extends to the latter only where there is agreement between the social partners, which means that a tripartite body may not vote on matters pertaining to conditions of work, but does have a vote when it comes to determining minimum wages by category.

The conclusions of the committee continue as follows:

V.    with respect to the subject of bipartite collective bargaining and, in particular, that in company collective bargaining where there is no workers’ organization, bargaining authority should pass to the representative higher level organization (article 14, last sentence), the Committee observes that the complainant organizations consider that the absence of a trade union does not mean the absence of collective relations in the company. The Committee considers, on the one hand, that bargaining with the most representative higher trade union level organization should only take place if it had a number of members in the company in accordance with the national legislation of each country. The Committee recalls, on the other hand, that the Collective Agreements Recommendation, 1951 (No. 91), gives pre-eminence to workers’ organizations as one of the parties to collective bargaining, and refers to representatives of non-organized workers only in the case of absence of such organizations. In these circumstances, the Committee requests the Government to take the necessary measures to ensure that future legislation takes these principles fully into account;

VI.   as regards the effects of the collective agreement and, in particular, that the collective agreement by sector of activity concluded by the most representative organizations is of mandatory application to all employers and workers at the respective bargaining level once it has been registered and published by the Executive Power (article 16), the Committee, taking into account the concern expressed by the complainant organizations, requests the Government to ensure that the process of registration and publication of the collective agreement only involves checks on compliance with the legal minima and questions of form, such as, for example, the determination of the parties and the beneficiaries of the agreement with sufficient precision and the duration of the agreement;

VII.  as regards the duration of collective agreements and, in particular, the maintenance in force of all the clauses of the agreement which has expired until a new agreement replaces it, unless the parties have agreed otherwise (article 17, second paragraph), the Committee recalls that the duration of collective agreements is primarily a matter for the parties involved, but if government action is being considered any legislation should reflect tripartite agreement [see Digest, op.cit., para. 1047]. In these circumstances, taking into account that the complainant organizations have expressed disagreement with the whole idea of automatic continuing effect of collective agreements, the Committee invites the Government to discuss with the social partners on amendments to the legislation in order to find a solution acceptable to both parties.

The Committee notes the Government’s statement that contacts and consultations are being sought with workers’ and employers’ organizations with a view to examining the recommendations made by the Committee on Freedom of Association regarding the law and that a tripartite body is to meet shortly to deal with the recommendations in depth. The Committee expresses the firm hope that, in consultation with the social partners, the legislation will be brought fully into conformity with the Convention, and requests the Government to provide any information on this matter in its next report. The Committee underlines in this regard, the information provided by the Government regarding the beginning of the tripartite discussions.

Public sector. In its previous observation the Committee took note of the information supplied by the Government on the preparation of a bill on collective bargaining in the public sector and asked the Government to report on progress towards its enactment. The Committee notes with satisfaction that, according to the Government, Act No. 18508 on collective bargaining in the context of industrial relations in the public sector has been adopted and is in keeping with the Framework Agreement on collective bargaining in the public sector concluded on 22 July 2005 by the Executive and the Inter-Union Assembly of Workers – National Convention of Workers (PIT–CNT).

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2008, published 98th ILC session (2009)

The Committee notes the comments made by the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), dated 29 August 2008, which refer to anti-union dismissals and an act of violence against a leader of the Uruguayan Federation of Commercial and Industrial Employees (FUECI). The Committee requests the Government to send its observations on these matters with its next report.

Article 4 of the Convention. The Committee notes that the Government reports that: (1) the national legislation does not include a single and complete text regulating collective bargaining and, consequently, part of the doctrine maintains that in Uruguay there are two collective bargaining models: the typical model and the model set up as a result of the convening of wages councils; (2) the re-establishment of wages councils in 2005 has revitalized both unionization and collective bargaining; (3) wages councils are tripartite bodies which have the task of setting minimum wages by category and branch of activity, and, although their basic task is to set minimum wages and categories, both through the application of other sections of Act No. 10449 (which establishes an entire system of collective bargaining for wages councils) and through practice, their powers have been expanded in the sense that they act as conciliation bodies in collective disputes, negotiating other working conditions and regulating trade union leave, etc; (4) in 2005, three bodies were set up at the general level: the Higher Tripartite Council, the Higher Rural Council and the body for negotiation in the public sector and, as a consequence, 20 groups of wages councils have been set up covering nearly 200 negotiating areas; (5) the results were widely successful and, in more than 95 per cent of them, agreement was reached and, in the rest, matters were resolved by vote; a framework agreement was concluded in the public sector and several in the rural sector, and a third round of negotiations is planned for this year.

