Observation (CEACR) - adoptée 1989, publiée 76ème session CIT (1989)

The Committee notes the Government's report and the information that it supplied to the Conference Committee in 1987. It also notes the observations of the Bangladesh Employers' Association.

Voluntary bargaining in the private sector

Referring to its previous requests for information concerning the determination of wages and conditions of employment in the organised private sector, the Committee notes the information provided by the Government relating to the further development of bipartite collective bargaining in this sector. It also notes that in small establishments in the private sector, where workers are usually not organised, wages are fixed by a statutory Minimum Wage Board. It notes that employers, workers or the Government have the right to refer matters to this Board for determination. In this regard, the Committee points out that section 7(2) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, as amended, provides that no trade union may be registered under the Ordinance unless it has a minimum membership of 30 per cent of the total number of workers employed in the establishment or group of establishments in which it is formed. According to sections 22 and 22A of the Ordinance, only unions which are registered in accordance with section 7 may become collective bargaining agents. The Committee is of the view that taken together these provisions may impair the development of voluntary collective bargaining in small establishments because they appear to inhibit the establishment of "sectoral" or "industry" unions. Accordingly, the Committee requests the Government to provide any available information as to the development of free collective bargaining in this sector.

Voluntary bargaining in the public sector

As indicated in previous comments, the Committee has continuing concerns about the development of collective bargaining in the organised public sector.

Since 1973 wage rates in this sector have been determined by government-appointed Wages Commissions. To date, there have been three such Commissions: in 1973, 1977 and 1984. According to the Government, all three Commissions have taken account of the opinions of all interested parties, including workers, in arriving at their determinations. However, the 1984 Commission was the first to have a formal tripartite structure. The Government states that it adopted this structure in 1984 because, as the employer in this sector, it could be expected to become the dominant partner in negotiations, and that accordingly it felt that it was necessary to provide some means of redressing any resultant imbalance.

The Committee considers that an ad hoc Commission which is established only at the initiative of the Government is not an appropriate means for the promotion of collective bargaining between workers and employers within the meaning of Article 4 of the Convention. The Committee notes that in a communication dated 29 July 1986, the Bangladesh Employers' Association intimated that it agreed with this assessment.

The Committee points out that, under Article 4, it is for the Government to encourage and promote the full development and utilisation of machinery for the voluntary negotiation of collective agreements. The Committee therefore requests the Government to state how it intends to meet this obligation in respect of workers in the public sector industries, where they should be able to negotiate freely in their own right with the employer, even though the employer is the State.

In making this request the Committee wishes to draw the attention of the Government to paragraphs 298 to 319 of its 1983 General Survey, which deal with machinery and procedures to facilitate bargaining and with the autonomy of the parties. In particular, it wishes to emphasise that the establishment of conciliation and arbitration procedures, on an ad hoc or a permanent basis, is not necessarily incompatible with the requirements of Article 4. However, all such procedures must be designed to facilitate bargaining between the two sides of industry and leave them free to reach their own settlements. This in turn requires that it should be for the parties to decide whether or not they wish to refer any matters in dispute to binding arbitration.

Protection against interference

The Committee has, on a number of occasions, observed that there is no adequate legislative protection against interference in the establishment, functioning or administration of workers' and employers' organisations as required by Article 2 of the Convention.

The Government has stated that it is willing, where necessary, to protect workers' organisations against any act of interference. Both the Government and the Bangladesh Employers' Association also draw attention to sections 15 and 16 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and point out that they do provide legislative protection with respect to interference in trade union activities.

The Committee notes that sections 15 and 16 of the Ordinance, taken together with section 53, do appear to provide an appropriate form of legislative protection against anti-union discrimination as envisaged by Article 1 of the Convention. However, the Committee is not satisfied that these provisions constitute an adequate response to the requirements of Article 2. Accordingly, it again requests the Government to review its legislation with a view to the adoption of an appropriate measure of protection against "interference" for purposes of Article 2. Such provision should seek to ensure that no employer or employer organisation may support any organisation of workers by financial or other means with a view to placing that organisation of workers under the control of the employer or employer organisation.