Individual Case (CAS) - Discussion: 1994, Publication: 81st ILC session (1994)

The Government supplied the following information:

The Annual Wage Supplement (AWS) payment is peculiar to Singapore. It began as a form of goodwill payment given by employers to their employees during the year and festival seasons. This was particularly so when companies were profitable. This payment later became a contentious industrial relations issue in collective bargaining. While the unions sought to raise the quantum of this payment, employers wanted it to be discontinued. As a compromise, employers and unions agreed that the payment of AWS should be limited to one month's salary and setting a legislative limit would help to solve the disputes on this issue. As there is no restriction in collective bargaining in respect of negotiation on wage increases, bonus payments and other forms of reward for workers, the legislative limit on the quantum of AWS to resolve an industrial relations problem peculiar to Singapore should not be viewed as an imposed restriction on collective bargaining. It should be seen as a "social contract" between the employers and trade unions, with the support of government to resolve a contentious issue in industrial relations for the benefit of all. To remove the legislative limit would seriously undermine this "social contract" and bring forth the contentious issue which has been painfully overcome through tripartite consultations and consensus. Hence, the Government hopes that the Committee of Experts could look at this legislative limit from the historical perspective and give due regard to the need to help balance the interests of both employers and unions/workers through legislation to solve this peculiar problem. As far as rewards for workers are concerned, either in the form of wage increases or bonus payments, there is no restriction in the system of collective bargaining.

In relation to section 25 of the Industrial Relations Act, we would also like to confirm that the Industrial Arbitration Court has, as in previous years, not refused to certify any of the collective agreements which contained terms and conditions of service more favourable than Part IV of the Employment Act.

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2022, published 111st ILC session (2023)

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2019, published 109th ILC session (2021)

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2010, published 100th ILC session (2011)

The Committee notes the comments made by the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) dated 24 August 2010, according to which: (1) while the right to collective bargaining is recognized, collective agreements have to be certified by the tripartite Industrial Arbitration Court which may refuse certification on the ground of public interest; (2) union members no longer have the power to accept or reject collective agreements negotiated on their behalf; and (3) the practice suggests that certain laws are outdated and can potentially restrict trade union rights; ITUC, together with other trade unions, has therefore called for these provisions to be removed from the national legislation. The Committee requests the Government to provide its observations in this regard in its next report.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2004, published 93rd ILC session (2005)

The Committee notes the Government’s report.

In its previous comments, the Committee had referred to section 25 of the Industrial Relations Act (IRA) which provided that in certain new undertakings employers and trade unions must seek approval from the Minister for Manpower if annual leave and sick leave benefits stipulated in their collective agreement were to be more favourable than those stated in the Employment Act. The Committee had requested the Government to take appropriate steps to repeal section 25 of the IRA so as to ensure that the right to bargain collectively was fully recognized in newly established enterprises.

The Committee notes with satisfaction the Government’s statement that section 25 of the IRA has been repealed with effect from 1 January 2004.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2001, published 90th ILC session (2002)

The Committee notes the Government’s report.

In its previous comments, the Committee had referred to section 25 of the Industrial Relations Act (IRA) which governs collective agreements with terms more favourable than those provided in Part IV of the Employment Act. The Committee recalls that section 25 subjects employers and trade unions to seek approval from the Minister for Manpower if annual leave and sick leave benefits stipulated in their collective agreement are to be more favourable than that stated in Part IV of the Employment Act.

The Committee notes the Government’s statement that in practice, the Minister has not rejected any application to grant better leave benefits under this provision. However, the Government is currently undertaking a review of other provisions of the IRA and the removal of section 25 would be taken up together with amendments to other provisions of the IRA.

The Committee once again trusts that the Government will take appropriate steps to repeal section 25 of the IRA in the near future so as to ensure that the right to bargain collectively is fully recognized in newly established enterprises. It requests the Government to keep it informed of any measures taken in this regard.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 1999, published 88th ILC session (2000)

The Committee notes the Government's report.