In this regard, while observing that the objective of wages councils in Uruguay has historically been to promote collective bargaining, the Committee observes that the possibility of a vote being held in the tripartite councils for setting conditions of employment infringes upon the principle of free and voluntary negotiation, which constitutes an essential aspect of the principles of freedom of association. The Committee recalls that setting minimum wages may be the subject of decisions by tripartite bodies. However, with regard to other conditions of work, the Committee emphasizes that, in accordance with the principles of free and voluntary collective bargaining between parties, established under Article 4 of the Convention, conditions of work should be set, without interference by the public authorities, by workers’ organizations and employers or their organizations. In these circumstances, the Committee requests the Government to take measures to promote collective bargaining as outlined above.

Finally, the Committee notes that the Government reports that the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, the Planning and Budget Office and the Inter-Trade Union Assembly–Workers' National Convention (PIT–CNT) prepared a draft law on collective bargaining for the public sector which is being considered by the National Parliament. The Committee requests the Government to provide information on any progress made with regard to the draft law in question.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2006, published 96th ILC session (2007)

The Committee takes note of the Government’s report.

1. Comments of the PIT-CNT. The Committee recalls that, reacting to comments by the PIT-CNT, it asked the Government in its last observation: (1) to provide information on the average time span between the initiation of an investigation of a complaint of anti-union discrimination and the imposition of sanctions or the closure of the case and to state the total number of such complaints lodged in the last two years, and (2) to provide information on the number of collective agreements by enterprise and by branch, including in the public sector and in the public administration, with an indication of the sectors and number of workers covered and, if possible, a full list of the collective agreements concluded in the country.

The Committee notes that, according to the Government: (1) measures have been taken (more employees have been appointed and trained, consultation and reception areas for complainants have been opened in the General Labour Inspectorate, and a database set up) to ensure that complaints of breach of trade union rights are dealt with as promptly as possible and that as a result of the measures, they are now processed within 4 months on average; (2) in 2005, 36 complaints were filed, 25 were resolved, penalties were applied in one case and 11 are pending. In 2006, at 6 June 15 complaints had been filed, seven resolved, no penalties had been applied and eight were pending; and (3) with regard to collective bargaining, the Wages Councils were convened. The sectors involved were industry, commerce and services, and the rural and public sectors.

2. Article 1 of the Convention. Protection from anti-union discrimination.  In its previous observation, the Committee took note of Decree No. 186/004 which provides, in section 6, that acts of anti-union discrimination are to be treated as very serious offences, for which substantial penalties are envisaged in sections 13 to 16, which may even, in the event of repeated offences, result in the temporary closure of the enterprise. It also noted that there is no specific procedure for cases of trade union repression, and complaints are therefore dealt with under Decree No. 500/91, which covers all types of administrative procedures. The Committee asked the Government to take steps to ensure that complaints of violations of trade union rights are examined as rapidly as possible. The Committee notes with interest the adoption of Act No. 17940, which provides for the invalidation of any act or omission, the aim of which is to make the worker’s employment contingent on his not joining or his resignation from a union, or to dismiss a worker or cause him any other form of injury because of his membership of a union or his participation in union activities. The Committee notes with particular interest that the abovementioned Act also provides for the worker to be reinstated, by means of a special procedure.

Article 4. Promotion of collective bargaining. In its previous observation, the Committee asks the Government to inform it of the number of collective or other agreements concluded in the public sector, indicating the institutions concerned. The Committee notes with interest that, according to the Government three bodies have been set up for negotiating at a general level: the Higher Tripartite Council, the Higher Rural Council and the Higher Council for the Public Sector. It notes that as a consequence, 20 groups of wage committees have been set up covering more than 180 negotiating areas and that in 95 per cent of them, agreement was reached. Furthermore, a framework agreement was concluded in the public sector.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2004, published 93rd ILC session (2005)

The Committee notes the Government’s report.

The Committee recalls that in its previous observation it noted the comments made by the PIT-CNT referring to the lack of rapid and effective machinery against acts of anti-union discrimination and the impossibility of carrying out collective bargaining in the major sectors, particularly in the services and commercial sectors. On that occasion, the Committee requested the Government to: (1) provide further particulars on the average time which elapses between the initiation of investigations of complaints of anti-union discrimination and the imposition of sanctions, or the closure of the case, with an indication of the total number of complaints of acts of anti-union discrimination lodged over the past two years; and (2) to provide information on the number of collective agreements concluded by enterprise and by economic branch, including the public sector and the public administration, with an indication of the sectors and number of workers covered and, if possible, with a full list of the collective agreements concluded in the country.

