Demande directe (CEACR) - adoptée 2017, publiée 107ème session CIT (2018)

Convention (n° 98) sur le droit d'organisation et de négociation collective, 1949 - Monténégro (Ratification: 2006)

Autre commentaire sur C098

Observation

Demande directe

2021
2017
2015
2010
2008

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Article 1 of the Convention. Adequate protection against anti-union discrimination. The Committee notes the information provided by the Government, in response to its previous request, that the Law on Strikes of 2015 provides in section 35 for fines on the employer (with the status of a legal entity) from €2,500 to €10,000, in cases of dismissal, suspension, disciplinary proceedings and other measures against employees due to the organization or participation in a strike in accordance with the law. A fine of between €500 and €1,000 shall be imposed on a competent person within a legal entity.

Article 4. Promotion of collective bargaining. Determination of trade union representativeness. Company level. The Committee previously noted that section 15 of the Law on the Representativeness of Trade Unions provides that the representativeness of the trade union at the level of the individual employer shall be determined by the “Director” at the proposal of the commission for the establishment of trade union representativeness. The commission is to be established by the “Director” and consists of two representatives of the employer, the representative trade union if it exists at the level of that employer and the interested trade union (the trade union that submitted the request for the determination).

The Committee notes the Government’s statement that, for the purposes of sections 15, 17 and 18 of the Law on the Representativeness of Trade Unions, the term “Director” refers to the head of a legal entity in which the representativeness of the trade union organization is to be established. The Government further indicates that the working methods of the commissions for the establishment of trade union representativeness are determined by the rules of procedure adopted by each commission and that the Government does not have a role in their adoption and implementation. The Committee considers that the determination of the most representative trade union should always be based on objective and pre established criteria so as to avoid any opportunity for partiality or abuse and that verification of the representative character of a union should be carried out by an independent and impartial body. The Committee requests the Government to take measures, in the context of the development of a new Law on Trade Union Representativeness, to ensure the establishment of an independent and impartial mechanism for determining the representativeness of trade unions at the company level. It also once again requests information on the board to which an appeal can be filed of the Director’s decision concerning trade union representativeness.

Branch level. The Committee previously noted that the condition for trade unions to be able to bargain collectively at the branch level is to affiliate a minimum of 15 per cent of the total number of workers employed in the relevant economic sector and it requested the Government to consider reducing the threshold, in consultation with the most representative employers’ and workers’ organizations. The Committee notes the Government’s statement that, during the drafting of the new Law on the Representativeness of Trade Unions, the Government proposed to decrease this percentage to 10 per cent, but that this proposal was not supported by the social partners.