Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2023, published 112nd ILC session (2024)

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2018, published 108th ILC session (2019)

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2012, published 102nd ILC session (2013)

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2012, published 102nd ILC session (2013)

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2010, published 100th ILC session (2011)

With reference to its observation, the Committee would like to draw the Government’s attention to the following additional points.

Article 6 of the Convention. Status and conditions of service of labour inspectors. The Committee notes from the Government’s report that the Public Service Act 1999 sets out the conditions of service for all Australian Public Service (APS) employees, including engagement and termination provisions; and establishes the APS values which require APS employees to be apolitical, performing their functions in an impartial and professional manner. According to the Government, a change of government may not have any effect on the conditions of service or employment of APS employees, unless an administrative rearrangement occurs in line with the provisions of the Public Service Act 1999. The Government adds that the majority of fair work inspectors are employed under the Office of the Fair Work Ombudsman Enterprise Agreement 2010–11 (EA) with a very small number of inspectors covered by individual workplace agreements. The EA and other agreements do not assure stability of employment; however, they include clear provisions outlining conditions of service, redundancy entitlements, termination procedures, and dispute resolution. Finally, the Fair Work Ombudsman and the fair work inspectors are expected under the Fair Work Act (FWA) to perform their functions in an impartial manner and on the basis of procedural fairness. The inspectors are consistently reminded of their duties as public servants and as inspectors to uphold the Australian Public Service (APS) Code of Conduct.

The Committee recalls that, under the terms of Article 6 of the Convention, the inspection staff should be composed of public officials whose status and conditions of service are such that they are assured of stability of employment and are independent of changes of government and of improper external influences. The Committee notes that stability of employment is not assured to the Fair Work Ombudsman and inspectors by sections 687 and 700 of the FWA as well as section 29 of the Public Service Act 1999 and the EA and individual workplace agreements on the basis of which most inspectors are employed. The Committee requests the Government to take measures so that the Fair Work Ombudsman and the fair work inspectors are guaranteed stability of employment according to Article 6 and to provide information on progress made in this regard.

In relation to the states and territories, the Government indicates that inspection staff are assured stability of employment in Victoria and Tasmania. While in Queensland inspectors have tenure, certain mining inspectors and some petroleum and gas inspectors are employed on a contract basis under section 122 of the Public Service Act 208 due to limitations on public service pay scales and the need to offer competitive salary packages to attract suitable inspectors. The Committee would be grateful if the Government would provide further information on the numbers of such inspectors and their functions, indicating the grounds for non-renewal.

Article 12. Right of labour inspectors to enter freely workplaces liable to inspection. New South Wales. With reference to its previous request for information, the Committee takes due note of the clarifications provided by the Government to the effect that under sections 51–58 of the Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) Act 2000, WorkCover inspectors in New South Wales have the power to enter and inspect workplaces at any time of the day or night when work is carried out or is usually carried out at the premises. An inspector may also apply for a search warrant if the inspector has reasonable grounds for believing that the OHS Act or the regulations have been or, are about to be, contravened in or about any premises that is a place of work. The Committee recalls that, under Article 12(1)(b) of the Convention, labour inspectors provided with proper credentials should be empowered to enter by day any premises which they may have reasonable cause to believe to be liable to inspection. The Committee requests the Government to specify the conditions under which labour inspectors are empowered to enter premises which function as workplaces (e.g. whether a search warrant is required also for inspections by day and the procedure/conditions for obtaining one).

Articles 20 and 21. Annual labour inspection report.  With reference to its previous comments on the need to include additional information in the annual inspection reports of Western Australia, the Committee notes from the Government’s report that the annual report of the Department of Commerce now provides information that is consistent with the provisions of Article 21. However, it has not been possible to access the report in question on the Government website. The Committee recalls that under Article 20, the annual general report on the work of the inspection services should be published, i.e. that it remains accessible. The Committee requests the Government to ensure that the annual labour inspection report is accessible and, if that is not the case, to furnish a printed copy of the excerpts relative to the application of Article 21.

With reference to its previous comments on the need to include statistics in annual reports on the number of workplaces liable to inspection and the number of workers employed therein (Article 21(c)) as well as on cases of occupational disease (Article 21(g)), the Committee notes from the Government’s report that, as far as the Commonwealth is concerned, the FWO relies upon inter-institutional cooperation for the gathering of relevant data to assist in the design and implementation of targeted campaigns, since relevant data are available in a number of government services. The FWO’s claims management system also contains information on workplaces that had had complaints filed against them, have been audited or have called the FWO for information.

At the level of the state jurisdiction, the Committee notes that the statistics in question are not reflected in the annual report but could be available through other sources, including the Australian Bureau of Statistics. Victoria and South Australia indicate that further consideration will be given to the issue. Western Australia reports that the annual report now provides information consistent with the provisions of Article 21.

The Committee notes that as the vast majority of Australian workplaces now fall within the jurisdiction of the FWO, it is possible to comply with the requirement of the Convention to publish an annual report containing information on the items listed in Article 21. This would enable the labour inspection authority to make a comprehensive assessment of the magnitude of the task entrusted upon the FWO in terms of the number of enterprises and workers’ activities carried out, results achieved, and possible improvements, notably in relation to the human and material resources placed at the disposal of the labour inspection system.

The Committee therefore once again requests the Government to take measures to ensure the inclusion of full data in annual labour inspection reports, and to keep the ILO informed of any progress in this regard.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2010, published 100th ILC session (2011)

The Committee notes the comments made by the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) in a communication dated 31 August 2010 as well as the Government’s response thereto. It finally notes the observations by the ACTU dated 25 October 2010 and requests the Government to communicate any comment it deems relevant in this regard.

Articles 3(1), 16, 17 and 18 of the Convention. Impact of legislative developments on the functioning of the system of labour inspection. 1. In its previous comments, the Committee had noted that following the replacement of the Workplace Relations Act (WR Act) by the Fair Work Act 2009 (FW Act), the Workplace Ombudsman, i.e., the inspection body which had been previously criticized by the ACTU for using aggressive methods of investigation in order to determine whether trade unions and workers had been in breach of the workplace legislation, had ceased operations on 30 June 2009, all of its functions having been assumed by the Office of the Fair Work Ombudsman (FWO).