1. In its previous comments, the Committee had referred to the prohibition in section 17(2) of the Industrial Relations Act (IRA) of negotiations relative to promotion, transfer, appointment, dismissal and assignment of duties. The Committee had considered that while issues such as promotion, appointment and assignment of duties could eventually be considered as a matter for the employer to decide on as part of his freedom to manage the enterprise, the other issues, namely transfer and dismissal that are currently excluded from negotiation by virtue of section 17(2) of the IRA, should not be excluded from the scope of collective bargaining.

The Committee notes the Government's statement that on the issue of transfer, section 17(2)(b) of the IRA allows management to transfer an employee within a company only where the transfer will not be detrimental to the terms of his employment. However, where the employee and his union consider the transfer to be detrimental, the transfer will still be an issue for collective bargaining. On the issue of termination and dismissal (section 17(2)(d) and 17(2)(e)), the Government states that in situations where the termination of service or dismissal involves possible victimization of union members or union officials, the union can lodge an appeal under section 35(1) of the Act with the view to referring the case to the Industrial Arbitration Court and to seek reinstatement on the basis that the employee concerned was dismissed in circumstances arising out of a contravention of section 82(1) of the Act. This provision seeks to protect employees who could be victimized by their employers due to their involvement as union members or leaders in pursuance of better terms and conditions of employment. If the employer concerned is found to have violated this provision, he may also be liable on conviction to a fine or to imprisonment. Moreover, under the terms of the IRA, any termination of service or dismissal without just cause entitles the employee to seek reinstatement through appeal procedures.

The Committee takes due note of this information.

2. With regard to section 25 of the IRA which governs collective agreements with terms more favourable than those provided in Part IV of the Employment Act, the Government indicates that essentially, section 25 of the IRA subjects employers and trade unions to seek approval from the Minister for Manpower if annual leave and sick leave benefits stipulated in their collective agreement are to be more favourable than that stated in Part IV of the Employment Act. In practice, the Minister in the last two decades has not rejected any application to grant better leave benefits. On annual leave, economic progress over the years has brought about the granting of annual leave far beyond the minimum standards provided under Part IV of the Employment Act. Similarly, on sick leave, the benefit granted by employers due to the favourable employment situation has also been greatly enhanced over the years. The norm is now either in line or higher than the standards stipulated in the Employment Act. Hence, section 25 of the IRA appears to have outlived its usefulness and the Government is considering its removal from the Act. The Committee trusts that the Government will take appropriate steps to repeal section 25 of the IRA in the near future so as to ensure that the right to bargain collectively is fully recognized in newly established enterprises. It requests the Government to inform it of any progress made in this regard in its next report.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 1997, published 86th ILC session (1998)

The Committee notes the information supplied by the Government in its report.

1. In its previous comments, the Committee had referred to the prohibition in section 17(2) of the Industrial Relations Act (IRA) of negotiations relative to promotion, transfer, appointment, dismissal and assignment of duties. The Government states that the exclusion of the above functions from collective bargaining is necessary to enable management to have greater flexibility in deploying and managing its manpower resources in order to achieve its corporate objectives in the most efficient manner. The Committee considers that while issues such as promotion, appointment and assignment of duties could eventually be considered as a matter for the employer to decide on as part of his freedom to manage the enterprise, the other issues, namely transfer and dismissal that are currently excluded from negotiation by virtue of section 17(2) of the IRA, should not be excluded from the scope of collective bargaining. The Committee therefore requests the Government to indicate, in its next report, the steps taken or envisaged to bring this provision into conformity with Article 4 of the Convention.

2. With regard to the discretion of the Industrial Arbitration Court to refuse to register collective agreements concluded in newly established enterprises (section 25 of the IRA), the Committee notes the Government's statement that the Industrial Arbitration Court has so far not refused to certify any of the collective agreements in the new enterprises with terms and conditions of service more favourable than those provided for in Part IV of the Employment Act. The Government states, moreover, that it will be reviewing this provision in consultation with the two other social partners. The Committee trusts that the Government will take appropriate steps to ensure that section 25(2) of the IRA is amended in line with the Convention's requirements so as to fully recognize the right to bargain collectively in newly established enterprises. It requests the Government to inform it of any developments in this respect in its next report.

