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Observación (CEACR) - Adopción: 2013, Publicación: 103ª reunión CIT (2014)

Convenio sobre el derecho de sindicación y de negociación colectiva, 1949 (núm. 98) - Armenia (Ratificación : 2003)

Otros comentarios sobre C098

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The Committee notes the comments made by the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) in a communication dated 30 August 2013, which refer to matters already examined by the Committee.
The Committee had previously noted that under the legislation in force (sections 23, 25, 45, 55 and 56 of the Labour Code and section 16(2) of the Act on Trade Unions), both trade unions and “workers’ representatives” enjoyed the right to negotiate collective agreements at the enterprise level and requested the Government to clarify whether in cases where there is no trade union representing 50 per cent of the company’s workers, the existing minority unions are entitled to bargain collectively on behalf of their own members. The Committee notes that in its report, the Government indicates that both the trade union and the representatives elected by the staff meeting can represent the rights and interests of workers. It further notes the Government’s indication that in the absence of a trade union, or if the existing trade union does not unite more than half of the company’s workers, the staff meeting elects representatives. If those representatives are not elected, the functions of defending the representation and interests of workers may be transferred by the staff meeting to the appropriate branch or regional trade union. In that case, the staff meeting elects a representative who takes part in collective bargaining within the delegation of the branch or regional trade union. The Committee once again recalls that where there exist in the same undertaking both trade union representatives and elected representatives, the existence of elected representatives should not be used to undermine the position of the trade unions concerned. The Committee also recalls that direct negotiation between the undertaking and its employees, bypassing representative organizations, where these exist, is detrimental to the principle that negotiation between employers and organizations of workers should be encouraged and promoted. The Committee therefore requests the Government to take the necessary measures to amend the above legislation in line with the principles above, so as to ensure that in cases where there is no trade union representing 50 per cent of the company’s workers, the existing minority unions are entitled to bargain collectively on behalf of their own members.
The Committee had previously noted that according to section 59(4) and section 61(2) of the Labour Code, if an enterprise is restructured or privatized, the collective agreement is considered to be unilaterally terminated, irrespective of its validity period. Recalling that neither the restructuring nor the privatization of an enterprise should in itself automatically result in the extinction of all the obligations resulting from the collective agreement, and that the parties should in any case be in a position to advocate the application of relevant clauses such as those concerning severance pay, the Committee had requested the Government to amend these provisions accordingly. The Committee notes the Government’s indication that those abovementioned provisions will be discussed within the framework of the expected future changes that will be made to the Labour Code. The Committee reiterates its request and asks the Government to provide information on the progress made in this respect.
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