The Committee notes with interest from the Government’s report that the FWO is committed to encouraging and enforcing compliance with the provisions of the FW Act and other specified legislation through procedural fairness and that the FWO’s authority has expanded to include oversight of almost all workplaces in New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania as a consequence of the referral to the Commonwealth of the industrial relations power of these states on 1 January 2010. In this framework, contracts for services were signed with the New South Wales, Queensland and South Australian industrial relations agencies, as a result of which, 203 inspectors from these provinces have been appointed as fair work inspectors and will carry out investigations under the direction of the FWO. In addition, the FWO has appointed 12 inspectors from the Western Australian labour inspection agency to investigate federal matters that have some relevance to the Western Australian state system. Fair work inspector numbers have therefore increased by approximately 74 per cent.

The Committee also notes that the FWO implements a compliance model that combines complaints, investigations, targeted education and compliance campaigns (undertaken upon the basis of evidence of systemic non-compliance, or in the presence of a higher percentage of vulnerable workers within a given industry), and prosecutions deemed to be in the public interest. The Committee notes in particular with interest from the annual report of the FWO the increased use of civil litigation as a form of insistence on compliance and the significant penalties awarded by the courts which confirms according to the FWO that “the light-handed approach to industrial regulation is a thing of the past”. From 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010, the FWO had: finalized over 21,070 investigations; recovered AU$21,312,749 on behalf of employees; and had 66 proceedings commenced and enforceable undertakings received for breaches of the FW Act.

Furthermore, the Government indicates that extensive education efforts are continually being applied to allow employers and employees to understand their rights and obligations through a range of guides, tools and educational material, the Fair Work Infoline, the Transition Assist Service (aimed at unions and industry groups), the National Employer Branch (to assist large national enterprises) and media campaigns.

The Committee requests the Government to continue to provide information on the activities of the FWO, and to indicate in particular the matters in relation to which most violations were found, prosecutions initiated and penalties imposed.

Furthermore, the Committee notes from the Government’s report that the FWO has tried a new compliance technique, termed assisted voluntary resolution (AVR), which is typically applied in the first 30 days of a complaint, and involves fair work inspectors facilitating communication between complainants and the other party to reach mutually acceptable outcomes; the FWO will roll out this method more widely during 2010–11. The Committee would be grateful if the Government would provide detailed information on the scope of activities carried out by the FWO and the range of subjects addressed in the framework of the AVR and also indicate the percentage of labour inspection activities dedicated to AVR and their outcomes.

Article 5(b). Collaboration between officials of the labour inspectorate and employers and workers or their organizations. In its previous comments, the Committee noted that the FW Act maintained certain restrictions initially imposed by the WR Act on the wide powers traditionally conferred upon trade unions to ensure enforcement of awards and agreements and transferred most of this power to a public authority, namely, the FWO. The Committee notes that according to the latest comments by the ACTU, despite some improvements in relation to the former statutory regime (the WR Act), the FW Act has retained much of the WR Act architecture on the right of entry, i.e., a permit system, the prohibition of obtaining, through collective bargaining, entry rights that are superior to those in the statutory regime and the possibility for a party (e.g., employer) to apply for a “representation order” which may have the effect of preventing a trade union from representing certain classes of employees (including with regard to the access to workplaces to investigate suspected breaches of workplace laws). According to the ACTU, it is very important for the application of the new statutory provisions to be closely monitored so as to ensure that these provisions do not unduly limit trade union access to workplaces. The ACTU indicates certain improvements in relation to regular consultations taking place with the social partners on issues such as targeted education and compliance campaigns and best practice guides available on the FWO website.

According to the Government, collaboration and consultation with employer and employee organizations is an integral part of the FWO’s activities in respect of development and implementation of framework policies as well as in the conduct of complaints, investigations and targeted education and compliance campaigns. The Government refers to the example of the development of the FWO’s education and advice material such as best practice guides, and guidance notes, including the interpretation of transitional arrangements created by the national workplace tribunal, Fair Work Australia. However, the Government acknowledges that the coverage of the system of the FWO has considerably expanded so that inspections of all businesses within its jurisdiction is not possible.

In this respect, the Committee is of the view that the establishment of a mechanism of collaboration between the FWO, and the organizations of workers could help maximize the effectiveness of the labour inspection system, notably through information exchange, the submission of complaints etc. Moreover, tripartite bodies and cooperation agreements at various levels could play an important role to this end (see General Survey of 2006 on labour inspection, paragraphs 163–171).

The Committee would be grateful if the Government would furnish information in its next report on arrangements made or envisaged in order to promote collaboration between the Fair Work Ombudsman and employers’ and workers’ organizations. The Committee would also appreciate statistical data on the exercise by trade unions of the right of entry to workplaces for compliance purposes.

Article 3(1) and (2). Building and construction industry. The Committee recalls that in its previous comments it took note of the serious concerns expressed by the ACTU on the conduct of the Australian Building and Construction Commission (ABCC), established on the basis of the Building and Construction Industry Improvement (BCII) Act, 2005, mainly in relation to an unbalanced approach of the ABCC in favour of employers and wide-ranging coercive powers bestowed upon it by the BCII Act. In particular, the ACTU had criticized the fact that the ABCC can carry out interrogations in private and the interviewees are generally not allowed to disclose to anyone else what happened during the interrogation on penalty of six months’ imprisonment.

The Committee takes note of the comments by the ACTU dated 31 August 2010 according to which despite electoral commitments to abolish the ABCC and replace it by a specialist division of the general labour inspectorate, in June 2009 the Government introduced legislation to Parliament to amend the BCII Act by replacing the ABCC with a separate and autonomous statutory agency working in parallel with, but independently of, the FWO. The Bill proposes to retain the power of coercive interview for this specialist statutory agency, but in an amended form with some procedural safeguards. Although the Building and Construction Industry Improvement Amendment (Transition to Fair Work) Bill 2009 was introduced into the Parliament in June 2009, it has not passed through the Senate. Consequently, the BCII Act remains unamended and the ABCC continues to operate as it has done since September 2005. The ACTU believes that the retention of such a separate labour inspectorate runs counter to the principle of a single central system of labour inspection which is embodied in Article 1 of the Convention. It notes in this regard that Australia is moving rapidly towards a single national system of labour law as all but one state have referred their industrial powers to the Commonwealth Government. The ACTU also notes that the ABCC does not operate in such a way as to enforce the legal provisions that are designed to protect workers in their employment. Rather, workers themselves are the subject of ABCC investigation, interrogation and prosecution for alleged breaches of industrial relations law (which includes wages and hours of work) and the BCII Act while only 4.5 per cent of the ABCC’s investigations in 2008–09 were directed at employers. The ACTU provides detailed data to support this view:

–           the ABCC has adopted an “understanding” with the former Workplace Ombudsman (now the FWO) that the ABCC will not deal with allegations of non-payment of wages and entitlements in accordance with applicable awards and agreements, despite the fact that the construction industry has been recently ranked as the fourth highest for employer non-compliance with legally binding awards and agreements that set employee rates of pay and conditions of employment;