Article 1 of the Convention. With regard to matters relating to acts of anti-union discrimination, the Committee notes with interest Decree No. 186/004, which provides in section 6 that acts of anti-union discrimination are considered to be very grave offences, for which substantial penalties are envisaged in sections 13 to 16, which may even, in the event of repeated offences, result in the temporary closure of the enterprise. The Committee also notes the Government’s information that: (1) there is no specific procedure for cases of trade union repression, and complaints are consequently dealt with in accordance with Decree No. 500/91, which covers any type of administrative procedure (the Government adds that in view of the variety of forms of evidence which may be produced it is difficult to assess the average duration of procedures); and (2) ten complaints were dealt with by the General Labour Inspectorate in 2002, nine in 2003 and four during the first half of 2004 (according to the Government, the ten complaints lodged in 2002 have been resolved, five of the complaints submitted in 2003 are still being dealt with and four have been resolved and, of those lodged in 2004, three are still being dealt with and one has been resolved). In this regard, the Committee notes that administrative procedures may last more than 12 months. The Committee considers that cases of violations of trade union rights should be examined rapidly so that the necessary corrective measures can be really effective. In these conditions, the Committee requests the Government to take measures to ensure that complaints of violations of trade union rights are examined as rapidly as possible. The Committee requests the Government to provide information in its next report on any measure adopted in this connection.

Article 4. The Committee notes the Government’s indication that: (1) between 1 January 2003 and 21 July 2004, some 155 agreements were concluded covering various enterprises and branches of activity (for metalworkers and transport workers); and (2) there is no information available concerning the total number of workers covered by each of these agreements. In this respect, the Committee requests the Government to provide information in its next report on the number of collective agreements or other accords concluded in the public sector, with an indication of the institutions concerned.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2003, published 92nd ILC session (2004)

The Committee notes the comments made by the trade union congress PIT-CNT in May 2003 reiterating comments that it had made previously. The Committee also notes the conclusions and recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association in Case No. 2087 [see 328th Report, paras. 606-616] concerning in particular the delays in administrative procedures in cases of denunciations of anti-union discrimination.

The Committee notes that the PIT-CNT refers to the lack of rapid and effective machinery against acts of anti-union discrimination and the impossibility of carrying out collective bargaining in the major sectors, and particularly in the services and commercial sectors. Moreover, in its previous observation, the Committee requested further information on collective bargaining in the public sector.

As it did in its previous observation, the Committee requests the Government to provide further particulars on the average time which elapses between the initiation of investigations of complaints of anti-union discrimination and the imposition of sanctions, or the closure of the case. The Committee also requests the Government to indicate the total number of complaints of acts of anti-union discrimination lodged over the past two years.

The Committee also requests the Government to provide information on the number of collective agreements concluded by enterprise and by economic branch, including the public sector and the public administration, with an indication of the sectors and number of workers covered and, if possible, with a full list of the collective agreements concluded in the country.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2001, published 90th ILC session (2002)

The Committee notes the Government’s report. The Committee recalls that in its previous observation it noted the comments of the Workers’ National Congress of Uruguay (PIT-CNT) on the application of the Convention.

Articles 1 and 3 of the Convention. The PIT-CNT indicates that dismissals for trade union reasons are common in Uruguay and emphasizes the lack of effective procedures for the reinstatement of trade union leaders and workers dismissed because of their trade union membership or activities, or for endeavouring to establish trade union organizations. The PIT-CNT also indicates that rapid and effective machinery has not been established to protect workers’ organizations and workers in the exercise of lawful trade union activities.

In this respect, the Government states that Uruguay has complied with the obligations deriving from the Convention and that reinstatement has not been applied as a sanction in the event of anti-union dismissals due to the absence of legal standards requiring such a measure. The Government adds that the prohibition of dismissal does not necessarily imply that the latter is null and void. Dismissal makes the employer liable to sanctions which, in the case of anti-union dismissals, are supplemented with a view to discouraging such dismissals and providing better protection to workers who are in a more delicate situation. The Government also indicates that practical factors prevent reinstatement, especially in the case of Uruguayan enterprises, which are generally small. The Government had indicated that in 1999 only one denunciation was received for anti-union acts, which was dismissed.

The Committee notes these statements and requests the Government to provide more particulars on the average time which elapses between the initiation of the investigation of denunciations of anti-union discrimination and the imposition of sanctions, or the closure of the case.

Article 4. The PIT-CNT states that collective bargaining is currently impossible in major sectors in Uruguay. Instead of real collective agreements, the practice has become generalized among some employers of requiring all the workers to sign giving their consent at the end of a document establishing conditions of work.

