Observation (CEACR) - adoptée 2006, publiée 96ème session CIT (2007)

The Committee notes the information contained in the Government’s report, received in September 2005, and the statistics tables attached to its report on non-ratified labour instruments, received in May 2005.

1. Decentralization and determination of resources for decentralized structures. In its previous comments, the Committee repeatedly warned the Government that the decentralization of this function ran the risk of causing the deterioration of a situation characterized by a general and chronic inadequacy of resources, such as is brought to light in the information communicated.  In its 2002 observation, the Committee pointed out several of the numerous reasons why it is important to place labour inspection under the supervision and control of a central authority, one being that this enables available resources to be shared between different services on the basis of identical criteria throughout the country, so as to ensure the same level of protection for all the workers covered. The Committee also expressed the hope that the steps taken, with ILO support, to find donors would make it possible to begin the process of establishing a labour inspection system consistent with the provisions of the Convention.

In its report for the period ending 1 September 2003, and without mentioning any developments in this regard, the Government indicated the adoption, by means of the Act of 30 December 2001, of a new Labour Code and emphasized its innovative aspects. The Government also declared that proper note had been taken of the Committee’s observation and that it would undertake to do its utmost to remedy the situation.

In 2003, the Committee requested information on measures taken with the support of international financing and ILO technical assistance to improve the human and material resources of the inspection services, in accordance with Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention, and on the maintenance of a central labour inspection authority, in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 1.

In its 2005 report, the Government confirmed the direct attachment of the labour inspectorate of Kigali to the office of the mayor of the town and the attachment of the labour inspectorate in each province to the office of the competent prefect, its justification for this choice being the requirements of decentralization policy and, in its opinion, the requirements of Article 4. Nevertheless, according to the report, the provincial structures continue to receive instructions of a technical nature from the Minister for Labour, who is responsible for the monitoring and assessment of labour inspection activities.

With regard to the fundamental issue of the human and financial resources of the labour inspectorate, the report indicates that these remain insufficient, but that this problem is common to all state services.

From the Committee’s point of view, the instructions of a technical nature issued by the Minister for Labour and addressed to the provincial labour inspection services strongly risk remaining a dead letter if the budget allocated to labour inspection depends on the decision of the prefect in each province. There is a risk that available resources differ substantially from one province to another, thus influencing not only the volume and quality of inspection activities, but also the ability of inspectors and local inspection offices to fulfil their obligations to report to the Minister, such as are envisaged in Article 19, so as to enable him to exercise his prerogatives in respect of monitoring for the purposes of general assessment. Detailed information on the budgetary aspect of labour inspection is indispensable to the Committee if it is to assess the impact of the decentralization of labour inspection in terms of the objectives of the Convention. In this respect, the Committee draws the Government’s attention to the explanation, in paragraph 140 of the 2006 General Survey, of the scope of the flexibility clauses in Article 4, i.e. that the designation of a central authority in each constituent unit of a federal State is only possible if these units have the budgetary resources intended for use in implementing the functions of the labour inspectorate within their respective jurisdictions. The decentralization of labour inspection to regional or local administrative authorities would therefore be inconsistent with the Convention if it were not an obligation for the authorities to institute a system to allow the labour inspectorate to function and to provide adequate budgetary resources. In order to allow the Committee to assess the development of the situation regarding the labour inspection system following its attachment to the provincial authorities, the Committee asks the Government to provide the following: (1) a copy of the text(s) by virtue of which the decentralization of this institution was decided and implemented; and (2) information on:

(a)   the budgetary origin of resources allocated to the provincial labour inspection services, the arrangements for determining these resources and the arrangements for their distribution in terms of inspection staff, equipment and means of transport between the various provincial structures and the town of Kigali;

(b)   the scope of the powers of provincial prefects in terms of the creation and suppression of inspection services;

(c)   the geographical distribution of inspection offices and staff throughout the country.

2. Conditions of service of inspection staff and obligations of inspectors. The Committee notes the Government’s indications in response to its previous comments, according to which labour inspectors are governed, like other state employees, by Act No. 22/2002 of 9 July 2002 issuing the general conditions of service for Rwandan public servants. The Committee would be grateful if the Government would indicate the manner in which it is ensured that public servants responsible for carrying out labour inspection activities in the sense of the Convention will continue to benefit, under the authority of provincial prefects, from conditions of service which guarantee them stability of employment and the independence required by their duties (Article 6).

The Government is also asked to communicate information on the arrangements and criteria for selecting and recruiting labour inspectors, on the arrangements for their appointment (Article 7), and on the manner in which employers and workers will be assured that inspectors are bound by the prohibitions and obligations relating to confidential information (Article 15).

The Committee is addressing a request directly to the Government on other matters.