–           in its most recent annual report, the ABCC disclosed that 63 per cent of all its investigations were directed at trade unions and a further 8.5 per cent concerned the conduct of workers in 2008–09. In 2006–07, the corresponding figures were 73 and 11 per cent respectively. Unions or employees were the subject of on average 76.5 per cent or more than three-quarters of all ABCC investigations between 1 July 2006 and 30 June 2009;

–           the ABCC’s report on the exercise of compliance powers for the period 1 October 2005 to 31 March 2010, shows that out of 197 “examinations” conducted in the period, 135 were directed at employees and ten at union officials; only 50 examinees were management/employer representatives. One worker is presently on trial for allegedly refusing to attend a coercive interview facing a possible penalty of six months’ imprisonment. An earlier criminal prosecution against a union official had been withdrawn in November 2008;

–           as of 8 July 2010 there had been 37 ABCC prosecutions before the courts. Of these, 36 identified a trade union, trade union official or employee as respondents to the proceedings. Only one of the 37 matters has been taken by the ABCC against an employer. The number of ABCC prosecutions against unions and workers has dramatically increased in the last 18 months.

The ACTU therefore considers that the ABCC disregards the functions which should be the primary responsibility of any labour inspectorate under the Convention and exercises unwarranted powers which should not be bestowed on a body dealing with contraventions of the civil law and potentially minor breaches of industrial instruments. According to the ACTU, this situation also undermines a key element of the Convention, namely, the impartiality of inspectors in their relations with employers and workers. Finally, the ACTU observes that the ABCC remains extensively resourced, with a total workforce of 156 people, and a recent addition of AU$33,342,000 to its annual funding.

The Government replies that the Building and Construction Industry Improvement (Transition to Fair Work) Bill 2009 has been based on the recommendations of a former Federal Court Judge and Chief Justice of the Industrial Relations Court of Australia (Transition to Fair Work Australia for the building and construction industry, March 2009). The Bill gave effect to the Government’s commitment to abolish the ABCC and replace it with a new independent regulator, the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate (the Inspectorate) which was designed to ensure compliance with relevant workplace relations laws by actively pursuing the unlawful or inappropriate conduct of all building industry participants including, importantly, the underpayment of employee entitlements, such as wages.

However, the coercive interrogation powers currently given to the ABCC were retained since according to the abovementioned report: “there is still such a level of industrial unlawfulness in the building and construction industry, especially in Victoria and Western Australia, that it would be inadvisable not to empower the [Inspectorate] to undertake compulsory examination. The reality is that, without such a power, some types of contravention would be almost impossible to prove” (op. cit., paragraph 1.23). However, the Bill also included a number of safeguards to ensure that these coercive interrogation powers vis-à-vis workers and their organizations are used in a fair and balanced manner. The Bill passed the lower house on 13 August 2009 and was introduced into the Senate on 17 August 2009 but lapsed when, on 19 July 2010, Parliament was prorogued for General Election for the House of Representatives and half the Senate. The re‑elected Australian Government is committed to reintroducing this legislation as a matter of priority. A ministerial direction which had been issued on 17 June 2009 to circumvent the application of coercive powers and the conduct of compulsory interviews by the ABCC, was finally overturned in full by the Senate on 25 June 2009.

The Committee notes with concern that the enforcement of legal provisions on the protection of workers constitutes a very small percentage of the ABCC’s activities; this body has according to the ACTU declared that it will refrain from its primary functions under the Convention, i.e., investigating allegations of
non-payment of wages and entitlements, directing instead the main bulk of its activities at the investigation, examination and prosecution of workers and trade union officials, notably for industrial action. The Committee cannot emphasize enough that under Article 3 of the Convention, the prosecution of workers does not constitute part of the primary duties of inspectors and may not only seriously interfere with the effective discharge of their primary duties – which should be centred on the protection of workers under Article 3(1) – but also prejudice the authority and impartiality necessary in the relations between inspectors and employers and workers as provided for in Article 3(2). With regard to the “unlawfulness” which justifies according to the report on “Transition to Fair Work Australia for the building and construction industry” the exercise of such functions by the labour inspection system, the Committee notes that it essentially relates to industrial action (strikes) (op. cit., paragraph 1.17) and refers in this regard to its comments under the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87).

Noting with concern that the manner in which the ABCC carries out its activities seems to have led to the exclusion of workers in the building and construction industry from the protection that the labour inspection system ought to secure for these workers under the applicable laws, the Committee urges the Government to ensure that the priorities of the ABCC (or the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate) are effectively reoriented so that labour inspectors in the building and construction industry may focus on their main functions in full conformity with Article 3(1) and (2) of the Convention. The Committee would be grateful if the Government would provide detailed information in this regard.

Noting the steps taken so far to introduce safeguards in the way in which the ABCC exercises its activities the Committee requests the Government to indicate the progress made in reintroducing and promoting the adoption of the Building and Construction Industry Improvement (Transition to Fair Work) Bill as a matter of priority.

The Committee is raising other points in a request addressed directly to the Government.

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2009, published 99th ILC session (2010)

With reference to its observation, the Committee would like to draw the Government’s attention to the following points.

Article 6 of the Convention. Status and conditions of service of labour inspectors. The Committee notes that in accordance with section 687 of the Fair Work Act (FWA), the Fair Work Ombudsman is to be appointed by the Governor-General by written instrument after the Minister has been satisfied that the person has suitable qualifications or experience and is of good character. The Ombudsman holds office for a period specified in the instrument of appointment which must not exceed five years. The Ombudsman is eligible for reappointment. In accordance with section 700, fair work inspectors are appointed by the Fair Work Ombudsman for a period which may not exceed four years. They are also eligible for reappointment.

The Committee recalls that, under the terms of Article 6 of the Convention, the inspection staff shall be composed of public officials whose status and conditions of service are such that they are assured of stability of employment and are independent of changes of government and of improper external influences. The Committee notes that stability of employment is not assured by sections 687 and 700 of the FWA, since the appointments of the Ombudsman and the inspectors are limited to renewable terms of five and four years respectively. The Committee requests the Government to indicate the ways in which the Fair Work Ombudsman and the fair work inspectors are ensured stability of employment and independence from improper external influences as provided for in Article 6 of the Convention. For instance, the Committee would like to request information on the reasons for the non-renewal of appointments.