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 1995, published 83rd ILC session (1996)

The Committee notes the Government's report.

The Committee recalls its previous comments concerning the limit on the amount of annual wage supplements (AWS) in new enterprises stipulated in section 48(3) of the Employment Act as amended in 1988.

In this regard, the Government reiterates that it has never been its intention to restrict the areas for wage bargaining. The amendment to the Employment Act to limit the payment of the AWS to a one-month's wage was the result of a social contract made between the unions and employers as part of the tripartite consensus to introduce a more flexible wage system which would benefit companies, workers and the economy.

The Committee would ask the Government to reassure it that the variable bonus provided for in section 48(3) does not hinder the workers' organizations from the possibility to bargain annually the basic wages.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 1995, published 82nd ILC session (1995)

The Committee notes the Government's report and the written information provided by the Government to the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards in June 1994.

The Committee recalls that its previous observations on inconsistencies between the national legislation and Article 4 of the Convention concerned the following points:

-- a quantum limit on the amount of annual wage supplements (AWS) in new enterprises (section 48(3) of the Employment Act as amended in 1988);

-- limitations on the scope of matters open to collective bargaining (section 17 of the Industrial Relations Act) (IRA); and

-- discretion of the Industrial Arbitration Court to refuse to register collective agreements concluded in newly established enterprises (section 25 of the Industrial Relations Act).

1. The Committee notes the information provided by the Government concerning the historical development of the annual wage supplement and the fact that, over time, this payment became a contentious industrial relations issue in collective bargaining, the unions endeavouring to increase the payment while the employers wanted it to be discontinued; the resulting limit to one month's salary being agreed to as a compromise position. The Government adds that the removal of this limit would seriously undermine the "social contract" between the employers and trade unions to resolve this issue for the benefit of all. While the duration of the limit on the amount of AWS in "new enterprises" is not clear, the Committee stresses once again the importance it attaches to the development of machinery and procedures to facilitate bargaining and recalls that voluntary negotiation implies the autonomy of each party to the negotiation, without government interference or restrictions. The Government is requested to take steps to encourage voluntary negotiations between employers and workers on all matters, including the question of AWS in new enterprises.

2. In its previous comments, the Committee requested the Government to take steps to repeal the prohibition in section 17(2) of the IRA of negotiations relative to promotion, transfer, appointment, dismissal and assignment of duties. As the Government has not provided any further information on this point in its report, the Committee requests it to indicate, in its next report, the steps taken or envisaged to bring this provision into conformity with Article 4 of the Convention.

3. As concerns section 25 of the IRA, the Committee notes with interest the indication in the Government's latest report that the Industrial Arbitration Court, as in previous years, has not refused to certify any of the collective agreements in new enterprises which contained terms and conditions of service more favourable than Part IV of the Employment Act. The Committee however draws the Government's attention to paragraph 251 of the 1994 General Survey on Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining which provides that legislation stipulating that collective agreements must be submitted for approval to the administrative authority or the labour tribunal before coming into force is compatible with Article 4 of the Convention, provided it merely stipulates that approval may be refused if the agreement has a procedural flaw or does not conform to the minimum standards laid down by the general labour legislation. The Committee requests the Government to indicate, in its next report, the steps taken or envisaged to bring the legislation into conformity with its practice by limiting the requirement for prior approval of collective agreements in new enterprises under section 25(2) of the IRA, as indicated above, so as to ensure the autonomy of the parties to freely conclude collective agreements.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 1995, published 83rd ILC session (1996)

The Committee notes the information supplied by the Government in its report.