The PIT-CNT adds that, as from 1992, the tripartite councils established by the executive authorities to approve agreements negotiated by employers and workers to make them compulsory for the whole sector are no longer convened, rendering it impossible to conclude collective agreements at the sectoral level. Negotiation has only been possible since then at the enterprise level. Finally, the PIT-CNT states that in Uruguay public servants and teaching staff do not have the right to collective bargaining.

In this regard, the Government indicates that there are no legal restrictions of any type on collective bargaining. Concerning the failure to convene the tripartite councils, it recognizes that as from the establishment of democracy a system had been introduced for the negotiation of wages every four months, but that this was a transitional stage in the promotion of collective bargaining rendered necessary by the period of time for which it had not existed. Nevertheless, with the re-establishment of individual and collective freedoms, it was understood that this stage had been completed. In its view, this does not imply that the right to collective bargaining is restricted. Finally, with regard to collective bargaining in the public sector, the Government indicates that not only is it not prohibited, but that it exists in practice.

The Committee notes this information and requests the Government to provide information on the number of collective agreements concluded by enterprise and by sector, including the public sector, with an indication of the sectors and numbers of workers covered.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2000, published 89th ILC session (2001)

The Committee notes the Government’s report.

The Committee observes that the Inter-Trade Union Assembly - Workers’ National Convention (PIT - CNT) has sent comments on the application of the Convention, attached to the Government’s report and communicated separately. The Committee requests the Government to send its comments in this respect.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 1994, published 81st ILC session (1994)

The Committee notes with interest the information supplied by the Government in its report that the National Public Education Board (ANEP) and the authorities have agreed upon measures to raise the wages and other benefits of teaching and non-teaching staff.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 1991, published 78th ILC session (1991)

The Committee takes note of the Government's report and regrets that it does not contain a reply to the communication dispatched on 15 August 1989 by the Association of Secondary School Teachers (ADES) which reported that teachers were in a difficult situation regarding the level of their wages. According to that organisation, teachers' wages are determined by the State since there is no legal framework for collective bargaining.

For many years the Committee has been calling for the adoption of measures to encourage and promote procedures for the voluntary negotiation of collective agreements by employers and organisations of public servants not engaged in the administration of the State with a view to the regulation by such means of their terms and conditions of employment, so as to ensure the full application of Articles 4 and 6 of the Convention. The Committee notes with interest that according to indications in the Government's report, representatives of the Government and of the Inter-Union Workers' Assembly (PIT-CNT) have continued dialogue with a view to identifying machinery to enable public servants not engaged in the administration of the State to bargain their terms and conditions of work collectively.

The Committee notes that, according to the Government's report, there has been progress in this regard and that a collective agreement for the banking sector - which includes the state bank whose employees are public servants in state commercial bodies - has been drawn up.

The Committee hopes that progress will continue to be made and that, in the near future, organisations of public servants in autonomous undertakings and decentralised services (public companies), including teaching establishments and, generally, organisations of public servants not engaged in the administration of the State, will be able to rely on legislation granting them the right to collective bargaining.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 1990, published 77th ILC session (1990)

The Committee takes note of the communication from the Association of Secondary School Teachers (ADES) dispatched on 15 August 1989, reporting that teachers were in a difficult situation with regard to the level of their wages and that, as their remuneration is determined by the State, there is no legal framework for collective bargaining, which is contrary to Convention No. 98.

Since the Government has not yet replied to the comments of the ADES, the Committee feels that it would be more appropriate to deal with this question at its session next year when it will have examined the Government's observations.

In addition, the Committee recalls that, for a number of years, it has been drawing attention to the fact that public servants other than those engaged in the administration of the State are being deprived of their right to bargain collectively (Articles 4 and 6 of the Convention).

The Committee emphasises once again that public servants not engaged in the administration of the State should enjoy the right to negotiate their conditions of employment, including wages, collectively. However, the Committee notes that under the Constitution, Legislative Decree No. 10388 of 1943 setting the conditions of service of the public service and the Special Rules issued under section 40 of Legislative Decree No. 10388, the status of public servant applies not only to public servants in the strict sense of the term but also to employees of autonomous bodies and decentralised services, including teachers, employees in commercial and industrial establishments and bank employees, and that these employees are deprived of the right to collective bargaining.

In its previous observation, the Committee noted that a Bill to issue regulations under article 65 of the Constitution had been prepared, establishing representative committees in autonomous bodies, but that it did not deal with collective bargaining.

The Committee trusts that the Government will take the necessary measures to ensure recognition of the right of public servants who are not engaged in the administration of the State to negotiate their conditions of employment collectively, in accordance with Article 4 of the Convention and requests it to provide information in its next report on any progress made towards ensuring compliance with the Convention in this respect.