Article 12, paragraph 1(a). Right of labour inspectors to enter freely workplaces liable to inspection. Queensland. With reference to its previous request for information, the Committee notes from the Government’s report that workplace health and safety inspectors have the right to enter workplaces at any time.

New South Wales. With reference to its previous request for information, the Committee notes that under sections 51–58 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000, WorkCover inspectors in New South Wales have the power to enter and inspect workplaces generally at a reasonable time when work is usually carried out on the premises. However, under certain circumstances they can attend a workplace without notice and gain entry by “use of force” in emergency situations. Finally, they can apply for a search warrant if there are reasonable grounds for believing that a provision of the legislation has been or is being or is about to be contravened in or about any work premises.

The Committee recalls that, under the terms of Article 12(1)(a), labour inspectors with proper credentials shall be empowered to enter freely and without previous notice at any hour of the day or night any workplace liable to inspection. It also notes that the protection of workers and the technical requirements of inspection should be the primordial criteria for determining the appropriate timing of visits, for example to check for violations such as abusive night work conditions in a workplace officially operating during the daytime, or to carry out technical inspections requiring machinery or production processes to be stopped (see General Survey of 2006 on labour inspection, paragraph 270). The Committee requests the Government to indicate in its next report any measures taken or envisaged to enable labour inspectors to carry out inspections at any hour of the day or night, where this is warranted.

Articles 20 and 21. Annual labour inspection report. 1. With reference to the Committee’s previous comments on the need to include additional information in the annual inspection reports of Western Australia, the Committee notes from the Government’s report that consultations have taken place with the staff responsible for compiling the relevant annual reports and efforts are underway to include additional information in the 2007–08 annual report and to implement systems that will collect the remaining data required for future reports. The Department of Consumer and Employment Protection will endeavour to include additional information as set out in Article 21 of the Convention in future annual reports. The Committee requests the Government to indicate in its next report the progress made in this regard.

2. With reference to its previous comments on the need to include statistics in annual reports on the number of workplaces liable to inspection and the number of workers employed therein (Article 21(c)) and on cases of occupational disease (Article 21(g)), the Committee notes from the Government’s report that, as far as the Commonwealth is concerned, it will inform the Committee of any developments as they occur. The Committee also notes that most other jurisdictions have not commented on this question. With regard to the Northern Territory, the Committee notes that, according to the Government, the reports cover all the information required by Article 21, except for items (b) on the staff of the labour inspection service and (c) on statistics of workplaces liable to inspection and the number of workers employed therein. However, information on all of the above statistics is provided to the Office of the Australian Safety and Compensation Council, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations. The information provided by all the Australian jurisdictions is compiled in the Comparative Performance Monitoring (CPM) report of the Workplace Relations Ministers’ Council, which provides trend analysis on occupational health and safety and workers’ compensation schemes in Australia and New Zealand.

In its previous comments, the Committee took due note of the availability on the web sites indicated by the Government of abundant information and numerous legislative texts and activity reports by the bodies engaged in labour inspection activities. The Committee once again observes that statistics on the number of workplaces liable to inspection and the number of workers employed therein (Article 21(c)), as well as on cases of occupational disease (Article 21(g)), are not included in the annual reports available. It recalls the interest of having available all the data required by Article 21 for inclusion in the annual inspection report so that it reflects as faithfully as possible the effectiveness of the labour inspectorate throughout the country and enables the social partners in particular, as well as any interested party, to express their views and to make proposals for its progressive improvement. The Committee therefore once again requests the Government to indicate in its next report any measure taken or envisaged, and any progress made in this regard.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2009, published 99th ILC session (2010)

The Committee notes the Government’s report and the information provided in reply to its previous comments. It also notes the comments made by the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) in a communication dated 1 September 2008, as well as the Government’s response to these comments. The Committee finally notes the adoption of the Fair Work Act 2009 (No. 28, 2009) (FWA) which establishes Fair Work Australia, a new statutory body with a wide range of functions including an inspectorate – the Fair Work Ombudsman and its Office – which has responsibility for monitoring and enforcing compliance with industrial laws.

Impact of legislative development on the functioning of labour inspection. In a previous direct request the Committee had noted comments communicated by the ACTU with regard to a change in orientation of the labour inspectorate which, instead of focusing on its traditional task of recovering wages owed to workers, had begun to use aggressive methods of investigation in order to determine whether trade unions and workers were in breach of the legislation which applied prior to the adoption of the FWA (i.e. the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (WR Act)) and which had itself been found by the Committee to be contrary to other international labour standards.

The Committee takes note of the Government’s reply which was communicated prior to the adoption of the FWA. The Government provides information on the activities of the Workplace Ombudsman who preceded the recently established Fair Work Ombudsman. The Workplace Ombudsman had commenced on 1 July 2007 on the basis of Part 5A of the WR Act. According to the Government, it had established itself as a strong, effective and independent regulator having finalized over 45,000 investigations, having recovered in excess of 52 million Australian dollars (AUD) on behalf of employees, and having commenced 123 court proceedings for breaches of the WR Act. The courts imposed over AUD2 million in penalties against employers as a result of the Workplace Ombudsman’s work. Furthermore, the Workplace Ombudsman performed targeted compliance and education campaigns, as a result of which it audited more than 9,500 businesses and recovered more than AUD14 million on behalf of over 15,000 employees.

The Committee also notes that in the meantime, the WR Act was replaced by the FWA and the Workplace Ombudsman ceased operations on 30 June 2009, all of its functions having been assumed by the Office of the Fair Work Ombudsman. It also takes note of the statement of the Chairperson of the ACTU to the 98th Session of the International Labour Conference (Geneva, June 2009) according to which “[i]n July [2009], the Fair Work Act will begin operation, re-establishing a decent safety net for all working Australians, restoring unfair dismissal rights, placing collective bargaining at the centre of industrial relations, and restoring the powers of the independent umpire with Fair Work Australia”. (Provisional Record No. 9, page 44)

The Committee takes note of this information with interest. It requests the Government to provide in its next report information on the activities of the Fair Work Ombudsman, with statistical information in particular on the number of violations found and prosecutions initiated.

The Committee also notes that in its comments, the ACTU raised the issue of provisions in the WR Act which restricted the right to access of trade unions to workplaces, effectively preventing them from performing inspection functions. The ACTU indicated that under the Australian industrial relations system, trade unions had historically played a key role in overseeing the enforcement of awards and agreements. In recent years, however, the WR Act, as amended by the Work Choices Act, had severely restricted the capacity of union officials to enter the workplace to investigate a suspected breach of industrial obligations and to hold discussions with employees. The ACTU strongly regretted that the new Government had indicated its intention to retain the existing restrictions.