The Committee recalls that its previous observations on inconsistencies between the national legislation and Article 4 of the Convention concerned the following points:

- limitations on the scope of matters open to collective bargaining (section 17 of the Industrial Relations Act) (IRA); and

- discretion of the Industrial Arbitration Court to refuse to register collective agreements concluded in newly established enterprises (section 25 of the Industrial Relations Act).

As concerns these two points, the Government indicates that it will continue to review the labour legislation, in consultation with the other two social partners, and take into consideration the Committee's previous comments thereon.

The Committee trusts that the Government will take appropriate steps to ensure that sections 17(2) and 25(2) of the IRA are amended so as to bring its legislation into conformity with Article 4. It requests the Government to keep it informed of any developments in this respect.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 1994, published 81st ILC session (1994)

The Committee notes that the Government's report has not been received. It must therefore repeat its previous observation which read as follows:

The Committee recalls that its previous observations on inconsistencies between the national legislation and Article 4 of the Convention concerned the following points: - a quantum limit on the amount of annual wage supplements (AWS) in new enterprises (section 48(3) of the Employment Act as amended in 1988); - limitations on the scope of matters open to collective bargaining (section 17 of the Industrial Relations Act); and - discretion of the Industrial Arbitration Court to refuse to register collective agreements concluded in newly established enterprises (section 25 of the Industrial Relations Act). 1. It notes the information supplied in the Government's report, in particular concerning the history behind the amendment, after tripartite consultations, of sections 48, 49 and 50 of the Employment Act already noted with interest in last year's observation. According to the Government, the wage system in place after these amendments consists of a basic monthly wage, an annual increment, a variable bonus component linked to company performance which can all be the subject of negotiation, and the AWS which, again by negotiation, can be retained, dropped or converted into other benefits. The quantum limit of one month's wages or less in newly created companies was decided on so as to encourage such companies, with the support of the unions, to pay more in the form of a variable bonus linked to company performance; the Government thus considers that the limits established in section 48 should not be regarded as a restriction on collective bargaining. The Committee takes due note of the Government's insistence that the AWS limit was the outcome of full tripartite consensus; nevertheless, it must recall the terms of Article 4 regarding the autonomy of the two parties involved in bargaining and the principles that where, for general economic reasons, the public authorities lay down standards or adopt measures to influence wage determination, these may at times assume the nature of veritable wage controls. The Committee has already drawn the Government's attention to the fact that, rather than imposing restrictions on collective bargaining - even if just on one element of the wage packet and only in newly created companies - it could take steps to persuade the bargaining parties to have regard voluntarily in their negotiations to economic and social policy considerations so that persuasion is used rather than constraint. 2. The Committee also notes the Government's contention that those areas listed in section 17 of the Industrial Relations Act are commonly regarded as management functions outside the scope of collective bargaining; as in past reports, it stresses that employers are nevertheless expected to, and do in practice, consult with the concerned unions if a decision taken in one of those areas would affect their employees. The Government adds that since the introduction of this provision in 1968 it has not hindered the conduct of industrial relations or the promotion of labour-management cooperation and points to the rapid economic growth for the benefit of workers, companies and the economy in Singapore over the years. The Committee has consistently stated that the legislative exclusion from bargaining of certain matters relating to conditions of employment (such as here: promotion, transfer, appointment, dismissal and assignment of duties) is not compatible with Article 4. It accordingly again asks the Government to take steps to bring section 17 into line with its obligations arising under the Convention. 3. The Government states that it reviews the Industrial Relations Act periodically and that it has taken note of the Committee's comments on section 25. The Committee trusts that, in its next report, the Government will indicate the measures taken or contemplated to promote, in newly established enterprises, the development and utilization of voluntary collective bargaining free of the risk of concluded agreements remaining ineffective by reason of their non-registration by the Labour Arbitration Court using its powers under section 25. The Committee also asks the Government to indicate in its next report whether any agreement has been refused in the period covered by the report.

