Observación (CEACR) - Adopción: 1992, Publicación: 79ª reunión CIT (1992)

The Committee recalls that its previous observations on inconsistencies between the national legislation and Article 4 of the Convention concerned the following points:

- a quantum limit on the amount of annual wage supplements (AWS) in new enterprises (section 48(3) of the Employment Act as amended in 1988);

- limitations on the scope of matters open to collective bargaining (section 17 of the Industrial Relations Act); and

- discretion of the Labour Arbitration Court to refuse to register collective agreements concluded in newly established enterprises (section 25 of the Industrial Relations Act).

1. It notes the information supplied in the Government's report, in particular concerning the history behind the amendment, after tripartite consultations, of sections 48, 49 and 50 of the Employment Act already noted with interest in last year's observation. According to the Government, the wage system in place after these amendments consists of a basic monthly wage, an annual increment, a variable bonus component linked to company performance which can all be the subject of negotiation, and the AWS which, again by negotiation, can be retained, dropped or converted into other benefits. The quantum limit of one month's wages or less in newly created companies was decided on so as to encourage such companies, with the support of the unions, to pay more in the form of a variable bonus linked to company performance; the Government thus considers that the limits established in section 48 should not be regarded as a restriction on collective bargaining. The Committee takes due note of the Government's insistence that the AWS limit was the outcome of full tripartite consensus; nevertheless, it must recall the terms of Article 4 regarding the autonomy of the two parties involved in bargaining and the principles that where, for general economic reasons, the public authorities lay down standards or adopt measures to influence wage determination, these may at times assume the nature of veritable wage controls (General Survey, 1983, para. 309). The Committee has already drawn the Government's attention to the fact that, rather than imposing restrictions on collective bargaining - even if just on one element of the wage packet and only in newly created companies - it could take steps to persuade the bargaining parties to have regard voluntarily in their negotiations to economic and social policy considerations so that persuasion is used rather than constraint.

2. The Committee also notes the Government's contention that those areas listed in section 17 of the Industrial Relations Act are commonly regarded as management functions outside the scope of collective bargaining; as in past reports, it stresses that employers are nevertheless expected to, and do in practice, consult with the concerned unions if a decision taken in one of those areas would affect their employees. The Government adds that since the introduction of this provision in 1968 it has not hindered the conduct of industrial relations or the promotion of labour-management cooperation and points to the rapid economic growth for the benefit of workers, companies and the economy in Singapore over the years. The Committee has consistently stated that the legislative exclusion from bargaining of certain matters relating to conditions of employment (such as here: promotion, transfer, appointment, dismissal and assignment of duties) is not compatible with Article 4 (General Survey, paras. 307 and 311). It accordingly again asks the Government to take steps to bring section 17 into line with its obligations arising under the Convention.

3. The Government states that it reviews the Industrial Relations Act periodically and that it has taken note of the Committee's comments on section 25. The Committee trusts that, in its next report, the Government will indicate the measures taken or contemplated to promote, in newly established enterprises, the development and utilisation of voluntary collective bargaining free of the risk of concluded agreements remaining ineffective by reason of their non-registration by the Labour Arbitration Court using its powers under section 25 (General Survey, paras. 308 and 311). The Committee also asks the Government to indicate in its next report whether any agreement has been refused in the period covered by the report.

The Committee draws the Government's attention to the fact that the ILO is at its disposal for any technical assistance that it may wish to request in relation to these three long-standing matters.