The Committee notes that the WR Act has now been replaced by the FWA, Part 3–4 and in particular sections 481–483E which enable union representatives to enter premises and investigate suspected contraventions of the FWA or a term of a fair work instrument (i.e., a “modern award”, “workplace determination” or order issued by Fair Work Australia, or an enterprise agreement (section 12)) that relates to or affects a member of their organization. However, the exercise of this right is subject to certain conditions concerning the right of entry aimed at maintaining a balance between the right of organizations to investigate suspected contraventions and the right of occupiers of premises and employers to go about their business without undue inconvenience (as stipulated in section 480 of the FWA). Moreover, trade union representatives are not entitled to exercise general inspection functions under the FWA. According to section 152(b) of the FWA, a “modern award” must not include terms that require or authorize an official of an organization to enter premises to inspect any work, process or object. Moreover, the conditions under which trade union representatives have right of entry to carry out inspections of suspected contraventions, cannot be modified by enterprise agreement, as provided in section 194 of the FWA.

The Committee observes that these provisions place certain restrictions on the wide powers traditionally conferred upon trade unions to ensure enforcement of awards and agreements. The power to enforce legal entitlements has now been transferred to a public authority, namely, the Fair Work Ombudsman while trade unions maintain the power to investigate suspected contraventions which relate to or affect one of their members.

The Committee recalls that, according to Article 4 of the Convention, so far as is compatible with the administrative practice of the Member, labour inspection shall be placed under the supervision and control of a central authority. At the same time, the Committee notes that according to Article 5(b), the competent authority shall make appropriate arrangements to promote collaboration between officials of the labour inspectorate and employers and workers or their organizations. The Committee notes that in its report, which antedated the adoption of the FWA, the Government referred to the measures taken to ensure that the Workplace Ombudsman (now replaced by the Fair Work Ombudsman) was as accessible as possible to the Australian community: the agency investigated all complaints and allegations of breaches of workplace relations law from any source, including employer and employee industrial associations, individuals, Commonwealth and state territory agencies, state and federal members of Parliament, and the media. Members of the public could access the Workplace Ombudsman and information regarding compliance rights and obligations through the post, the telephone, in person or online. In addition to this, key stakeholders including union and employer associations were contacted prior to the commencement of compliance and education campaigns and provided with the opportunity to both comment on and participate in the educational phase of the campaigns. Furthermore, the Workplace Ombudsman had a good general working relationship with peak union and employer associations such as the ACTU and the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI).

While taking due note of this information, the Committee emphasizes that possible arrangements for collaboration with the social partners normally go beyond the right to communicate complaints to the Ombudsman and can take various forms, ranging from tripartite bodies, to cooperation agreements at various levels (national, regional, sectoral and enterprise) (see General Survey of 2006 on labour inspection, paragraphs 163–71). The Committee also recalls that Recommendation No. 81 provides specific guidance on possible forms and methods of collaboration in the area of occupational safety and health. The Committee notes that it does not have recent information at its disposal to enable it to evaluate whether the collaboration with employers’ and workers’ organizations has been further developed after the creation of the Fair Work Ombudsman. The Committee requests the Government to provide further information in its next report on arrangements made or envisaged in order to promote collaboration between the Fair Work Ombudsman and employers’ and workers’ organizations.

Specific impact of new legislation on labour inspection in the building and construction sector. The Committee finally notes that in its comments dated 1 September 2008, the ACTU refers to the Australian Building and Construction Commission (ABCC), established on the basis of the Building and Construction Industry Improvement (BCII) Act, 2005. The ACTU raises serious concerns about the conduct of the ABCC, in particular, its unbalanced approach in favour of employers in relation to the selection of matters for prosecution, its refusal to prosecute employer breaches of industrial instruments and its failure to observe reasonable standards of prosecutorial fairness in the conduct of litigation against unions and workers. The ACTU emphasizes that according to the ABCC’s annual report for 2006–07, trade unions were the subject of 73 per cent of investigations and employees the subject of 11 per cent (a total of 84 per cent). At the same time, the total number of employers prosecuted by the ABCC since October 2005 for failure to pay minimum lawful entitlements was zero; the total number of employers referred to other statutory agencies for such breaches was four. This was the case although the Workplace Ombudsman had ranked the construction industry as having the fourth highest rate of non-compliance with minimum standards by employers. According to the ACTU, the ABCC had apparently adopted a policy position not to investigate or prosecute such matters.

The ACTU adds that the BCII Act contains provisions which give the ABCC wide-ranging coercive powers akin to an agency charged with investigating criminal matters and a harsh regime of financial penalties for acts which constitute regular trade union activity. Among other things, the BCII Act imposes the penalty of imprisonment for failing to appear and answer questions or provide documents to the ABCC. As of May 2008, the overwhelming majority of individuals who had been served with notices under section 52 of the BCII Act compelling them to attend and answer questions, were workers as opposed to management representatives. The total amount of financial penalties imposed from 1 October 2005 to May 2008 was AUD1.2 million, including AUD883,200 imposed on 107 individual employees in a single prosecution in Western Australia. Finally, on 2 June 2008, a trade union officer in Victoria was prosecuted and faced imprisonment simply for failing to attend and answer questions as required by a notice issued by the ABCC (section 52(6) BCII Act) without being the subject of any investigation.

According to the ACTU, since the election of the new Government in 2007, the BCII Act has continued to apply without amendment and the ABCC has continued to operate with the same powers, with undiminished resources and unaltered policy direction. Despite having the capacity to do so under section 11(1) of the BCII Act, the incoming minister has not issued any directions to the ABCC specifying the manner in which the ABCC should exercise or perform the powers or functions it has under the Act. The new Government announced that the ABCC would be retained until 31 January 2010, and after that date, responsibilities would transfer to a specialist division within Fair Work Australia. The ACTU objects to the creation of a specialist division on building and construction.

The Committee notes the Government’s reply to these comments, according to which the ABCC will be retained until 31 January 2010, after which time it will be replaced with a specialist building and construction division of the inspectorate of Fair Work Australia. The Government has engaged a former judge of the Australian Federal Court to consult and report on matters related to the creation of the specialist division and to report to the Government in 2009. A report will be provided to the Committee of Experts once the Government has had the opportunity to consider the recommendations of this inquiry.