The Committee hopes that the Government will make every effort to take the necessary action in the very near future.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 1992, published 79th ILC session (1992)

The Committee recalls that its previous observations on inconsistencies between the national legislation and Article 4 of the Convention concerned the following points:

- a quantum limit on the amount of annual wage supplements (AWS) in new enterprises (section 48(3) of the Employment Act as amended in 1988);

- limitations on the scope of matters open to collective bargaining (section 17 of the Industrial Relations Act); and

- discretion of the Labour Arbitration Court to refuse to register collective agreements concluded in newly established enterprises (section 25 of the Industrial Relations Act).

1. It notes the information supplied in the Government's report, in particular concerning the history behind the amendment, after tripartite consultations, of sections 48, 49 and 50 of the Employment Act already noted with interest in last year's observation. According to the Government, the wage system in place after these amendments consists of a basic monthly wage, an annual increment, a variable bonus component linked to company performance which can all be the subject of negotiation, and the AWS which, again by negotiation, can be retained, dropped or converted into other benefits. The quantum limit of one month's wages or less in newly created companies was decided on so as to encourage such companies, with the support of the unions, to pay more in the form of a variable bonus linked to company performance; the Government thus considers that the limits established in section 48 should not be regarded as a restriction on collective bargaining. The Committee takes due note of the Government's insistence that the AWS limit was the outcome of full tripartite consensus; nevertheless, it must recall the terms of Article 4 regarding the autonomy of the two parties involved in bargaining and the principles that where, for general economic reasons, the public authorities lay down standards or adopt measures to influence wage determination, these may at times assume the nature of veritable wage controls (General Survey, 1983, para. 309). The Committee has already drawn the Government's attention to the fact that, rather than imposing restrictions on collective bargaining - even if just on one element of the wage packet and only in newly created companies - it could take steps to persuade the bargaining parties to have regard voluntarily in their negotiations to economic and social policy considerations so that persuasion is used rather than constraint.

2. The Committee also notes the Government's contention that those areas listed in section 17 of the Industrial Relations Act are commonly regarded as management functions outside the scope of collective bargaining; as in past reports, it stresses that employers are nevertheless expected to, and do in practice, consult with the concerned unions if a decision taken in one of those areas would affect their employees. The Government adds that since the introduction of this provision in 1968 it has not hindered the conduct of industrial relations or the promotion of labour-management cooperation and points to the rapid economic growth for the benefit of workers, companies and the economy in Singapore over the years. The Committee has consistently stated that the legislative exclusion from bargaining of certain matters relating to conditions of employment (such as here: promotion, transfer, appointment, dismissal and assignment of duties) is not compatible with Article 4 (General Survey, paras. 307 and 311). It accordingly again asks the Government to take steps to bring section 17 into line with its obligations arising under the Convention.

3. The Government states that it reviews the Industrial Relations Act periodically and that it has taken note of the Committee's comments on section 25. The Committee trusts that, in its next report, the Government will indicate the measures taken or contemplated to promote, in newly established enterprises, the development and utilisation of voluntary collective bargaining free of the risk of concluded agreements remaining ineffective by reason of their non-registration by the Labour Arbitration Court using its powers under section 25 (General Survey, paras. 308 and 311). The Committee also asks the Government to indicate in its next report whether any agreement has been refused in the period covered by the report.

The Committee draws the Government's attention to the fact that the ILO is at its disposal for any technical assistance that it may wish to request in relation to these three long-standing matters.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 1991, published 78th ILC session (1991)

The Committee notes that the Government's report has not been received. It must therefore repeat its previous observation which read as follows:

