Demande directe (CEACR) - adoptée 2011, publiée 101ème session CIT (2012)

Repetition

Part IV (Unemployment benefit) of the Convention. The Committee would like the Government to continue to indicate in its future reports any changes in the national legislation and practice related to the conditions governing entitlement to and suspension of unemployment benefit.

Part VI (Employment injury benefit). With reference to its previous conclusions, the Committee would like the Government to explain in its next report the main reasons and objectives of the recent reform of the workers’ compensation scheme, highlighting in particular the role of private companies in providing insurance coverage, their supervision by the public authorities and the participation of the representatives of the persons protected in the management of the branch.

Part XI (Standards to be complied with by periodical payments). The replacement rate of the sickness, maternity and unemployment benefits is calculated in the abovementioned Government’s reports on a yearly basis by comparing the total amount of benefit to the yearly reference wage of the skilled manual male employee in the iron and metal industry selected under Article 65 of the Convention or, in case of the employment injury benefit, of an ordinary adult male labourer in the same industry selected under Article 66 of the Convention. The Committee notes, however, that for compensation purposes, sickness, maternity and unemployment benefits are calculated on a daily basis taking into account the hourly pay for which the person would have been entitled had he been working during the period of absence, subject to a maximum of DKK88.30 per hour or DKK3,267 per week fixed for the year 2005. It appears from the report that basic old-age pension and anticipatory (invalidity) pension, which are universal flat-rate benefits covering all residents and not related to the previous earnings of the beneficiary, are fixed at the rate corresponding to the above maximum of daily cash benefit in the earnings-related schemes protecting employees. This maximum, which is fixed by the Government each year, corresponds to 50 per cent of the weekly wage of the standard beneficiary selected under Article 65 of the Convention (DKK6,519). Thus, while the daily cash benefit is 100 per cent of the daily pay in case of sickness and maternity, and 90 per cent in case of unemployment, the standard beneficiary will be entitled to the maximum benefit of only 50 per cent of his daily wage. The Committee observes that in the Danish system the maximum limit for earnings-related benefits is fixed so low that it has the effect of transforming them into flat-rate schemes. It would therefore like the Government to explain in detail in its next report, with reference to the corresponding provisions of Article 65, the methodology used for selecting the standard beneficiary as the skilled manual male employee from the iron and metal industry and for determining his reference wage. The Government is also invited to show that the maximum limit for the benefits in question complies with the requirements of Article 65(3) and to make the calculation of their replacement rate not on the yearly basis, which is not the appropriate time basis for measuring daily benefits, but on a weekly or monthly basis depending on the periodicity of the benefit payments. Finally, the Committee draws the Government’s attention to the fact that the replacement level of the employment injury benefit should be calculated under Article 65 and not 66 of the Convention, inasmuch as it is also subjected to a maximum limit.

Part XIII (Common provisions). Article 69. The report states that the employment injury benefits for loss of earning capacity and for permanent injury may be reduced or withheld where the beneficiary intentionally or by unlawful conduct or negligence has provoked or to a considerable extent contributed to the occurrence of industrial injury. The Committee would like the Government to explain, on the basis of the relevant judicial or administrative decisions, how the term “negligence” is defined and how assessment is being made of the extent to which such negligent behaviour might have contributed to the occurrence of industrial injury. In this connection it draws the Government’s attention to items (e) and (f) of Article 69 of the Convention, which authorize suspension of the benefit only where the contingency has been caused by a criminal offence or wilful misconduct of the person concerned.