The Committee recalls that under Article 3 of the Convention, the functions of the system of labour inspection shall be to secure the enforcement of legal provisions relating to conditions of work and the protection of workers while engaged in their work; any further duties which may be entrusted to labour inspectors shall not be such as to interfere with the effective discharge of their primary duties or to prejudice in any way the authority and impartiality which are necessary to inspectors in their relations with employers and workers. The Committee considers that the prosecution of workers does not constitute part of the primary duties of inspectors and may not only seriously interfere with the effective discharge of their primary duties – which should be centred on the protection of workers under Article 3 of the Convention – but also prejudice the authority and impartiality necessary in the relations between inspectors and employers and workers. This is even more so when the laws on the basis of which the workers are prosecuted have been repeatedly found by this Committee to be contrary to other international labour standards, notably Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), and Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).

The Committee hopes that the above issues will be fully resolved in the framework of the formal inquiry into the regulatory arrangements to replace the ABCC and the establishment of a specialist building and construction division in Fair Work Australia. The Committee requests the Government to communicate the results of this inquiry and to indicate in its next report the measures taken or envisaged to ensure that labour inspectors in the building and construction division of Fair Work Australia focus on enforcement of legal provisions relating to conditions of work and the protection of workers while engaged in their work and that any further duties which may be entrusted to them are not such as to interfere with the effective discharge of their primary duties or to prejudice in any way the authority and impartiality which are necessary to inspectors in their relations with employers and workers.

The Committee is raising other points in a request addressed directly to the Government.

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2007, published 97th ILC session (2008)

The Committee notes the Government’s report and the information provided in reply to its previous comments. It also notes the observations provided by the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) on the implementation of the Convention, received by the ILO on 2 September 2005.

The Committee notes with interest the provision of the information requested in relation to: Article 6 of the Convention concerning the status and conditions of service of labour inspectors in New South Wales; Articles 5, 13, 15 and 17 relating to Queensland; Article 16 relating to Tasmania; and Article 12, paragraph 1(a) and Article 17 relating to Western Australia.

Article 12, paragraph 1(a). Right of labour inspectors to enter freely workplaces liable to inspection.

Queensland. The Committee requests the Government to specify whether workplace health and safety inspectors are legally empowered to enter workplaces at any hour of the day or night and, if so, to provide a copy of any relevant texts. If not, it would be grateful if the Government would ensure that measures are taken rapidly to give effect to this provision.

New South Wales. In the absence of the information requested previously on this point, the Committee hopes that the Government will not fail to ensure that measures empowering labour inspectors to enter freely, and without previous notice, at any hour of the day or night any workplace liable to inspection are introduced in practice and that it will provide information on any development in this regard.

Articles 20 and 21. The Committee notes with interest the Government’s statement that it intends to take due account of the Committee’s comments on the need to ensure that the annual reports on labour inspection activities in Western Australia are completed in accordance with Article 21 of the Convention.

With regard to the Northern Territory, the Committee notes that all the information required by this provision of the Convention is communicated to the Office of the Australian Safety and Compensation Council, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, and that the information provided by all the Australian jurisdictions is compiled in the Comparative Performance Monitoring (CPM) report of the Workplace Relations Ministers’ Council, which provides trend analysis on occupational health and safety and workers’ compensation schemes in Australia and New Zealand.

The Committee also takes due note of the availability on the web sites indicated by the Government of abundant information and numerous legislative texts and activity reports by the bodies engaged in labour inspection activities. However, it notes that statistics on the number of workplaces liable to inspection and the number of workers employed therein (Article 21, paragraph (c)), as well as on cases of occupational disease, are not included in the annual reports available. It recalls the importance of having available all the data required by Article 21 for inclusion in the annual inspection report so that it reflects as faithfully as possible the effectiveness of the labour inspectorate throughout the country and enables the social partners in particular, as well as any interested party, to express their views and to make proposals for their progressive improvement. The Committee would be grateful if the Government would take every appropriate measure to this end and keep the ILO informed of the progress made in this regard.

Article 5(b). Collaboration between the inspection services and representative workers’ organizations. According to the ACTU, the measures taken by the federal Government with respect to labour inspection are not used for the protection of workers, but to intimidate them. Traditionally, the task of the federal labour inspectorate has essentially been to recover wages owed to workers as well as redundancy money, a task which the inspectorate carried out relatively passively and generally only in response to a specific request from a worker. Over the past 12 months the labour inspectorate has changed its focus and has started to play a more aggressive role in ensuring compliance with the provisions of the Workplace Relations Act 1996. The ACTU considers its methods of investigation to be aggressive and intended above all to determine whether trade unions and workers are in breach of the Act, to identify union delegates and members or to obtain the correspondence between the union and the employer for the purpose of determining whether employees have been paid during industrial action or have taken action that was not protected.

The ACTU considers that the intention of the inspectorate is above all to sue unions for breaching the provisions of the Workplace Relations Act or other texts, regardless of whether the employer wishes this to occur. The inspectorate does not take into account any settlement reached between the employer and the union, in contradiction with the Committee’s requests for explanations in 2005 concerning the right of employers and unions to reach agreements on strike pay.

According to the ACTU, the adoption of the Workplace Relations Act Amendment (Right of Entry) Bill 2004 will make it more difficult for unions to access the workplace and will therefore severely restrict the critical role that they have historically played in ensuring that the provisions of individual awards and agreements are applied properly. Furthermore, the Government recently announced new guidelines for the issuing of government contracts in the construction industry which specifically state that companies that enter into agreements with their workers which allow the union to oversee implementation of the agreement will not be eligible for any government contract. According to the ACTU, these legislative developments have restricted union access to workplaces. The same applies to the draft legislation prepared by the Government which will explicitly prohibit the entry of unions to discussions where all the employees concerned are parties to Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs), and prohibit union participation in the bargaining process (Workplace Relations Act Amendment (Right of Entry) Bill 2004). A recent decision of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission held that the union had no right of entry into a workplace where all staff had been employed on AWAs.

With regard to the Office of the Employment Advocate (OEA), the ACTU considers that it fails to protect workers and has approved individual agreements with terms below award standard wages and conditions. A recent court decision concerning the application of the “no disadvantage test” found it “troubling” that more than 50 AWAs had been approved on the same terms as one that paid a student 25 per cent less than her minimum award entitlement. Some of the agreements approved do not even contain wages clauses.

However, based on the information available on the official government web site of the Workplace Authority, the Committee notes that arrangements have recently been made to provide workers and employers with the necessary assistance for the conclusion of individual workplace agreements containing appropriate clauses that are at least equal to those contained in federal law.

The Committee notes furthermore that the OEA’s name has been changed to the “Workplace Authority”, which has the principal task of overseeing the content of workplace agreements. Through its offices located in every state capital except Canberra, it provides free advice and information to employers and workers relating to the conclusion of workplace agreements and on the Australian Fair Pay and Conditions Standard, to ensure that workplace agreements do not contain prohibited clauses. Specific assistance using appropriate means of communication is available for young people and non-English speakers, as well as for persons with hearing or speech impediments.