1. With reference to its earlier comments, the Committee notes with interest that the Employment (Amendment) Act of 1988 removes the prohibition on the negotiation of annual wage supplements, introduced by the Employment Act of 1968 and its amendments of 1972, 1975 and 1980, and provides that wage increases may be negotiated freely according to a system based on trading results, productivity or any other criteria agreed upon by the parties concerned (section 48(1) (2) of the 1988 Act). Under this new system, the Minister responsible may make recommendations for wage adjustments, to serve as a basis for negotiations (section 49 of the 1988 Act). However, the Committee notes that, where an employer has never paid any annual wage supplement, the parties to the negotiations may not negotiate an annual wage supplement exceeding the equivalent of one month's wages, under penalty of sanctions (section 48(3) of the 1988 Act). The Committee recalls in this connection that, rather than imposing restrictions on collective bargaining, the Government should take steps to persuade the parties to collective bargaining to have regard voluntarily in their negotiations to major economic and social policy considerations of general interest invoked by the Government, and that it should prefer persuasion to constraint. 2. The Committee further recalls that it addressed the following points in its earlier comments: - exclusion from collective bargaining of issues concerning promotion, transfer, appointment, dismissal without notice and the assignment of duties (section 17 of the Industrial Relations Act) even if, according to the Government, these matters have been the subject of consultation with the unions; - power of the Industrial Arbitration Court to refuse to register the collective agreement of newly-established enterprises, when the conditions of employment that they afford are more favourable than those set forth in Part IV of the Employment Act (section 25 of the Industrial Relations Act) even if, according to the Government, the Industrial Arbitration Court has never refused to register a collective agreement. In the absence of any new information on these points, the Committee again requests the Government to indicate in its next report the measures taken or contemplated to remove all restrictions in the area of collective bargaining contained in the legislation (section 17 of the Industrial Relations Act), since workers' organisations must be able to negotiate freely with employers and their organisations, and not merely be consulted on all aspects of conditions of employment. It also requests the Government to indicate the measures taken or contemplated to remove the restrictions on free collective bargaining laid down by section 25 of the Act and to promote, in newly-established enterprises, the development and utilisation of voluntary collective bargaining procedures with a view to regulating conditions of employment.

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The Committee hopes that the Government will make every effort to take the necessary action in the very near future.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 1989, published 76th ILC session (1989)

1. With reference to its earlier comments, the Committee notes with interest that the Employment (Amendment) Act of 1988 removes the prohibition on the negotiation of annual wage supplements, introduced by the Employment Act of 1968 and its amendments of 1972, 1975 and 1980, and provides that wage increases may be negotiated freely according to a system based on trading results, productivity or any other criteria agreed upon by the parties concerned (section 48(1) (2) of the 1988 Act). Under this new system, the Minister responsible may make recommendations for wage adjustments, to serve as a basis for negotiations (section 49 of the 1988 Act).

However, the Committee notes that, where an employer has never paid any annual wage supplement, the parties to the negotiations may not negotiate an annual wage supplement exceeding the equivalent of one month's wages, under penalty of sanctions (section 48(3) of the 1988 Act).

The Committee recalls in this connection that, rather than imposing restrictions on collective bargaining, the Government should take steps to persuade the parties to collective bargaining to have regard voluntarily in their negotiations to major economic and social policy considerations of general interest invoked by the Government, and that it should prefer persuasion to constraint.

2. The Committee further recalls that it addressed the following points in its earlier comments:

- exclusion from collective bargaining of issues concerning promotion, transfer, appointment, dismissal without notice and the assignment of duties (section 17 of the Industrial Relations Act) even if, according to the Government, these matters have been the subject of consultation with the unions;

- power of the Industrial Arbitration Court to refuse to register the collective agreement of newly-established enterprises, when the conditions of employment that they afford are more favourable than those set forth in Part IV of the Employment Act (section 25 of the Industrial Relations Act) even if, according to the Government, the Industrial Arbitration Court has never refused to register a collective agreement.

In the absence of any new information on these points, the Committee again requests the Government to indicate in its next report the measures taken or contemplated to remove all restrictions in the area of collective bargaining contained in the legislation (section 17 of the Industrial Relations Act), since workers' organisations must be able to negotiate freely with employers and their organisations, and not merely be consulted on all aspects of conditions of employment. It also requests the Government to indicate the measures taken or contemplated to remove the restrictions on free collective bargaining laid down by section 25 of the Act and to promote, in newly-established enterprises, the development and utilisation of voluntary collective bargaining procedures with a view to regulating conditions of employment.