In response to the ACTU’s allegations concerning the existence of clauses that do not meet federal standards in some approved individual agreements, the Authority has made it clear that the individual agreement containing an unfair clause to which the union refers concerned a student who had left her job before her individual labour agreement had been lodged with the Authority. The Authority maintains that the prior “no disadvantage test” procedure applies to all AWAs and that, in two cases concerning students, the approval of the AWAs had been postponed until they met federal standards.

The Committee would be grateful if the Government would keep the ILO informed of any developments relating to the collaboration between the labour inspection services and employers’ and workers’ organizations in order to ensure compliance with the legislation relating to conditions of work and the protection of workers while engaged in their work. It would be grateful if the Government would also provide any comments that may be useful as well as any additional explanation in response to the points raised by the ACTU.

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2004, published 93rd ILC session (2005)

The Committee notes the Government’s report and the attached documentation on the implementation of the Convention at the Federal and state levels. It also notes that the report does not reply in full to the Committee’s previous requests concerning Article 21 and, as regards New South Wales, Article 6. Moreover, the Committee has not yet received information on the implementation of the Convention from the State of Victoria.

The Committee welcomes the Government’s indication that the system of data collection is being improved, particularly in the area of occupational diseases, as part of the National Occupational Health and Safety Strategy, 2002-12. It hopes that the Government will keep it informed of any developments in this regard and will provide information on the various subjects enumerated in Article 21 of the Convention.

Referring to paragraphs 272 to 276 of the General Survey of 1985 on labour inspection with regard to the objectives of an annual report on the work of the labour inspection services, the Committee asks the Government to take appropriate measures to ensure that the central authority complies with its obligation to communicate reports drawn up in the form and within the time limits prescribed by Article 20, and containing the information required under Article 21 of the Convention, and to supply more detailed information in accordance with Part IV of Recommendation No. 81.

Article 6 of the Convention. New South Wales. The Committee notes that the Government has not replied to the comments made in 2001 concerning inspectors employed on a contract basis, whose status, salaries and other conditions of service are determined by the Statutory and Other Officer Remuneration Tribunal. The Government is therefore once again asked to supply information on whether stability of employment is assured for these inspectors.

In addition, the Committee would also like to draw the Government’s attention to the following points.

Article 5. Queensland. The Committee notes with interest the information provided on labour inspection activities in accordance with the Industrial Relations Act and Article 5(a) of the Convention. It would be grateful if the Government would indicate whether any other private or public bodies are responsible for supervising the application of labour law in such areas as wages and employers’ registration obligations, and if it would provide a copy of any relevant legal provisions.

Article 6. Queensland. According to the Government of Queensland, within the Department of Natural Resources, Mines and Energy, certain mining inspectors are employed on a contractual basis. Referring to the above comment relating to the application of this provision in New South Wales, the Committee asks the Government to indicate the manner in which the stability of employment of such inspectors and their independence of changes of Government are ensured and to provide a copy of any relevant legal provision.

Article 12. 1. New South Wales. Under the terms of section 385 of the Industrial Relations Act, 1996, an inspector may inspect "at any reasonable time" any presumed premises of an employer and any work being done there. Emphasizing the need to provide a legal basis for the application of the principle of free access to any workplace liable to inspection without previous notice at any hour of the day or night, (paragraph 1(a)). If not, the Committee requests the Government to indicate the measures taken to give full effect to this provision of the Convention in law and practice.

2. Queensland. The Committee notes section 353(1) of the Industrial Relations Act, under which the inspector has to tell the occupier of the inspector’s intention to gain access to the workplace if it is practicable. In this regard, section 104(3), of the Workplace Health and Safety Act established that, if it is practicable to do so, tell the occupier of the inspector’s intention of gaining access to a workplace. Furthermore, under section 139 of the Electrical Safety Act, in urgent circumstances the inspector must make a reasonable attempt to tell the occupier the purpose of the entry.

The Committee emphasizes that the only distinction between formal workplaces and presumed workplaces made under Article 12, paragraph 1, concerning the right of free access consists of the period when inspection is authorized in relation to points (a) and (b). With regard to the principle of notification by inspectors to the employer or his/her representative of their presence on the occasion of an inspection, the Convention provides that inspectors should be allowed to refrain from such notification where they consider that it might be prejudicial to the performance of their duties (paragraph 2).

The Government is therefore asked to take the necessary measures to ensure that the law is in compliance with each of the provisions of Article 12 and to provide information on any progress achieved in this respect.

Moreover, the Committee would be grateful if the Government would provide explanations as regards the cases in which the occupier’s consent and the corresponding warrant, as referred to in the Workplace Health and Safety Act and the Electrical Safety Act, 2002, are compulsory for labour inspectors to be able to enter a workplace.

The Committee would also be grateful if the Government would provide information on the extent of the labour inspector’s right of entry, in accordance with the Workplace Health and Safety Act and the Industrial Relations Act, and in particular whether inspectors are authorized to enter workplaces liable to inspection at any hour of the day or night.

3.  Western Australia. The Committee asks the Government to indicate the extent to which labour inspectors can enter workplaces freely (Article 12, paragraph 1(a)) under the terms of the Industrial Relations Act and the Occupational Safety and Health Act and to provide information on the effect given to the relevant provisions in practice.

Noting that, pursuant to section 45(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the inspector shall take all reasonable steps to notify the employer of her or his presence on the occasion of an inspection visit, the Committee would be grateful if the Government would indicate the measures adopted in this respect and provide information on the application of Article 12, paragraph 2.

4. Northern Territory. The Committee notes that, under the terms of section 37 of the Work Health Act and 89L(1) of the Petroleum Act, work health officers or inspectors shall not conduct an investigation at the workplace until they have taken reasonable steps to notify the employer or the employer’s representative of their entry into the workplace.

Furthermore, under section 88(1) of the Petroleum Act, an inspector may, at all reasonable times, "enter and remain in an exploration permit or licence area, or inspect and test equipment. In this respect, the Committee recalls once again that, in accordance with Article 12(1)(a), labour inspectors shall be empowered to enter freely and without previous notice at any hour of the day or night any workplace liable to inspection. Moreover, under paragraph 2, inspectors should be authorized to decide whether they should refrain from notifying the employer or her or his representative of their presence where they consider that such notification may prejudice the effectiveness of the inspection. The Government is asked to provide information on any measure taken to give effect to these provisions of the Convention.

Articles 13 and 17. Queensland. Noting that, according to the Government, within the fields covered by the Department of Industrial Relations, the relevant national and state laws provide access to prompt legal proceedings in case of non-compliance. The Committee asks the Government to indicate the corresponding legislative provisions.

Article 15. Queensland. The Committee notes that, according to the Government, inspectors in the Department of Natural Resources, Mines and Energy, and the Department of Industrial Relations are covered by departmental codes of conduct which meet the requirements of this Article. The Committee asks the Government to indicate the legal status of these codes of conduct and to provide copies of them, and of any related legal provisions.

Article 16. Tasmania. The Committee notes with interest that, according to the Government of Tasmania, inspections relating to workers employed under terms and conditions set in awards by the Tasmanian Industrial Commission are performed on a reactive basis. Highlighting the importance of preventive inspections, the Committee would be grateful if the Government would indicate frequency with which preventive inspections are undertaken and the areas covered.

Article 17. Western Australia. The Committee notes the Government’s indication that cases of non-compliance are addressed by improvement notices, prohibitions notices, prosecutions and verbal instructions during inspections. The Committee would be grateful if the Government would provide details on whether it is left to the discretion of labour inspectors to give warning and advice instead of instituting or recommending proceedings, as provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article, and if it would provide a copy of the relevant provisions.

Article 21. 1. Western Australia. The Committee notes the Government’s indication concerning the information contained in the annual report of the Department of Consumer and Employment Protection, including the lack of data on the number of workers employed in workplaces liable to inspection. It encourages the Government to continue its efforts to compile and publish all the information required by this Article of the Convention.

2. Northern Territory. The Committee notes the Government’s indication that some of the statistics required under Article 21 are missing in the annual report and that measures are being taken to improve reporting in this respect. The Committee encourages the Government to continue its efforts to compile and publish the data required under this Article of the Convention and to provide information on any development in this regard.

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2001, published 90th ILC session (2002)

The Committee notes the Government’s detailed report. It requests the Government to provide further information on the points below.

Article 6. New South Wales. The Committee notes that the Government’s report does not respond to the point raised in its previous comments concerning the status, salaries and conditions of service of the inspectors determined by the Statutory and Other Officers Remuneration Tribunal as these inspectors are employed on a contract basis (such as, Senior Executive Service contract). The Committee hopes that the Government will supply precise information on whether the stability of employment is assured for them.

Article 21. The Committee notes that the annual inspection reports of the states and territories supplied by the Government provide detailed information on the activities of the competent authorities. Noting however, that most of the reports do not always contain full information on each of the subjects set out in Article 21 of the Convention, the Committee hopes that future annual inspection reports will include such information.

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2000, published 89th ILC session (2001)

The Committee notes the detailed Government’s report as well as the annual inspection reports. It requests the Government to provide further information on the points raised below:

Article 6 of the Convention.  (i) Federal Government.  The Committee notes the Government’s indication that inspectors appointed under subsection 84(2)(a) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 are officials employed under the Public Service Act 1922, and therefore they have public sector conditions of service, stability of employment and security of tenure. The Committee notes in this connection the provisions of subsection 84(2)(b) of the above Act, which refers to the inspectors appointed for such period as is specified in the instrument of appointment. Noting that the Government’s report contained no information on the status and conditions of service of the inspectors appointed under the provision of this subsection 84(2)(b), the Committee requests the Government to provide detailed information in this regard as well as to indicate whether these inspectors are assured of stability of employment.

(ii) New South Wales.  The Committee notes that some of the labour industrial inspectors are employed on a contract basis (such as, Senior Executive Service contract) and their status, salaries and conditions of service are determined by the Statutory and Other Officers Remuneration Tribunal. With regard to the status and conditions of service of these inspectors, the Committee hopes that the Government will supply detailed information and indicate whether the stability of employment is assured for them.

(iii) Queensland.  The Committee notes the Government’s indication that, as a part of the restructuring of the Mines Inspectorate in 1996, the inspectors have been employed under five‑year contracts which is in contrast to their previously tenured position. The Committee hopes that the Government will supply detailed information on the status and conditions of service of mine inspectors and indicate whether they are assured of stability of employment as prescribed by the Convention.

Articles 13(2) and 14.  The Committee notes the information in the Government’s report concerning the State of Western Australia that labour inspectors responsible for the inspection of defects which may constitute a threat to the health or safety of workers, are engaged by WorkSafe Western Australia. Noting that Government’s report contained no further information regarding powers of inspectors (Article 13(2)) and on notification of cases of occupational disease (Article 14), the Committee requests the Government to provide detailed information in this regard.

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 1992, published 79th ILC session (1992)

The Committee notes the detailed information provided by the Government. It hopes future reports will give information on the application of the Convention in all jurisdictions, including South Australia, Tasmania, Northern Territory and Australian Capital Territory.

Article 18 of the Convention. 1. Queensland. Please indicate any steps taken or envisaged to ensure that penalties for violations of legislation enforced by the labour inspectorate, notably the Inspection of Machinery Act, are adequate, as required by the Convention. 2. Western Australia. The Committee notes the concern expressed in the Joint Annual Report 1989-90 of the Commission and the Department of Occupational Health, Safety and Welfare that, although the maximum penalty for breach of the Occupational Health, Safety and Welfare Act is $50,000, the highest penalty imposed was $9,000. The Committee would be grateful to receive additional information in future reports on any measures taken or proposed in the light of the Convention's requirements.

Articles 2O and 21. 1. New South Wales. In future, the Committee would be grateful if the Government would transmit copies of the annual reports of the Workcover Authority. 2. Western Australia. In future, the Committee would be grateful if the Government would transmit copies of the reports of the inspection activities of the Department of Productivity and Labour Relations and the Department of Mines.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 1992, published 79th ILC session (1992)

Further to previous comments over several years, the Committee notes that the Government is investigating the measures to be adopted to enable New South Wales to comply with Article 15(a) of the Convention, by prohibiting labour inspectors from having any direct or indirect interest in the undertakings under their supervision. It hopes the necessary steps will be taken shortly.

Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 1990, published 77th ILC session (1990)

The Committee notes the information supplied by the Government in reply to its previous direct request concerning the application of Article 12, paragraph 1(c)(iv) of the Convention in Western Australia.

Article 15(a): New South Wales. The Committee notes that the matter raised in its earlier comments (prohibition of inspectors having any interest in the undertaking under supervision) is still under consideration by the Department of Industrial Relations and Employment. It hopes that information on measures adopted to bring the legislation into conformity with this provision will be supplied in the next report.